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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Research on the welfare state is a fruitfully developed area in social sciences.
Scholars have discussed the evolution of protective legislation, social insurance
systems, poverty relief, and inequality. They have suggested several responses
as to which are the determinants of the growth in social protection, from eco-
nomic development and the social changes induced by industrialization (Wilen-
sky, 2002), to corporatist arrangements, democratization, and working-class mo-
bilization (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Lindert, 1994).
Relatively lower attention, however, has been paid to taxes, in spite of their es-
sential role in levying funds for the state functions, and themselves clearly hav-
ing distributive consequences. Tax revenue growth has been explained by factors
such as warfare effects on tax collection and attitudes towards social solidarity
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Scheve and Stasavage, 2012), or to the use of in-
creasingly efficient revenue techniques (first personal income taxation, then value
added taxes – Lindert, 2004 makes this argument in the opposite direction). These
tax innovations may be tightly connected to societal and economic developments
reducing collection costs, such as alphabetization (Aidt and Jensen, 2009a) or in-
formation technologies and business size (Kleven et al., 2015 underline the role
played by corporations in withholding for governments).
Taxes have also been related to the extension of political rights: they can be un-
derstood as a reflection of power struggles, where different groups in a society at-
tempt to shift the burden onto others (e.g. Mares and Queralt, 2015), or as part of a
contract by which taxpayers acquire certain leverage on the state – which would
make us expect a correspondence between both sides of the budget (Timmons,
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2005). The recently emerged “new fiscal sociology” attempts to bridge some of
the gaps between research on taxes and other developments in social, economic
and political history (see e.g. the works compiled in Martin et al., 2009).
In the following pages, I investigate the changes in taxation that accompanied the
transition to democracy in Spain. The idea behind this research is to infer from
the effective operation of the tax system some features of the political reform.
How did democracy affect the taxes that Spaniards paid? Did an increase in
political equality lead to a similar increase in economic equality? What were the
social demands about taxes? How were tax reform decisions taken? And how
compliant were citizens with the new system?
The thesis thus intends to contribute to four different strands of literature. It
first adds a case study to the empirical literature on tax incidence, where a coun-
try is followed over some years using an homogeneous methodology. Provid-
ing more observations is important for this literature, where comparison is still
quite limited precisely because of lack of adequate data – specially in historical
terms. Research has very often focused only on direct taxes from, and transfers
to households, thus leaving aside consumption taxation (Wang and Caminada,
2011; Whiteford, 2008); remarkable exceptions are Garfinkel et al. (2006), and
Prasad and Deng (2009).
Secondly, this work is inserted in the discussion about the development of the
welfare state and redistribution, and about the relation of tax structures to dif-
ferent social preconditions and outcomes, in the spirit of Steinmo (1989) or Aidt
and Jensen (2009b). The Spanish case in the second half of the 20th Century,
moreover, allows to explore the effects of a regime change on taxation, thus con-
tributing to the scholarly discussion about democratic transitions and their distri-
butional consequences (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003; Boylan, 1996;
O’Donnell et al., 1986).
Finally, this thesis also aims to contribute to the historiography of this period,
where tax history would ideally go hand in hand with that of political institu-
tions, labour conflicts, or international integration (Cotarelo, 1992; García Del-
gado, 1990; Molinero, 2006; Trullén, 1993; Tusell and Soto, 1996) .
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1.2 Theoretical framework
The academic debate on democratic transitions and the determinants of redistri-
bution is rich and diverse. The classic reference is Meltzer and Richard (1981)’s
model, that predicts an increase in redistribution following an extension of the
franchise, applying the theory of the median voter. These authors’ framework
was followed by the analyses of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994), who showed a negative correlation between inequality and growth,
interpreting it as a result of the negative effects of redistributive taxes on capital
accumulation. The link between inequality and redistribution underlying these
studies has been questioned by later work, which suggests more complex causal
connections (e.g. Perotti, 1996; Saint Paul and Verdier, 1996). My research aims at
contributing to this line of analysis, focusing specifically on revenues.
The aim of this thesis is to explore, further away from the basic cleavage dictatorship-
democracy, into the effective operation of institutions. Several models about
regime change and distributive conflict are available in the literature. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001; 2008) underline the possibility that the elite may de facto
block the implementation of aggressive redistributive policies, with the threat of
economic or even political reversal. Boix (2003) also considers high redistribu-
tion as a potentially destabilising factor for democracy: thus, democratic transi-
tions would be more likely under low levels of inequality, and higher capacity
of capital in the country to escape from taxation. Albertus and Menaldo (2014)
suggest that redistribution will only make significant progress after a transition
if the elite’s power was effectively challenged in the process, which is not al-
ways the case. In a survey of empirical works, Gradstein and Milanovic (2004)
find some evidence of increase in redistribution after democratization, although
not always with the corollary of reductions in inequality. Transitions might have
also triggered other changes pushing in the opposite direction (notably in the
ex-communist countries).
Most analyses of regime change take the redistributive preferences of citizens and
social groups as given. Following canonical economic models, agents are sup-
posed to favour these policies that provide them the highest (immediate) benefit
in terms of income. In this way, low income individuals would always vote for
redistribution and those with high incomes would always oppose it. While the
income ladder is indeed related to political cleavages, reality is clearly more com-
plex.
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In that sense, the literature on preferences for redistribution has provided with a
wide range of possible motives to demand redistributive policies.1 Self-interest
is the most obvious cause for the less well-off in society, and has been backed by
various empirical studies, among which Fong (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002)
or Isaksson and Lindskog (2007). With this force at work, inequality and democ-
ratization would be expected to increase demand for redistribution.
Several elements, nonetheless, push in the opposite direction, making even the
poor less prone to redistribution: social mobility (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Piketty, 1995), status considerations in the low-middle
class relative to the low end of the social strata (Grüner and Corneo, 2000), or the
awareness about efficiency costs of redistribution (as is the rationale in Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994, and Cremer et al., 1996). Opposi-
tion to progressive taxation can therefore be found not only among the well-off.
Fiscal resistances have been suggested to be more acute in the case of direct taxes,
and specially those on personal income, while indirect taxation, because of its
lower salience, would trigger less strong reactions (Wilensky, 1975). The high
strata of society are expected to defend their own self-interest and vote for less
redistribution, but also to use economic arguments of the kind put forward in the
“efficiency costs of redistribution” literature.
In this context, the poor can also not vote strongly for redistribution because of
lack of adequate knowledge of the actual levels of inequality or its consequences
(as suggested by Cruces et al., 2013), or because of mistrust in the government
and its ability to pursue their interests (as suggested in Kuziemko et al., 2013,
and Svallfors, 2013). They may also hold inconsistent attitudes, as has been put
forward by Bartels (2005) for the case of the US – but contested by Edlund (2003)
when dealing with Swedish data, and Singhal (2013) for the OECD in general.
Altruism and egalitarian values, on the other hand, could boost support for re-
distribution even in social groups that would not benefit from it directly. This
hypothesis has found empirical support in several studies, such as Fong (2001)
or Corneo and Grüner (2002). This tends to be related to the beliefs about the
causes of economic inequalities: societies or individuals who believe that cur-
rent income depends closely on effort tend to be less supportive of redistribution,
while the opposite is true when luck is thought to be an important determinant.
Such has been suggested by Alesina et al. (2001) as one of the reasons behind the
1An exhaustive review can be found in Harms and Zink (2003), although they fail to include
ideological considerations.
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differences between the US and Europe (see also Alesina and Angeletos, 2005;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Recently, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) posited that individual demand for
redistribution might be influenced by the economic context experienced during
youth, with individuals growing up in a crisis environment being more prone
to equalization policies. This might be related to perceptions of bad luck affect-
ing incomes, or to a demand of social insurance, as underlined by Moene and
Wallerstein (2001) and found for contemporary Spain by Backus and Esteller-
Moré (2014).
1.3 The Spanish transition to democracy
A wide literature has developed around the return of democracy to Spain in the
1970s. Together with international discussions on transition theory and the “third
wave” of democratization, scholars have discussed the role of economic develop-
ment, elites and opposition from below. My research is embedded in this discus-
sion, and aims at providing with a new piece for the puzzle, focusing in this case
on the distributive results of the transition.
At the time of Franco’s death in November 1975, the country was clearly head-
ing towards a multi-dimensional crisis. Opposition movements to the dictator-
ship had developed during the previous decades, increasing their strength spe-
cially since the 1960s (Molinero and Ysàs, 2008; Saz, 2010). In the ruling block,
some discrepancies had grown visible, with factions recognising the difficulties
to maintain the regime after Franco’s death and some talks about limited liberal-
ization of “political associations” (while others were in favour of continuity). The
economic context was worrisome, with the first oil crisis putting an abrupt end
to the growth cycle of the previous decade.
In the usual interpretation, the transition was the product of the incapacity of
both sides to take full control of the situation. Colomer (1998) mentions in this
sense the considerations of Przeworski about uncertainty during political transi-
tions, bringing stances towards moderation (Przeworski, 1986). Martínez-Alier
and Roca Jusmet (1988) also point to the fear of a military coup as the cause for
moderation in labour unions and leftist parties, leading them to a cooperative at-
titude in the political and economic pacts. The correlation of forces gave rise to a
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“reforma pactada” (“agreed reform”), an intermediate path between full continu-
ity and democratic breakout. As is well known, the process was orchestrated by
Adolfo Suárez and its main cornerstones were the Ley de Reforma Política of 1976
(which initiated the dismantling of the old francoist institutions without violat-
ing the existing legal framework), the return of democratic elections in June 1977,
and the elaboration of a new Constitution to be approved in December 1978. Op-
position parties were successful in their demands of constitutional talks and full
legalisation – although, in the case of the communist party PCE, this came quite
late and probably impacted negatively on their electoral results. The old powers,
on the other hand, were given satisfaction with a Senate (upper chamber) and an
electoral system with majoritarian and conservative biases (Lago and Montero,
2005).
The 1977 elections were won by Suárez’s coalition Unión de Centro Democrático,
UCD. This was an heterogeneous group, where liberals, Christian democrats and
social democrats had joined together in the preceding months. In the left wing of
this coalition, tax reform was seen as a priority.
1.4 The tax reform of 1977
The tax changes that were established in the first decade of democracy had been
envisaged long time before. They followed the model extended in Europe during
the 20th century, which introduced progressive rates and gave personal income
taxation a central role as a revenue source (Steinmo, 2003). In Spain, prominent
economists had been advocating for tax reform during the last years of the dic-
tatorship, in front of obvious problems in the existing system, namely rigidity,
regressivity, and limited revenue capacity. The last aspect was clearly an obstacle
for the ability of the state to provide some essential functions, such as spending
on education and infrastructure to promote growth.
The reform proposals were reflected in various projects by the Instituto de Estu-
dios Fiscales (a research and training institution related to the Ministry of Pub-
lic Finance), under the lead of Enrique Fuentes Quintana. These suggested the
adoption of a European taxation model in Spain, where personal income taxation
would be at the centre, together with wealth, inheritance, and value-added taxes.
This system was to be fairer, more efficient and also more flexible, providing with
higher revenue, which was needed to allow the State to meet the needs of a higher
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stage of development, in the minds of its proponents. It also meant convergence
with Europe, and thus would facilitate the long-desired process of integration in
the EEC.
The first proposal of the institute (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973) was re-
jected when presented by Minister Alberto Monreal to Franco’s government, in
April 1973: the plan was hidden from public knowledge and Monreal was dis-
missed. After this episode, Fuentes Quintana and his group became convinced
that a modernising tax reform of this sort could never be passed under Franco’s
dictatorship. Democratisation was a required prerequisite.2 After the dictator’s
death, a second project, very similar to the first, was presented by Minister Vil-
lar Mir, only to be also postponed (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1976). Lagares
(1999), another economist involved, provides a detailed account of the process.
In Spanish history, tax changes have normally taken place in times of profound
political disruption. Such was the case of the tax reform of 1845 that put in place
the “liberal” system in the country, following the French model (Comín, 2010b;
Fuentes Quintana, 1990). The same pattern repeated itself in the 1970s, when
transition to democracy finally made the tax reform possible. After the first elec-
tions, Fuentes Quintana was appointed by Suárez as Economics Minister and
Vice-president in the first democratic government, and his collaborator Francisco
Fernández Ordóñez, who had joined Suárez’s coalition UCD, was the new Public
Finance Minister. These men had already designed their reform a decade ear-
lier. The central points of their program were shared, at least in the surface, by
the main political parties, and as such were introduced in the Moncloa Pacts as
progressive measures to counteract the negative distributive effects of economic
stabilization (Comín, 2007; Fuentes Quintana, 2004).
Precisely, the first law of the new democratic Parliament, in November 1977, was
the beginning of this reform. Fernández Ordóñez had presented a comprehensive
project, consisting of a first “urgent” set of measures, a reform of direct taxation
around the personal income tax, and of indirect taxation around a value added
tax. All these were understood as part of the same process of change, but not all
of them could be passed during the first parliamentary terms. The first law (Law
of Urgent Tax Reform Measures, Ley de Medidas Urgentes de Reforma Fiscal) intro-
duced a wealth tax and a set of measures to fight tax evasion: lifting of banking
secrecy, introduction of tax offence, and related issues – together with granting a
2Fuentes Quintana made this point for example in ABC, 19th May 1977, p. 65: “La reforma fiscal
será inviable sin un sistema democrático”. He also recalls it in Fuentes Quintana (1990).
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tax amnesty. The idea was to provide a fresh start for the relationship between
taxpayers and the tax administration, ending with the culture of widespread eva-
sion. Shortly after, the income tax project arrived to Parliament and was passed
in September 1978. This was the main milestone of the reform, meant to have a
prominent role in raising revenue for welfare state development – and following
the prevailing ideas on fairness.
Fernández Ordóñez was a proponent of progressivity (or, at least, a significant
decrease in the regressive nature of the existing system) and the expansion of
public services. He also placed huge importance on fighting tax evasion, not only
in legal terms, but by fostering voluntary compliance, introducing a new era in
the relations between the (now) citizens and the (now democratic) state, based on
responsibility and fair exchange. In his mindset, reducing inequality through the
tax system was less conflictive than attempting to do it in the wage bargaining
process, and this equity objective was crucial for the legitimation of a market
economy, particularly in the context of the prevailing crisis: “The fragile Spanish
economy is going through difficult times, and we think that adequate restructuring will
only be possible if there is fairness in the distribution of sacrifices and the part of effort that
we all must share. As much as we respect the market economy as the main instrument for
obtaining resources, we firmly demand the public sector’s correcting action through the
tax system and redistributive expenditure”.3
Pan-Montojo (1996) has identified a period of “tax counter-reform” after these
first developments. The politics of consensus was replaced by the politics of com-
petition once the constitution was passed and new elections were on their way
(1979). The following projects were delayed and never made it through Parlia-
ment (see also Comín, 2007). The application of the reforms was faulty because
of lack of administrative capacity and obstruction by financial institutions. The
second phase of the tax reform, that of indirect taxation, did not come about un-
til the second half of the eighties, under socialist party governments. The main
innovation now was the introduction of the value added tax in 1986 (a condition
for the accession to the EEC), and efforts to improve tax administration. Other
reforms were of limited importance. For instance, the wealth tax had symbolic
power but scarce real effects, being transitory until new regulations were set in
place in 1991. Similarly, a new inheritance tax was delayed until 1987.
3Fernández Ordóñez (1980), p. 60. When he wrote “we”, he meant the members of his Social
Democratic Party, one of the groups forming UCD in 1977.
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The reform measures, nevertheless, brought about a substantial modernization of
public finances, and allowed an increase in revenues and the funding of a nascent
Welfare State (see e.g. Albi, 1990; Fuentes Quintana, 1990 or Espuelas, 2013).
Social Security is also part of this story. Under Francoist rule, a contributory “Bis-
marckian” system was introduced in 1963-67, which increased the tax burden on
labour during the following years in order to fund pensions and health care.4 By
the end of the seventies, the Social Security system had a budget as big as that of
all other Public Administrations, and its reform was also planned (although it did
not fall under the responsibility of the same Ministry as ordinary taxes). Social
contributions are also a tax, despite being earmarked revenues. And they were
strongly regressive, since they were not assessed on full wages, but on “bases” es-
tablished by decree for different workers’ categories, which meant very low caps
for high salaries. Other problems of the social security system were its high com-
plexity, the strong differences between regimes, its possible negative effects on
employment, and the low level of pensions.5 The main demand at the time was
to integrate the Social Security system with the public budget, in order to fund
its expenditure, in part or wholly, with general taxes. But changes did not go
that far during the first decade of democracy: an administrative reorganisation in
1978 improved transparency and the minimum pensions were increased during
the following years, but the contributive system remained very much unchanged
until the end of the eighties.
It has been said that the tax reform program was shared by all the main political
parties in Parliament, and widely by the Spanish society (Fuentes Quintana, 2004;
Lagares, 1999). My own research, as will be shown, agrees with this assertion but
qualifies it to some extent. It is true that during the first years of democracy no
real alternatives to the reform were put on the table: the pages of the conserva-
tive newspaper ABC are a clear example that immobility was not popular in the
exceptional years of the transition. But much of the agreement seems to have
been superficial and based on a very wide understanding of some concepts. As
soon as the parties had to sit down in Parliament and discuss concrete measures,
differences showed up, foreseeing the program of “reform of the reform” during
4During the sixties, the system had considerable surpluses, which were used to finance in-
vestment projects, given the insufficiency of tax revenues (Subsecretaría de la Seguridad Social,
1977).
5Pensions had decreased with respect to the country’s standard of living during the preceding
years, because in the context of rising salaries the tax bases had remained fixed or grown less than
real wages, in order to avoid strong increases in labour costs.
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the eighties. The new tax ideas, placing the emphasis on efficiency, – on the neg-
ative effects or progressivity on savings and labour effort – were soon added to
the main taxes in the system, and are particularly visible in the evolution of the
personal income tax.
The story of the tax reform has been analysed from several perspectives, besides
the accounts of some of the lead actors of the day (Fernández Ordóñez, 1980;
Fuentes Quintana, 1990, 2004; Lagares, 1999). Valiño (1989) provides a review
of the legislative innovations from the point of view of a public finance scholar.
Gandarias (1999) adds the insights of a political scientist. Pan-Montojo (1996) and
Comín (2007) apply the approach of the historian. This thesis offers a quantitative
analysis of the real effects of the reform on the income distribution and the fund-
ing of welfare state efforts. Only a tax incidence study can answer our research
questions: “Was the tax system made progressive?”, “Did it reduce income inequality
in the country?”, “How did tax evasion evolve and what was its incidence?”. The an-
swers to these will lead me to provide a tentative interpretation: “What were the
constraints on tax progressivity and redistribution in the early democratic period?”
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis has been written as a collection of articles, which can be read indepen-
dently but share the same general objective. Chapter 2, “The evolution of income
inequality” is the result of my confrontation with the sources for the analysis of
the income distribution in Spain in the second half of the 20th Century. After
reading extensively about their problems and biases, I decided that it was prefer-
able to work with a corrected version. The exercise turned out to provide some
interesting insights about the evolution of inequality itself.
Chapter 3, “The distribution of the tax burden”, is the main core of the thesis. It deals
with imputation of Spanish tax revenue in three different years, showing how the
changing tax system impacted on the different income levels of the population.
The bottom of the distribution was over-burdened, specially at the beginning of
the period, and less so after the tax reforms. As a result of the legal innovations,
the tax burden was pushed upwards, although it remained regressive when all
taxes are considered. Increased tax revenues, nevertheless, provided funding for
expanding redistributive social expenditure.
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In chapter 4, “Fraud and base erosion in personal income taxation”, I further qualify
the findings of the previous chapter. I suggest that fraud and under-reporting
worked in the opposite direction of increased progressivity. Concealment of in-
comes from self-employment and capital (to a greater extent than those from
labour, which were better controlled) was slow to confront, and affected very
negatively the introduction of general, progressive, personal income taxation in
the country.
An explanation of these results of the tax reform process is sought in the pages
of chapter 5, “Public opinion and political institutions”, where I analyse the avail-
able data on social preferences for redistribution (mainly on the basis of surveys)
and explore the paths of their translation onto policies, with specific attention to
internal political institutions and external constraints.
The concluding remarks summarize the results and point towards lines of further
research.

Chapter 2
The evolution of income inequality
This chapter investigates the evolution of income inequality in Spain during its transition
to democracy, suggesting a method for the correction of under-reporting of earnings and
profits in the Household Budget Surveys’ data. The contribution is twofold: the method-
ological proposal, based on income-expenditure discrepancy and scaling-up to National
Accounts, improves on previous work, and can be convenient for similar historical sources
in other countries. Secondly, its application results in an alternative history of the distri-
bution of income in this case, changing the levels and also the observed trend. Previous
literature asserted a substantial equalization, related to the democratization process, while
after the adjustment inequality in disposable income is shown to have been quite persis-
tent.1
2.1 Introduction
Income inequality is at the centre of many debates. Political power, economic de-
velopment or taxation are all related to the distribution of resources in any given
country – or the world. This study takes a dynamic national perspective, and
investigates how inequality changed during a period of transition from dictator-
ship to democracy.
The contribution of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it is inserted in the
debate about the distributional consequences of political transitions, providing
an example where income inequality did not substantially decrease after democ-
ratization. Secondly, it does so by applying a correction methodology to the main
1An adapted version of this chapter has been published in Revista de Historia Económica, 2015,
under the title “Sticky income inequality in the Spanish transition (1973-1990)”.
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historical source, namely the Household Budget Surveys, which leads to results
challenging the prior consensus.
The literature on income distribution has undertaken many changes in the last
decades. After the popularization of Kuznets (1955)’s theory about structural
change and the decrease in inequality in advanced industrial countries, recent
work has pointed at a new upsurge. Among its causes, globalization and skill-
biased technological change hold pre-eminent places (Atkinson, 2000; Easterly,
2004; Krugman, 2000). The slowdown of economic growth after the oil crises and
the rise of unemployment could also have played a role in certain contexts; along
these lines, Piketty (2011) has suggested that inherited wealth might have more
relevance in a slow-growth economy, compared with self-generated wealth.
This phenomenon, however, cannot be analysed as a purely economic issue. On
the contrary, it is connected to political developments, such as the rise of neo-
liberalism and the deep crisis in social democracy in post-industrial societies.
Levy and Temin (2007) argue that the widening of income inequality in the US
since 1980 is largely related to the institutional context, which is shaped politi-
cally. Labour market regulation, the education system and fiscal redistribution
all have strong distributive effects, as has also been underlined by Piketty (2003)
for the latter.
In this context, transitions from dictatorship to democracy are expected to bring
about a decrease in income inequality, as a result of the higher influence of the dis-
tributive goals of lower classes (Meltzer and Richard, 1981 and related literature).
But, as Acemoglu et al. (2013) note, the issue of transition might be complex and
nuanced: the new regime can be “captured” by the elites and not result in fully
democratic policies, and it can also lead to economic liberalization and increased
market inequalities. For example, Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) suggest the
importance of taking into account ideology, discussing the recent experience in
post-communist countries, while Mulligan et al. (2004) do not find significant dif-
ferences between the public policies of democratic and non-democratic regimes.
The Spanish transition (1976-82) is an interesting example for this discussion. De-
mocratization came when the oil crises hit the country, and the early period of the
new regime was marked by industrial restructuring and international integra-
tion, as well as by an unprecedented and dramatic increase in unemployment.
The intensification of structural transformation and the development of welfare-
state functions brought about by the ascent of social democracy to power could
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have pushed the income distribution in different directions. So which force pre-
vailed? Was democratization a strong enough driver for equality?
Generally, studies on Spanish income inequality for the period 1970-90 have found
that differences between the poor and the rich shrank very substantially (e.g. Al-
caide, 2000; Ayala et al., 2006). This result is consistent with a positive impact of
the political transition and the subsequent development of the Welfare State in
the country. This work, however, reaches different conclusions.
The main data source for the income distribution in this period are the Household
Budget Surveys. These suffer from a widely known problem of under-reporting
of earnings, particularly those coming from self-employment and capital, which
can potentially bring about a misrepresentation of the real levels of inequality.2 I
address the issue with an upwards correction of household incomes by revenue
sources, using both internal and external information, and ultimately adjusting
the flows to the National Accounts. Similar approaches have been widespread in
Latin American studies (Barreix et al., 2009; ECLAC, 1991; Engel et al., 1999), and
are also recently applied by an extensive literature on inequality measurement
issues in several rich countries (Accardo et al., 2009; Fixler and Johnson, 2012;
McColl et al., 2010; Neri and Zizza, 2010).3 The majority of these works, however,
are very recent, and focus on the latest years available. This chapter makes a step
forward by adopting a historical perspective, and measuring the inequality trend
over several decades.
After scaling up the income data, I find inequality to be higher than in the original
data, and to have experienced only a slight decrease during the decades consid-
ered. This suggests that, in Spain, the democratic transition was not sufficiently
strong to impact positively on distributional dynamics. It also implies that under-
reporting has to be taken into account in the study of income distribution and its
changes over time. Differential rates of concealment of household revenues by
source will not only mean higher inequality than that directly observed, but may
also affect its trend, fundamentally in the presence of significant changes in the
factorial distribution.
2This problem has been signalled by the literature as a reason to use tax data for the top in-
comes, which would allow to perform an upwards correction of the inequality indices (Alvaredo,
2011; Atkinson, 2007).
3This orientation can be traced back to the NBER Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth of 1975 (Budd and Radner, 1975).
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the proce-
dures and conclusions of previous literature on the topic, while also presenting
the main data source used, the Household Budget Surveys. The methodology
and process of correction of the data are exposed in section 2.3, with the results
and some of their implications reported in section 2.4. I conclude in section 2.5.
2.2 The story of personal income equalization
Literature has shown a widespread consensus on the fact that inequality de-
creased very substantially in Spain between the 1970s and the 1990s. This has
been related to structural economic change and to an increase in the redistributive
role played by the State in the second half of the period, due to democratization.
The studies are generally derived from the Household Budget Surveys (hence-
forth HBSs). These are consumption and income investigations conducted by the
National Statistical Institute (INE, from now on) more or less on a ten-year basis
since 1964.4 They provide information on socio-economic classes, total household
disposable income and expenditure in different categories of goods and services.
The detail and quantity of information have improved over time: since 1973-74
the sampling procedure was more accurate and the data have a higher level of
disaggregation, with 170 different groups of goods and services, and income dis-
tributed in several components (labour, property, benefits, and so on – but not
among the different household members until 1980). Estimations of home con-
sumption and imputed income from owner-occupied housing are also provided
(thus indicating if the family rents or owns their house), as are the households’
size and some information on their age composition. The income data always
refers to disposable income, so each component is net of direct taxes: this is also
the definition used all along this chapter.
There are significant differences in the results obtained from this source. Some
studies use the original income data provided by the surveys, while other rely on
different correction procedures, since some troubling problems are widely known
to be present in the HBSs. I will first review the results based on the original data,
4It is not possible to rely on personal income tax statistics to study income distribution in the
general population, given that until 1979 they covered only a very small part of it. As a depiction
of top incomes, they have been used by Alvaredo and Saez (2009). Other work has relied on
macroeconomic indicators (Prados de la Escosura, 2008).
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and then proceed to discuss the quality issues in the surveys. Finally, I will show
the corrections proposed by previous literature.
2.2.1 Working with the raw HBS data
The studies which rely on the original HBS data are surveyed in table 2.1. They
observe a significant reduction of inequality along these decades, attaining by
1990 levels comparable to those of other developed European countries. Many
of these studies acknowledge the problems in the data, such as under-reporting,
and therefore call for caution or test for possible impacts with techniques such as
trimming (Cowell et al., 1999) or a comparison with National Accounts (Oliver
et al., 2001).
The values of inequality indices vary depending on each author’s methodolog-
ical choices, such as the income definition, the equivalence scale applied, or the
weighting unit. All these are important conceptual decisions to be made by the re-
searcher. My own choice would be an income definition as wide as possible (TDI
in the table, which includes in kind elements such as imputed owner-occupier in-
come – but, recall, excludes direct taxation), and individual weighting. This last
aspect implies giving the same value in our calculations to all individuals (while
weighting by households effectively means attaching less importance to people
living in big families). In any case, these choices do not change the qualitative
result here: a decrease in inequality along with the political transition.
Alternatively, many authors are interested in working with inequality of con-
sumption instead of income, or along with it (e.g. Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo,
1996; Goerlich and Mas, 2001; Gradín, 2002; Gradín et al., 2008; Martín-Guzmán
et al., 1996). They generally also find a decrease in inequality during the decades
of 1970-90.5 The rationale for this approach is that, in the context of the life-cycle
and permanent income theory, consumption is a better indicator of welfare. An
excellent survey of the debate is given by Gradín et al. (2008), who compare the
results of using income or consumption. Morelli et al. (2014) argue that income
5Martín-Guzmán et al. (1996), for example, obtain a Gini of per capita expenditure of 35.7, 35.0
and 34.2 respectively for the three HBSs (this includes non-monetary items and is weighted by
household). Goerlich and Mas (2001) find 32.7, 31.4 and 30.3 with total equivalized expenditure.
Gradín (2002)’s calculations result in 35.9, 33.2 and 31.7 (OECD’s equivalence scale), slightly over
his values for income (35.2, 32.7 and 30.6). Some works on expenditure inequality have also been
done with the data provided by another survey, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares,
generally obtaining lower levels; see e.g. Gradín et al. (2008) or Pijoan-Mas and Sánchez-Marcos
(2010).
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is conceptually a better indicator, since it measures potential consumption and
therefore does not lead to confuse need with chosen frugality (following Sen,
1992); furthermore, current consumption may not mirror permanent income in
presence of obstacles to lifetime smoothing (especially borrowing constraints).6
The use of consumption can also arise from the acknowledgement that income
is under-assessed, and therefore reported consumption would actually be closer
to real income than the stated revenue amounts. Expenditure data is not free
of measurement issues, such as the difficulty to correctly capture durable goods
consumption. But income is truly known to be under-estimated in many surveys,
and remarkably in our case. I turn to this now.
2.2.2 Biases in the sources
The quality of the HBSs data is highly uneven. There are no micro-data available
for the 1964-65 survey, so it is only possible to work with aggregate results pub-
lished by INE. In the other cases, micro-data are available online (1973-74, 1980-81
and 1990-91).7 In this work, I am using the files provided by Carlos III University,
which undertook a project to facilitate their usage.8
Several issues on the reliability of HBSs (as that of their counterparts in other
countries) have been put forward by the literature, starting with the publications
of INE itself. As may be seen in table 2.2, household surveys underestimate in-
equality for a number of reasons. Some of them seem more worrying than others:
the exclusion of the homeless might be quite insurmountable, but its quantitative
impact is limited. Undistributed profits can be considered as part of the economic
capacity of the individuals they accrue to, but may be left aside from an annual
income analysis (as is indeed most common in the literature).9
6Attanasio (1999), with cohort data from the US and the UK, shows how the variability of
disposable income over the life cycle is mirrored by that of consumption, although in a less pro-
nounced way in the case of equivalent non-durables. Borrowing constraints have been found
significant for low income households in several studies, e.g. Cutanda (2003).
7The surveys always covered a 12-month period, but it did not coincide with the calendar year.
8Please see http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/epf.html.
9The bias associated to this exclusion would grow, however, given that National Accounts
depict an increase in corporations’ share of capital income with respect to households’.
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TABLE 2.2: Biases in the Household Budget Surveys
Problem Effect on inequality
Universe Excludes the homeless -
Income definition Excludes undistributed profits -
Sampling procedure No oversampling -
Non-response Bigger in dynamic urban areas -
Under-reporting Bigger in non-salary income -
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Garde et al. (1996).
The remaining issues appear more troubling. Oversampling the higher-income
strata (urban areas with wealthy inhabitants) would have helped to provide bet-
ter estimates of income for rich families, since the variability among them is usu-
ally higher (this is a common method in modern statistics). On the other hand,
non-response and under-reporting entail a likely under-representation of the rich
both in quantity and income levels. Not correcting for these effects implies a po-
tentially important bias. It has to be kept in mind that these are not tax data, so
the term under-reporting does not equal tax base fraud: it could be related to
evasion, but also to lack of accounting control in the families, mistakes and for-
getfulness, or errors in calculating yearly totals from the questions. The problem
is relatively common in this kind of surveys.
Trying to confront the issue, some statistical work was already undertaken during
the 1970s. At least part of the unit non-response bias was corrected by INE with
the scaling-up factors provided with the results, which give higher population
weights to observations in strata where unit non-response was more acute.10 But
under-reporting clearly remains an issue. A simple comparison of the data on
total income and expenditure (plus net savings) tells us that something is wrong:
only 30-40% of the households spend less than their yearly income, while around
10% would consume more than twice its level (table 2.3; see also the distribution
disaggregated by decile in Appendix B.1).
Certainly, not all families in a given year spend less than they earn, but the high
10Unit non-response is total lack of answer from a selected household, due to refusal or inability
to contact it; it is different from item non-response, which arises when one household participates
in the survey but fails to provide answers to specific questions. The re-weighting procedure does
not eliminate the whole problem, as it can be argued for example that non-response correction
should take into account also the income level of households’ strata, which affects the probability
of response, as suggested by Mistiaen and Ravallion (2003). Pérez-Duarte et al. (2010), however,
show that for the Finnish wealth survey the non-response bias was not substantially reduced after
applying more refined re-weightings and calibrations using further variables.
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TABLE 2.3: Households and budget constraint: distribution
according to the ratio (Expenditure + Net Savings) / Income
0 - 1 1 - 2 2 - 4 >4 Total
1973-74 30.8% 57.4% 10.7% 1.1% 100%
1980-81 37.2% 53.5% 8.4% 0.8% 100%
1990-91 41.9% 48.5% 8.8% 0.8% 100%
Source: author’s calculations based on Household Budget Sur-
veys.
Note: households in the first column spend within their budget constraint. A ratio
of 2, for example, means that the family reported to spend twice as much as her
yearly income.
ratios in the table seem implausible, specially given that total net household sav-
ings in those years were positive, according to the Spanish National Accounts.
In fact, another possible evidence of under-reporting is a comparison with Na-
tional Accounts data, which normally are taken as a more reliable source for the
aggregates. Disposable income totals are contrasted in table 2.4 (a disaggregated
examination can be found in Appendix B.3). Disposable incomes in the surveys
are only around 70% of those estimated in national accounting for the household
sector, which reinforces our suspicion that in the HBSs they are under-assessed
to a considerable extent. The fact that this problem affects richer areas and non-
salary income to a greater degree (as stated by e.g. Alcaide and Alcaide, 1974
and Sanz, 1995) should warn us against the use of these data without enough
criticism. The under-estimation of incomes in the surveys seems more acute in
the seventies than in 1990, which could indicate an improvement in the accuracy
of the source and therefore a non-homogeneous bias over time – thus potentially
affecting inter-temporal comparisons.11
11Other household surveys have been contrasted with the magnitudes from National Accounts
with similar results. Pou and Alegre (2002) made the exercise for the Encuesta Continua de Pre-
supuestos Familiares, a rotating panel stretching from 1985 to 1996, and found that the ratio in
gross terms was around 62-69%, with a slight improvement over the period. (This ratio is not
directly comparable to those given in the last column of table 2.4, which are obtained from the
net magnitudes. In the case of the HBSs, the corresponding gross values would be 66.8%, 74.7%
and 80.2% for the three years respectively: the ECPF thus appears more unreliable for the study
of income inequality than the benchmark year surveys I am using here). Andrés and Mercader-
Prats (2001) engaged in similar calculations with the 1994 European Community Household Panel
(PHOGUE). They present ratios for the different income sources which show the high reliability
of wages and salaries data, and the troubles with incomes from self-employment and capital. This
result coincides with our further exploration of HBSs in section 2.3.
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TABLE 2.4: Disposable Income in HBSs and National Accounts
HBSs (1) Nat. Acc. (2) (1)/(2)
1973 2,209,839 3,099,302 65.5%
1980 7,703,772 11,049,326 69.7%
1990 25,079,849 33,387,093 75.1%
Millions of nominal pesetas. Household sector.
Source: author’s calculations and Pena and Callealta
(1996).
2.2.3 Literature with correction of HBSs
The problems surveyed in the previous subsection were known by both INE and
the research community at the time. As a result, some corrections were attempted
in the data. Table 2.5 displays the original distribution from the HBSs, together
with the main adjusted estimates available.
The original distributions show a constant increase in the shares of the bottom
five deciles, together with a decrease in the part accruing to the top (deciles 9-
10). The Gini index corresponds to that given by Goerlich and Mas (2001) in their
second row in table 2.1. According to these data, the period of the democratic
transition was very positive for the Spanish poor and middle classes.
The other columns in the table present distributions corrected for under-reporting
with different procedures. J. Alcaide was the first researcher to tackle the issue,
contemporaneously to the surveys. In Alcaide (2000) he showed an abrupt de-
crease in disposable income inequality starting at some point between 1973 and
1980, and continuing with less intensity in the following years. His corrections on
the HBSs are based on the difference between total income and total expenditure
data, taking the latter as more reliable (since they adjust better to the National
Accounts and households may have felt less reluctant to report them). His first
step thus consisted of an upwards adjustment of income to expenditure, with
data aggregated by socio-economic groups, and later he scaled-up the corrected
income figures to National Accounts.12 These results have been widely accepted
since, and are included in the Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX (Car-
reras et al., 2005). Table 2.5 shows that his procedure provided higher inequality
figures than the raw HBSs data. Since the difference was much larger for 1973-74,
12The methodology is best explained in Alcaide and Alcaide (1974), where there is reference to
other sources used, such as INE’s wage surveys, and to a Pareto simulation in the upper tail of
the distribution.
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his calculations depict a more powerful retreat of inequality during the years of
the political transition than in the following decade. Estruch (1996) used a very
similar methodology, applying it to the 1990-91 data, in his work about public
spending.
Alternatively, it can be accepted as economically normal that some households
consume above their yearly income, up to a certain extent. Such an approach
was taken by INE’s study of the 1973-74 survey, for the volume La Renta Nacional
y su Distribución 1976 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1977): they accepted as
“honest” those households where the difference between total expenditure (plus
net savings) and income was not bigger than 5%.13 With those, a log-log relation-
ship was estimated between consumption and income and used to correct the
under-reported incomes. The result was also a more unequal distribution. The
authors themselves considered it as a lower bound of inequality, since “honest”
families were found mostly in the poorer deciles: if expenditure-income elasticity
is not constant but decreasing, the concentration of income would be bigger than
estimated.
A similar procedure was applied by Pena and Callealta (1996). They first ob-
tained under-reporting correction factors by socio-economic categories, again de-
rived from the relationship of declared income with consumption (ranging from
1.63 to 1.11). But these were not applied directly on the total income of the house-
hold: 1.06 was assigned to salaries and 1.03 to public benefits, following the re-
sults in Díaz and Fernández (1993); which implies that the correction factors for
other income sources resulted higher as a consequence. In a second step, they ap-
plied a uniform adjustment to the National Accounts.14 Their result is also higher
inequality than in the original surveys, with a lower reduction over time than
according to Alcaide.15
In the next section I present an alternative procedure to deal with income under-
reporting, which leads to different conclusions.
13Argimón et al. (1987), for their study on indirect taxation in 1980, followed the same assump-
tion. They used, however, provincial-level data, since the micro-data were not yet available at the
time of their work. I have not therefore included their estimation in the table.
14Pena’s procedure was followed with slight modifications in Marchante Mera et al. (2002). The
focus of this study is not income inequality but consumption and savings by age group, which is
why it is not surveyed here.
15It should be noted that the reported distribution in Pena and Callealta (1996) is of income per
capita, so the comparison with the other columns is not straightforward.
Chapter 2. The evolution of income inequality 25
2.3 Adjusting Household Surveys
My methodology is similar to Alcaide’s and Pena’s in the basic intuitions, namely
using income-expenditure discrepancy and scaling-up to National Accounts. But
the specific calculations differ, and so do the results. I first follow Pissarides and
Weber (1989) and Martínez-López (2013) to obtain the relative level of under-
reporting of the self-employed, using only information from the surveys. Then I
resort to comparison with National Accounts, but instead of employing the ag-
gregate disposable income I make separate contrasts for the different sources of
household revenue, as suggested by Oliver (1997). This allows to obtain particu-
lar adjustment factors and therefore a more realistic view of the distribution.
2.3.1 Relative under-reporting of the self-employed
It is widely believed that the self-employed under-report their incomes both in
tax assessments and income surveys. Pissarides and Weber (1989) were the first
to suggest an estimation of this concealing of incomes by means of contrasting
their expenditure levels (in food) with those of wage earners in household sur-
veys. Their idea rested on the basic assumptions of accurate reporting of: (a) the
incomes of wage earners and (b) the food expenditures of both kinds of house-
holds. The intuition is that wage earners can more easily know their exact in-
come (because of its regularity) and have also less tax-fraud incentives to hide it
in a survey (since they have less capacity to evade anyway, given withholding at
source). On the other hand, expenditures are known to be better declared than
income in household surveys, and specially in the case of food, with ratios near
90-100% with respect to National Accounts.
Pissarides and Weber (1989) obtained for Britain in 1982 that incomes reported
by the self-employed should be multiplied by a factor of 1.55 to obtain their
true earnings. After them, a wide literature has undertaken similar calculations
for other countries and time-periods, with some further methodological con-
tributions (Engström and Holmlund, 2009; Hurst et al., 2010; Johansson, 2005;
Lyssiotou et al., 2004; Martínez-López, 2013; Tedds, 2010). Here I follow En-
gström and Holmlund (2009), who calculated a factor of 1.30 for Sweden around
the year 2000, and Martínez-López (2013), who estimated 1.25 for Spain in 2006-
2009. Martínez-López stressed that this coefficient was relative to the wage earn-
ers’ own under-reporting rate – something which is important in the Spanish case
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and in a historical analysis, where salaried workers might not be completely reli-
able.
The procedure is based on the estimation of an Engel curve with the following
form:
lnF = α + βlnY D + γSE + δZ + u, (2.1)
F being declared food expenditure, α the subsistence level, Y D total declared in-
come, SE a dummy for self-employed households (defined as those where at
least the household head or the spouse is so), Z a vector of control variables
(family size, town size, and so on), and u the error term. γ is expected to be posi-
tive, implying an apparent higher consumption of food among the self-employed,
which is interpreted as income under-reporting. The idea can be seen in figure
2.1, where γ would be the vertical difference between both regression lines, β the
slope (estimated elasticity) and lnF ∗ the log of reported food consumption by
two households with the same real incomes Y R, but different reported incomes
Y D.
FIGURE 2.1: Pissarides-Weber’s model
Source: adapted from Engström and Holmlund (2009).
The difference between real income Y R and declared income Y D (in logs, hori-
zontal distance between both vertical lines in the graph) is given by:
lnY R − lnY D = γ
β
, (2.2)
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because of the formula to calculate the slope of the regression line in figure 2.1
(β = γ/(lnY R − lnY D)). Then we can further obtain:
Y R
Y D
= exp
(
γ
β
)
≡ k, (2.3)
k being the factor by which the self-employed’s reported income should be mul-
tiplied in order to obtain their real income (under the assumption that the wage
earners’ reporting is correct – i.e., relative to it).
Food expenditure is used as the dependent variable for various reasons: it is
one of the most accurately reported expenditures in the surveys (in terms of the
adjustment with National Accounts of total resulting consumption), and we can
safely assume that it is less affected by preferences than other goods. Rural house-
holds are excluded from the estimation, since they might obtain a significant part
of their food supply out of the market and not report it correctly. The variable F
is defined as expenditure in food (excluding alcohol and tobacco) plus foodstuff
self-supply and free meals provided by companies to their employees. It is thus
supposed to capture total food consumption, except for meals at restaurants and
similar establishments.
In order to make the results more robust, I have made an alternative estimation
with energy consumption as the dependent variable. In the surveys, this item
was asked for as the last bill, so it could be easier to report correctly, without the
need to note down and control purchases that is associated with food expenditure
questions. It is also less affected by the issue of eating at the firm, out of home
and so on. The energy consumption reported is only that of the household as
a family: i.e. explicitly excluding expenditures associated with unincorporated
businesses.
The results of the estimation are shown in table 2.6. Taking the average k derived
from both models, for each year, the self-employed would under-report their in-
comes by around 14-20% more than the recipients of salary income.16 This could
be applied directly to the data, estimating the effects of the differential under-
reporting of the self-employed independently from the other issues identified
(see Appendix B.2). The impact, however, is limited. My preferred calculation
16My results are slightly below Martínez-López (2013)’s estimation for later years. However,
this should not be directly interpreted as an increase in under-reporting, since the factor is relative
to the wage-earners’ behaviour. A constant reporting rate of the self-employed in surveys with
increased reliance of the salaried households would also be consistent with the results.
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retains this coefficient, underlining its relative nature, to integrate it in the next
exercise.
TABLE 2.6: Regression for relative under-reporting of the Self-
Employed
1973 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Food) ln(Energy) ln(Food) ln(Energy) ln(Food) ln(Energy)
lnY 0.268*** 0.438*** 0.207*** 0.368*** 0.167*** 0.280***
(0.00841) (0.0106) (0.00960) (0.0124) (0.0100) (0.0137)
SE 0.0407*** 0.102*** 0.0446*** 0.0892*** 0.0185* 0.0558***
(0.00999) (0.0135) (0.0107) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0148)
Obs. 14,442 14,297 12,624 12,619 10,360 10,242
R2 0.371 0.236 0.315 0.200 0.312 0.133
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls include: household size, age of household head, dummies for municipality size and
survey seasonality, meals in restaurants in columns (1), (3) and (5), a dummy for cold climate in
columns (2), (4) and (6), and a constant.
k 1.16 1.26 1.24 1.27 1.12 1.22
k 1.21 1.26 1.17
Source: author’s calculations.
2.3.2 Scaling-up to National Accounts
The other source of correction is external information: a comparison of the to-
tals for each type of income obtained from the surveys with those in National
Accounts, which are considered more reliable for the aggregate results, and sup-
posed to capture at least a part of the black economy. This micro-macro contrast of
aggregates is a common and desirable practice, as stated by the Canberra Expert
Group (2011).17 Such a step is usual in analysis of survey data in other countries,
as can be seen, for instance, in ECLAC’s reports, Engel et al. (1999) and Barreix
et al. (2009).
Complete income accounts for households are available in the Spanish National
Accounts since 1980 (the different macroeconomic flows are disaggregated by
17“Most users of household income distribution statistics would expect the producers to have undertaken
reconciliation between the macro aggregate of household income and the micro income statistics suitably
grossed up to population totals. Even if this is not possible, the data producer should provide clear explana-
tions when differences are known to exist” (Canberra Expert Group, 2011, p.5).
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sectors, one of which are the households, together with private non-profit insti-
tutions). Data for 1973 is taken from Pena and Callealta (1996), with the excep-
tion of capital incomes, which have been approximated using the percentage of
dividend and interest income in “incomes from property and enterprise” in the
household sector in 1969 and 1980 (the two closest available years).18
There are some coverage differences between the surveys and the National Ac-
counts data: namely, in the latter households appear aggregated with private
non-profit institutions, and they also include people living in collective arrange-
ments (e.g. retirement homes), who are not present in the surveys. For an exten-
sive discussion, see Sanz (1995). These differences are considered minor and not
dealt with here.19
The adjustment procedure needs to take into account that Household Surveys
provide incomes net of taxes, while the figures in National Accounts are gross.
The corresponding taxes have therefore been subtracted from the latter before
calculating the relationship between magnitudes, in net terms. Imputed incomes
are not corrected, since they do not mostly derive from the respondents’ answers
but were estimated by INE; hence, they are also extracted a priori from both
sources.20 Scaling-up factors for each source of income have been calculated with
the following formula:
mi = (Xi,NA − Ii − Ti)/(Xi,HBS − Ii), (2.4)
withXi,NA meaning the gross amount in National Accounts, Ii the imputed (non-
monetary) incomes in category i if there are, Ti the associated taxes, and Xi,HBS
the net amount given by the Household Budget Survey. See table 2.7 for the
correspondence between magnitudes in both sources.
The basic procedure, however, is modified for Net Operating Surplus (NOS) and
Transfers. NOS includes self-employment monetary income, self-employment
imputed income (not corrected) and income from real estate rentals. A total
18In Pena and Callealta (1996), capital incomes seem to be underestimated. I have thus used
this information provided in the National Accounts publications of the pre-1970 base (where only
some household flows are present).
19There is an additional problem with interest income, which is defined in the surveys in net
terms (interest incomes received minus interests paid for loans). This is consistent with an eco-
nomic concept of yearly income, but not with the distribution of gross revenues of this kind across
households. The fiscal concept is different, since only certain interest payments are deductible.
20These are non-monetary flows accruing to households, related either to wage-earning activi-
ties (in-kind compensation and meals at the workplace) or to self-employment (home consump-
tion and housing services in owner-occupied housing).
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adjustment to National Accounts would be incorrect, since these include undis-
tributed profits of unincorporated enterprises, which are not present in the sur-
veys (recall section 2.2.2): the procedure applied here yields a difference of around
20% under total adjustment. It is based on the factor for self-employment ob-
tained in subsection 2.3.1: mSE is the product of the previously estimated k and
the up-scaling factor for Labour income (since the equation yielded under-estimation
relative to wage-earners). The same coefficient has been applied to rental in-
comes, which make part of the same category in National Accounts.21
Regarding transfers, from the surveys of 1973 and 1980 it is only possible to ob-
tain a joint correction factor for the total (which includes social benefits together
with all sorts of private flows). However, applying this number to all households
equally would underestimate inequality, because benefits are better reported than
the rest of transfers, and both kinds of revenue have very distinct distributions
(as shown by the 1990 data). To account for this problem, I have used a different
correction factor for each decile, based on the results in 1990. Since for this year
the survey provides both variables, it allows to obtain a different “general trans-
fer factor” (total corrected transfers / total reported transfers) in each decile, the
variation of which responds to the composition between private and public ones.
The changing relation of this factor with the total mTR (1.65 in 1990) is used to
generate variation in the factors to apply in 1980 and 1973. This entails that the
correction factor of transfers increases with income.22
The resulting scaling-up factors mi are shown in table 2.8. As can be seen, they
tend to decline over time, showing what seems to be the increasing reliability of
the surveys.
However, this is not the case with capital income, which has the highest estimated
factors (together with private transfers). This may be a reflection of structural and
regulatory change. A decrease in capital income concentration could be accom-
panied by growing non-reporting: a rising number of households receiving small
quantities of capital income and neglecting to include them in the surveys’ ques-
tionnaires.23 On the other hand, the increase in the associated tax burden and
21Income from real estate rentals is in fact only available separately for 1990. For the previous
surveys, I have approximated it using the relation to total capital income by deciles in that year.
22Obviously, such a procedure is not completely accurate, since the distribution of both kinds
of transfers, and specially public benefits, may have changed across the period. It is however
preferred to applying a single factor to all households. Alternative estimations are shown in
Appendix B.5.
23This source of misrepresentation of incomes in HBSs is dealt with in Engel et al. (1999) with
a random imputation procedure (by deciles), the effect of which would presumably be a slight
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TABLE 2.8: Correction factors by sources of income
1973 1980 1990
Wages & salaries 1.35 1.19 1.12
Self-employment 1.63 1.51 1.31
& Rental income
Capital income 4.35 3.40 6.85
Private transfers 2.51 2.05 4.02
Social benefits 1.43
Source: Author’s calculations.
The table displays the factors mi, obtained with expression
(2.4), which serve to scale-up the income data to the totals in
National Accounts.
financial sophistication could have implied higher concealing of such incomes.24
The application of these coefficients to each type of income, at the micro-data
level, yields a different composite correction factor to each household, as well
as to every possible socio-economic sub-group, because of the distribution of in-
come sources. Table 2.9 shows the resulting factors by deciles. The profiles have
a J-shape, being lower at the middle part of the distribution and attaining the
highest values at the very top.
2.4 The evolution of the Spanish income distribution
(1973-1990): an alternative picture
The final outcome of the correction is a set of higher inequality estimates, com-
pared with those resulting from the original INE data, as was originally expected.
Table 2.10 displays the Gini indices obtained following two different calculations.
decrease in measured inequality. However, this choice is not taken here because it would be
necessary to establish first what share of total misrepresentation corresponds to each problem
(under-reporting versus non-reporting).
24Another possible explanation for the rise in m would be that the total reference gross mag-
nitudes used in 1973 and 1980 are underestimated, but it seems unlikely. An examination of the
factor shares shows that the weight of capital income in household revenues increased during the
decades considered here, from 5.5% in 1973 to 6.2% in 1980 and 10% in 1990. The joint accounts for
both households and non-financial enterprises show a similar trend. Nevertheless, it is possible
that the data for 1973 reflect an extraordinary, circumstantial situation, since wage remuneration
was increasing strongly in national income during the first half of the seventies and profits were
decreasing. The 1980 data can also be thought of as depicting an economy with low profits, given
the context of crisis.
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TABLE 2.9: Correction factors by deciles
1973 1980 1990
Decile 1 1.73 1.50 1.33
Decile 2 1.59 1.51 1.28
Decile 3 1.54 1.40 1.26
Decile 4 1.51 1.38 1.27
Decile 5 1.49 1.37 1.25
Decile 6 1.48 1.36 1.27
Decile 7 1.49 1.37 1.28
Decile 8 1.51 1.40 1.29
Decile 9 1.57 1.40 1.33
Decile 10 1.75 1.45 1.55
Top 1% 2.06 1.69 2.40
Total 1.57 1.41 1.31
Source: author’s calculations.
Mean factor applied (weighted average among house-
holds). Deciles are built on the corrected resulting dis-
posable income.
The first row shows inequality of disposable income across households, with no
adjustment for household size and using them as the unit of analysis (thus giving
the same importance in the index to a 1-member household and to a 6-member
one); the second uses equivalent income and individual weights (i.e., each person
is assigned the equivalent per capita income of its household and has the same
importance in the estimation). The latter approach provides a better measure
of inequality between individuals, but it requires some assumptions about the
distribution of resources within the family and economies of scale in consump-
tion.25 Unsurprisingly, inequality is lower between individuals than between
households, because larger families tend to have higher aggregate incomes.26
As can be seen, the correction of under-reporting also implies a change in the ob-
served trend of inequality. While the unadjusted data and the corrections from
25It is assumed that all members of a household are entitled to the same level of material well-
being (that they share their income equally). Regarding the elasticity of “needs” to household
size and composition, here I use the OECD scale, which attaches value 1 to the first adult, 0.7
to the subsequent ones and 0.5 to the minors in the household (up to 14 years old). The choice
is consistent with empirical results based on Spanish data (Bosch-Domenech, 1991; Duclos and
Mercader-Prats, 1999; Labeaga et al., 2004).
26The general result of higher inequality after scaling-up is not present in the 1980 data with
household weighting (first row): in this case, the Gini index for adjusted incomes is slightly lower
than the original one. This should be attributed to the approximate methods and the plausible
under-adjustment in rental incomes and interest incomes. In any case, our main focus is inequality
between individuals.
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TABLE 2.10: Spanish income inequality (1973-1990):
Gini index in scaled-up data
1973 1980 1990
Disposable total income (households) 36.8 33.5 34.8
Disposable equivalent income (individuals) 34.6 32.6 33.0
Source: Author’s calculations on HBSs.
Equivalent incomes are obtained using the OECD scale (which attaches value 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to
the remaining adults, and 0.5 to the members of the household under 14).
previous literature reviewed earlier showed an abrupt improvement in the dis-
tribution over time, the new corrected incomes show a much more slight change
across these decades (around 1.5 Gini points), and coming to a halt in the eight-
ies. We can thus talk about considerable persistence in inequality. This result
contrasts with most of the literature presented in section 2.2, but is not necessar-
ily at odds with studies based on tax or macroeconomic data, which are reviewed
in Appendix B.6.
In the rest of the chapter I make a further analysis of my results. I look at the
shares of income accruing to each decile and offer their decomposition into rev-
enue sources. To conclude, I consider the increase in absolute income differences.
The concept of inequality is indeed complex, and so is its depiction.
2.4.1 Relative inequality and its composition
The inspection of decile shares based on the corrected disposable income data
allows a deeper analysis of the distributive evolution. In table 2.11 inequality
among households is shown to have been quite stable over these decades (consis-
tent with the Gini indices in the first row of table 2.10). Interpersonal inequality,
which is approached by the distribution of equivalent income in columns 5-7, is
slightly lower. In any case, the absence of a clear trend remains. The bottom-half
deciles increased their share, but the changes are small and erratic.
It is nonetheless most likely that the roots of inequality in the economy changed
during these decades. The capital share had been decreasing in the last years of
the dictatorship as a short-term response to the crisis, and could have increased
again later because of liberalization. Most advanced industrial economies have
experienced a recent increase in wages and salaries dispersion. These trends,
together with the increase in unemployment, could have counteracted to some
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TABLE 2.11: Shares of disposable income among deciles
Total income - households Equivalent income - individuals
1973 1980 1990 1973 1980 1990
Decile 1 2.38 2.84 2.79 3.01 3.00 3.22
Decile 2 4.09 4.45 4.33 4.51 4.74 4.83
Decile 3 5.23 5.60 5.49 5.55 5.85 5.84
Decile 4 6.31 6.71 6.52 6.52 6.82 6.74
Decile 5 7.42 7.81 7.61 7.50 7.82 7.72
Decile 6 8.64 8.98 8.84 8.62 8.90 8.72
Decile 7 10.14 10.41 10.23 9.98 10.23 9.95
Decile 8 12.15 12.25 12.06 11.88 12.04 11.65
Decile 9 15.41 15.14 15.02 14.73 14.78 14.45
Decile 10 28.23 25.80 27.13 27.69 25.80 26.87
Top 1% 6.47 6.03 7.15 6.65 6.14 7.30
Source: Author’s calculations.
All data given in percentages. Equivalent incomes are obtained using the OECD scale.
extent the equalizing force of public benefits expansion and the introduction of
progressivity in the tax system (as will be seen in the next chapter).27
Entering such debate in depth is out of the scope of this paper. But the decomposi-
tion of disposable income in figure 2.2 can provide an idea of the forces behind in-
equality change. Apart from wages, self-employment income, capital income and
transfers, two kinds of imputed incomes are included. These are non-monetary
flows accruing to households, which were given an approximate value in the sur-
vey. ‘WE imputations’ (those related to wage-earning activities) include in-kind
compensation and meals at the workplace, while ‘SE imputations’ (related to self-
employment) are home consumption and housing services in owner-occupied
housing.28
27On the other hand, it should be noted that our three observations are to a certain extent also
a result of short-term fluctuations: 1973 was the culmination of the pre-oil-shock growth in the
country, while 1980 was a period of economic distress, and in 1990 the country was back on the
ascending side of the cycle. We cannot make strong conclusions out of them. Unfortunately, these
are the only data available for the period. The Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, a yearly
rotating panel starting in 1985, might have complemented the image, but it is known to have an
even more serious income under-assessment problem. Recall the results in Pou and Alegre (2002)
and the comments in Eurostat (1999).
28The imputation of income from owner-occupied housing is conceptually important but em-
pirically complicated. Measuring standards of living excluding this item can be highly misleading
if renters coexist with owner-occupiers, which is of course the case here (although around 80%
of the households fall in the second category). The variable in the survey is an approximation to
the rent a household would pay if it rented its house. The calculations are certainly not flawless,
and moreover it should only be imputed in the percentage that the house is paid (i.e., 100% if
the family totally owns its house, 50% if half of it is still owed to the bank). This adjustment is
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FIGURE 2.2: Composition of disposable income
Source: Author’s calculations, using sgini mod-
ule for STATA by Philippe van Kerm.
Employment incomes were clearly the main components of disposable household
resources. But their share decreased over time (accounting each year for 53%, 50%
and 43%, respectively). The items gaining weight were mainly transfers (due to
the development of the welfare state: total transfers increased from 14% to 25%)
and capital income (from 4% to 7%). Because capital income is concentrated at
the top, while public benefits accrue mainly to the bottom, both changes could
have counteracting effects on total inequality. Also self-employment imputations
had a growing participation (from 7% to 13%), mainly due to the imputed rentals
from owner-occupied housing.
This general composition of disposable income is of course very variable along
the social ladder, as can be seen in figure 2.3. In the bottom deciles transfers
and salary income make up most revenues. Social benefits and private transfers
are regrettably not disaggregated in the 1973 and 1980 data, but the progressive
nature of the first can be seen clearly in 1990. Wages reach maximum participation
in the middle deciles, and self-employment income was somewhat skewed to the
top in the first years. Revenues from capital are the most concentrated: almost
absent in the lower classes, they constitute over 10% of income for the upper
decile and around 30% for the top 1%. This pattern is similar in other countries
not possible here because of lack of data. However, I consider necessary to include this element,
specially in a context marked by rising prices of dwelling and with the housing bubble in the
horizon.
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(e.g. Piketty, 2003).
FIGURE 2.3: Disposable income composition by deciles
Source: author’s calculations, using sgini module for STATA by Philippe van
Kerm.
In all cases incomes are equivalised by household size, using the OECD scale. The last bar of each
year represents the top 1%.
Figure 2.4 plots inequality for each component of income, following the decom-
position method originally developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). It shows
that employment incomes got slightly more concentrated over the period: wages
and salaries went from 50.6 to 53.2 Gini points, and self-employment income from
84.1 to 86.5.29 The element with the most uneven distribution is capital income
(99-95 Gini points), the increasing participation of which also pulled up total in-
equality. These forces were offset by a more homogeneous distribution of self-
employment imputations and transfers, income sources which, as we have seen,
experienced substantial growth over the period.
29Recall that this is the Gini index for each component over the whole population, not only over
the households which do have each kind of income. If we considered only families with salary
income, for example, we would get a quite constant Gini index of 34-36. Both computations are
showing different facts (and none of them is wage inequality among the workforce, which would
correspond to individual-level data).
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FIGURE 2.4: Gini indices for components
of disposable income
Source: Author’s calculations, using sgini module for
STATA by Philippe van Kerm.
In all cases incomes are equivalised by household size, using the
OECD scale. ’WE imp.’ means imputed incomes from labour activ-
ity, while ’SE imp.’ refers to non-monetary self-employment incomes
such as that from owner-occupied housing.
2.4.2 Inequality in levels
As we can see, the near stability of the Gini index does not imply the absence
of several interesting distributive changes. A further image emerges if we take
a look at the levels of income: in order to do so, table 2.12 displays mean dis-
posable per capita equivalent income by deciles, in constant 1990 pesetas. All
groups experienced an increase in their purchasing power during the period.30
The profiles of income growth were dissimilar in the two sub-periods: while dur-
ing the seventies it was higher at the lower-mid levels, in the nineties it was the
extremes which benefited the most (pointing towards the expansion in Welfare
State’s transfers in the case of the low-income households). If we look at the top
1%, we even find stagnation in the first sub-period (the oil-crisis decade) and a
very significant recovery in the second. The ratios in the last rows confirm the
same impression of a weak decrease in economic distances.
Let us recall that the Gini index and other related indicators measure relative in-
equality (i.e., independent from the scale: constant if all incomes were multiplied
by the same factor). If absolute differences in income within a society are also
30It should be borne in mind that disposable income is still subject to indirect taxes, so changes
in consumption taxation also affected final material well-being.
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TABLE 2.12: Levels and growth of Disposable Equivalent Income
Mean (constant 1990 ptas) Increase
1973 1980 1990 1980/73 1990/80 1990/73
Dec. 1 257,168 279,276 359,219 8.6% 28.6% 39.7%
Dec. 2 385,927 440,857 540,182 14.2% 22.5% 40.0%
Dec. 3 475,042 543,928 652,221 14.5% 19.9% 37.3%
Dec. 4 558,261 633,925 754,046 13.6% 18.9% 35.1%
Dec. 5 640,977 727,475 863,084 13.5% 18.6% 34.7%
Dec. 6 737,294 826,796 974,459 12.1% 17.9% 32.2%
Dec. 7 854,088 950,880 1,111,928 11.3% 16.9% 30.2%
Dec. 8 1,015,400 1,119,565 1,302,864 10.3% 16.4% 28.3%
Dec. 9 1,260,337 1,373,365 1,615,610 9.0% 17.6% 28.2%
Dec. 10 2,369,292 2,399,594 3,004,124 1.3% 25.2% 26.8%
Top 1% 5,691,256 5,705,531 8,444,164 0.3% 48.0% 48.4%
Total 855,313 929,507 1,117,712 8.7% 20.2% 30.7%
Dec. 10/1 9.21 8.59 8.36 0.15 0.88 0.68
Dec. 10/5 3.70 3.30 3.48 0.09 1.35 0.77
Dec. 5/1 2.49 2.60 2.40 1.57 0.65 0.87
Source: Author’s calculations, using GDP deflators from Prados de la Escosura (2003).
Deciles of individuals based on Disposable equivalent income, obtained with the OECD scale.
thought to be important, we can calculate an absolute Gini, which is the same
index without normalization to the mean (as put forward by Ravallion, 2003).
Doing this exercise with the three years, we get an increase in the absolute in-
equality index of 24% between 1973 and 1990. Relative economic distances did
not change that much, but they did in absolute terms, in actual consumption ca-
pacity.31
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have analysed the sources available on disposable income distri-
bution in Spain during the years surrounding the transition to democracy. The
main data come from the Household Budget Surveys conducted by the INE,
which contain very rich information but need to be used with caution. It is
widely known that they suffer from severe under-reporting – and, furthermore,
that this is not homogeneous across income sources. Such a problem entails that
31The issue is more complicated. Taking into account diminishing utility of incomes, it could be
argued that absolute differences in income would be more accurately expressed after some kind
of functional transformation to reflect it.
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the under-estimation of incomes is not homogeneous across income levels, bias-
ing the inequality indices readily obtained from the data.
I have performed a two-step correction procedure, trying to identify under-repor-
ting first with an Engel’s curve approach (contrasting the self-employed with the
wage-earners in their incomes and food/energy expenditure) and then with an
aggregate adjustment to the magnitudes of the household sector given in Na-
tional Accounts. The results allow to question the conventional wisdom that in-
equality strongly diminished in Spain during these decades. The Gini indices of
all surveys are pulled up by the correction, and the trend across the years signifi-
cantly weakens.
This leads directly to asking another question. Did transition to democracy not in-
troduce significant distributive improvements? Political economy theory would
expect from democracy an inclination to favour the lower classes (at least, rela-
tive to a right-wing dictatorship as Spain had recently suffered), via labour mar-
ket regulation, welfare state benefits, and progressive taxation. We do witness an
increase in the importance of transfers received by the households at the bottom
of the distribution, reflecting Welfare State development in the years after 1977.
But they did not outdo forces pulling in the opposite direction. The tax system
did not turn out progressive, as the next chapter will show. Absolute gains from
growth went both to the lower and the upper classes.
Economic growth and decline in inequality in the years after 1950 were suggested
to facilitate the transition in the 1970s. Prados de la Escosura (2008) interpreted
in this way the elimination of absolute poverty and the growth of the middle
class, which would have permitted the stabilization of democracy, contrary to
what happened in the interwar period. But that evolution does not seem to have
gone much further. Liberalization brought about new distributive forces, while
in the context of general economic distress in Europe, the new political system
did not turn out to disproportionately favour the less well-off. At least, it could
not effectively counteract market forces towards growing inequality.
This is, of course, a political choice, reflecting the equilibrium between classes
or interest groups in the young parliamentary state. In that sense, the lack of
economic equalization could be enlightening about the access to political power.
In the next chapter, I explore the role played by the tax system, as a reflection of
power structures and as a distributive instrument.
Chapter 3
The distribution of the tax burden
The relationship between democracy, inequality and redistribution has inspired extensive
research, but consensus is still elusive. In order to contribute to this discussion, the
author analyses the Spanish case, where transition to democracy was accompanied by
a comprehensive tax reform, aiming at increasing progressivity and revenue. But how
effectively did it change the distribution of the tax burden? Was there a ‘fiscal revolution’?
The results show that persistent regressivity (albeit decreasing) exacerbated income in-
equality, failing to attain convergence with more developed countries. The joint effect of
the fiscal system, however, was slightly positive due to progressive social spending.1
3.1 Introduction
“Do you think that, generally, taxes are fairly collected? That is, that the
ones who own more pay more?”2
During the last thirty years, approximately 80% of Spanish citizens would an-
swer no to this question according to annual opinion polls (Alvira and García,
2005). Spaniards do not seem to believe that their tax system is progressive, con-
trary to what was proclaimed as an objective during the political transition. Are
they right? And what could that tell us about the effects of democratization on
distribution?
Redistribution and progressivity are commonplace today in the debate about tax-
ation, but the force of these ideas has changed strongly over history. They were
1An adapted version of this chapter has been published in European Review of Economic History
in August 2015, under the title “Did Democracy bring Redistribution? Insights from the Spanish
tax system (1960-1990)”.
2Question posed in surveys by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, an official sociological
research center.
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brought by evolving economic thought and political scenarios at the turn of the
20th Century, to become gradually accepted by democratic states. However, after
the development of Welfare States their validity has been questioned, especially
since the economic conditions of the 1970s-80s motivated a stronger emphasis
on the disincentive effects of redistributive taxation. So is redistribution an auto-
matic side effect of inequality, under a democracy? If it were, we would expect the
impact of taxes and benefits to change drastically as a result of a regime transition
– if this entails an effective modification of power and decision-making institu-
tions, and social preferences support redistribution. In this chapter, I investigate
the case of Spain during the years surrounding the coming of democracy, to shed
some light on the issue.
Empirical investigation on tax incidence originated in the mid 20th Century, with
the path-breaking studies of Barna (1945) and Nicholson (1965) for the UK and
Musgrave (1951), Musgrave et al. (1974), and Pechman and Okner (1974) for
the USA. The basics of this approach are still followed today by academia (e.g.
Piketty and Saez, 2007) and official statistical institutions. Other studies have fo-
cused on public expenditure, or encompassed both aspects (Barnard et al., 2011;
Breceda et al., 2009), although many leave aside indirect taxation (e.g. Wang and
Caminada, 2011). The literature is wide, but it lacks a common methodological
framework and shows no consensus in the relation with political economic vari-
ables.
For the case of Spain, most of the available analyses focus on specific taxes (es-
pecially the personal income tax, e.g. Argimón and Marín, 1989; Onrubia et al.,
2007).3 Some general estimations were performed in the late period of Franco’s
regime (e.g. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973; Lagares, 1975; Perona, 1972;
Pérez Morales, 1974; Valle, 1970, 1974) and also for 1978 (Confederación Española
de Cajas de Ahorros, 1978) and 1990 (Manresa and Calonge, 2001). Regrettably,
these are not directly comparable due to methodological differences: so far, we
do not have a long run description of the distribution of the tax burden in the
country, to contrast with political events. Obtaining it, and comparing it with
other cases, is the primary goal of this chapter. The preliminary hypothesis, aris-
ing from prior empirical literature and the analysis of the revenue structure, is
3Other works have dealt with all of direct contributions (Martínez, 2009), the indirect side of
the budget (Argimón et al., 1987; Avellaneda and Sánchez, 2002; Edo Hernández, 1992; Mayo
and Salas, 1993), or social contributions (Argimón and González-Páramo, 1987; Castellano, 1977).
This is not an exhaustive list.
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that the tax system underwent a transition from a regressive to a somewhat pro-
portional system.
This study is necessary for the historical interpretation of the Spanish transition to
democracy. As soon as 1977 a broad tax reform was initiated, having among its
central goals an improvement in equity. Progressivity and redistribution were
explicitly introduced, even in the new Constitution. I analyse to what extent
such policy orientation was effectively applied in practice. The main finding is
that regressivity was not eradicated from the tax system, although it was atten-
uated, after having increased during the 1960s. As a result, taxation effected an
inverse redistribution of income, contradicting the political discourse and leaving
the country far from convergence with the European Welfare State model.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2 introduces the theoreti-
cal framing, and section 3 describes the Spanish tax system and its main reforms.
In section 4 I expose the methodology, while section 5 presents the results, ul-
timately addressing an international comparison. The conclusion sums up the
main contributions and comments on further paths for research on the topic.
3.2 Democracy and fiscal redistribution
As has been previously mentioned, classic political economy models predicted
that an extension of franchise would be followed by an increase in redistribution
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Applied to the theory of political transitions, the
basics of the argument are also found in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Boix
(2003): democratic countries will be (more?) redistributive, and the threat of such
a policy may hinder the achievement or consolidation of democracy.
The logic of these arguments has failed to be consistently backed by empirical
work. Aidt and Jensen (2009b)’s results pointed to a significant impact of fran-
chise expansion on the adoption of progressive income taxes. Scheve and Stasav-
age (2012), however, failed to confirm this hypothesis regarding inheritance tax-
ation. On the other hand, the positive impact of democratization has been estab-
lished for the expenditure side by Lindert (1994), but research examining differ-
ences between the socio-economic policies of democracies and non-democracies
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normally does not get the expected results (Mulligan et al., 2004).4
In this regard, a line of literature has called for a nuanced interpretation of po-
litical transitions and regimes. Acemoglu et al. (2013) discuss several channels
through which democracy may not result in income equalization: increased struc-
tural transformation, or the preeminence of the interests of the elite or the mid-
dle class. In their empirical exploration, they find no robust effect of democracy
on inequality. Albertus and Menaldo (2014) posit that a relationship between
democracy and redistribution only arises when a revolutionary threat hampers
the elite’s control of the democratic transition. Their data, however, measure re-
distribution only indirectly.
We therefore lack a solid consensus about the effects of democratization on re-
distribution. This paper proposes Spain as a significant case study. After a four-
decade dictatorship, the country underwent a political transition since 1976, ac-
companied by a profound tax reform that was the basis for the development of
the Welfare State and reinforced international integration. However, a historical
quantitative study of the distributive changes along the period is still not avail-
able.
The interest of the study lies in several points. First, Spain is an example of a
peaceful transition: arguably a desirable feature, whose results could be enlight-
ening to compare to other processes. Its political history has many similarities
with those of Portugal and Greece, which also suffered dictatorships in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, while the rest of Western Europe was under demo-
cratic rule. Whether they followed similar paths during and after democratisa-
tion could be a good starting point to place the experience analysed here, using
Italy as a contrast with longer-standing parliamentary institutions. Several Latin
American countries, on the other hand, also experienced recent democratic tran-
sitions, though at different levels of economic development and inequality.
The international context is very relevant here: “third wave” democratizations
took place at a time of crisis, after the golden age of fordism, growth and redis-
tribution in Western countries, and surrounded by increasing global integration.
This scenario influences the range of policies available. International mobility
of assets has been signalled by several scholars as an obstacle to redistribution,
4The relationship between inequality and redistribution has also been challenged: while Mi-
lanovic (2000) found support for it (leaving aside indirect taxation), others suggest a “Robin Hood
paradox”, redistribution being more extensive where it is less needed (Lindert, 2004).
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given the reinforced leverage of their owners (Bates and Lien, 1985; Freeman and
Quinn, 2012).
A specific point of this work is the focus on the revenue side of the budget –
although some attention is paid to household benefits as well. Most of the stud-
ies in the political economy tradition have concentrated on disposable income or
social expenditure, i.e., indirect or incomplete indicators of redistribution. Tax
progressivity, however, is often a social demand in itself, and it is the result of
the two-sided budget that matters. Furthermore, the interactions between both
dimensions are of interest: in this sense, Timmons (2005) argued that there is a
correspondence between the regressivity of taxation and the service to the inter-
ests of the poor (leaving little space for effective vertical redistribution), while
Steinmo (1989) and Lindert (2004) suggested that more progressive systems tend
to be smaller and therefore less redistributive as a whole. To investigate these
issues further, better historical data on tax incidence is highly convenient.
To sum up, while early studies suggested a direct relationship between democra-
tization and redistribution, this idea has been elusive empirically and challenged
by new theory. My hypothesis is that the Spanish tax system went from regres-
sivity to near-proportionality during the political transition, thus failing to attain
progressivity – which was an explicit objective. This ‘insufficiency’ affected the
redistributive capacity of the joint tax-and-transfer system. The confirmation of
these insights would pose our case study as an advocate for the nuanced inter-
pretation of political transitions in the distributive arena.
3.3 Reforms and persistence in the tax system
Two tax systems may be distinguished in modern Spain’s history. Both were born
in times of political change: in 1845, shortly after parliamentary politics stabilized
under dominance of the moderate party; again in 1977, as Franco’s dictatorship
gave way to a new democratic regime. This coincidence provides a motivation
for the paper, following Schumpeter’s insight that “The public finances are one of
the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively
of its political life" (Schumpeter, 1954).
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The main features of the 1845 system were the predominance of indirect taxes
(especially excises), the design of direct taxation as factor-specific taxes,5 and a
scarce revenue potential, tending to stagnate (Comín, 2010b). The structure was
completed in the turn of the century adding taxes on capital and labour.6 Further
changes were the introduction of the first income tax during the 2nd Republic
(1932) – as a limited super-tax on very high incomes – and some reforms under
Franco’s dictatorship, which did not affect the fundamentals of the model (Comín
and Martorell, 2013). Nearest to our period, Navarro Rubio’s reforms in 1957
and 1964 were related to a major turn in economic policy: the abandonment of
autarchic orientation with the 1959 Stabilization Plan.7 The first reform pursued
an increase in revenues, together with the extension of incentives to investment,
while in 1964 the alleged objective was redistributive. However, in spite of the
propaganda filling the Minister of Finance’s speeches, redistribution did not find
its way under the dictatorship. Collection procedures actually took a step back-
wards with the generalization of presumptive collective assessment of taxable
bases, due to the lack of capacity in the tax administration.
Despite the lack of fundamental tax reform, there were some significant changes
in the financing of public administrations in Franco’s Spain. Social Security was
introduced in a 1963 law as the result of integration of different social insurance
programs, taking off in practice in 1967 (Comín, 2010a).8 As a consequence, in the
final years of the dictatorship public budgets did grow noticeably, but without a
(politically complicated) ‘tax’ reform, using an independent contributory system
that increased pressure on labour. Figure 3.1 shows the share of social contribu-
tions in total tax revenue progressively growing during late Francoism, to become
5This type of taxation is directed upon each specific source of income regardless of the tax-
payer’s characteristics, as opposed to personal taxation, which aims to jointly consider economic
capacity from all sources.
6The government also attempted to introduce progressive rates in the Inheritance tax, some-
thing which was rejected at the Senate (but finally passed in a similar fashion in 1910). The de-
bate in Parliament shows the full validity of the idea of proportionality at the time: increasing
rates were not defended as a redistributive tool (a socialist, subversive idea), but because of their
revenue-increasing effect or, in any case, as a compensation for regressivity in other taxes (San
Julián, 2011).
7A deflationary programme put forth in time of critical economic imbalances, meant to start
internal and external liberalization.
8In all the thesis, Social Security contributions will be considered as a tax. This is based on
the extent to which the system functions as an insurance or not: compulsory or voluntary nature,
the level of budgetary autonomy, the actuarial or pay-as-you-go administration, the proportion-
ality between contributions and benefits, or the existence of non-contributory pensions. Bandrés
and Cuenca (1996) showed that in 1992 the ‘transfer’ component in Spanish public pensions was
around 50% of the benefit received, and not homogeneous across professional regimes, so the
tax-benefit approach is justified.
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the main source of funding in the beginning of the 1970s. The shares of direct and
indirect taxation got closer over these years, with both lines almost coinciding
since 1978. This was an objective of the reform, but to know its implications in
terms of progressivity a deeper analysis is required.
FIGURE 3.1: Main categories as percentage of Spanish tax revenue
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Source: Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas (see Appendix A for details
on the inner disaggregation).
There is a break in the series in 1967, due to the coming into force of the 1963 Social Security
law, which entailed the unification of the public social insurance system, the incorporation of
some private insurance institutions and an improvement in aggregate accounting. The change
in trend due to the reforms in 1977-78 can be clearly seen.
Transition to democracy brought about a comprehensive transformation of the
tax system, thought of as a basic aspect of the regime change. The main political
parties shared the core of a reform program put forward by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies, a centre related to the Ministry of Public Finance (Instituto de Estudios
Fiscales, 1973, 1976): it aimed at attaining a balance between direct and indirect
taxes, thus improving the fairness of the system, and at increasing revenue to
finance the development of the Welfare State in response to social demands. All
this meant a convergence with the European model. It was made possible only a
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few years after Franco’s death, as part of the negotiations in the Moncloa Pacts.9
As an immediate effect, the new personal income tax (hereafter, PIT) substituted
a progressive structure for the previous range of factor taxes, and became cen-
tral in public revenues, unlike its old precedents. A Wealth tax was introduced
during the same years, but always provided a small share of the public budget,
as did the Inheritance tax. Both have gradually become irrelevant; a process re-
lated to widespread fraud and, in the last case, to the cession to Autonomous
Communities (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2010a). Social contributions also
experienced changes in the contributory scheme and administrative reorganisa-
tion, but important differences across regimes remained (i.e., between “general”
workers and those of special sectors: agrarian, self-employed, or others).
The consensus period, however, did not last long, and gave way to what some
have called the “fiscal counter-reform” (Comín, 2007; Pan-Montojo, 1996). The
culmination of projected changes was delayed, especially in indirect taxes: VAT
was not introduced until 1986, at the time of accession to the European Economic
Community, replacing a Transactions tax and the Luxury tax. Generally, indirect
taxation followed the lead of international integration and harmonization in the
construction of the common market (also affecting excises, public monopolies
and tariffs).10
After 1978 public budgets experienced a significant expansion, which funded the
nascent Welfare State (together with an increase in public deficits; see Comín
and Díaz, 2005).11 The process of convergence with more advanced countries
remained nevertheless incomplete: as shown in figure 3.2, total tax revenue in
terms of GDP approached that of the EU core, but a significant differential stayed
in place, and the path was reversed by the economic crises of the early 1990s’ and
2008, indicating its vulnerability (a somewhat different story would arise if our
reference were the other OECD countries, which Spain has slightly surpassed).
Understanding the unfinished convergence with Western Europe’s model will re-
quire taking into account the regime transition in Spain together with the change
in economic conditions since the original development of Welfare States. The oil
9Agreements reached in the autumn of 1977 by the main political parties. They focused on set-
ting a policy response to the economic crisis, but included also several points on taxation (Comín,
2007).
10Tariffs had a considerable importance in the sixties (a common feature of underdeveloped
countries), lost due to commercial liberalization. State monopolies, banned by EU legislation,
were replaced by excises.
11Resources were also obtained through seigniorage and financial repression, estimated by Re-
pullo (1992) as 1.7% of GDP in average during the eighties.
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shocks and the turn taken by economic policies in the eighties moved emphasis
from equity to efficiency.
FIGURE 3.2: Tax revenue as percentage of GDP
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EU-14: European Union of 15 members excluding Spain. OECD-other excludes all EU-15 countries. This
last series is not homogeneous over time, since prior to 1995 data is not available for a number of coun-
tries (Chile – pre-1990, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Korea – 1972, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia).
Since 1990 no global redesign has been undertaken, although partial modifica-
tions have been abundant, affecting PIT (1991, 1998, 2006)12, the corporation tax
(1995, 2006) and VAT (1992, 1995, 2010, 2012). Increases in VAT rates have sev-
eral times been implemented in conjunction with reductions in social security
contributions. The democratic period also involved decentralisation in favour of
regional governments, both of expenditure and revenue. This process finally en-
tailed the transfer of regulatory capacities in 1996, which brought about a partial
differentiation among regions and a “race to the bottom” in some cases like the
Inheritance tax (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2010a). A thorough approach
12Introduction of optional separate filing for married couples in 1989, modifications in the al-
lowance structure in 1998, partial dualization in 2006.
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to the reforms up to the mid 2000s can be found in Martínez-Vázquez and Sanz-
Sanz (2007).
Was there a transition into progressivity as a result of these changes? In spite
of the stated objectives and the classic political economy models, aspects such
as the constantly high share of social contributions or the more intense taxation
of wages and salaries in PIT (related to the bigger possibilities of fraud in other
sources, as will be seen in chapter 4) sustain our hypothesis of a still regressive
or near-proportional incidence in 1990, as Manresa and Calonge (2001) obtained.
This culmination of the tax reform process is not consistent with the discourses
emanating from the government, nor with the most extended opinion among
citizens about fairness in taxation (which are analysed in chapter 5).
3.4 Calculating progressivity
Tax incidence analysis proceeds by imputation of tax revenue to the social groups
assumed to have borne the corresponding burden (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002).
I use the results of previous theoretical and empirical literature to assign tax pay-
ments and obtain effective tax rates by percentiles, and indices of progressivity
and redistribution.13 The methodology is briefly reviewed here; for further de-
tails, see Appendix C.1.
Some limitations of this work are the uncertainty on the economic incidence of
several taxes and the non-inclusion of possible dynamic effects.14
3.4.1 Time span of the analysis
I have chosen the years 1970, 1982 and 1990 as representative of the evolution of
the tax system during these decades, spanning from the latter years of Franco’s
regime to after the consolidation of democracy.15
13Progressivity is the increase in the tax rate as income grows, while redistribution is the differ-
ence in inequality caused by taxation.
14For a discussion on the latter, see Onrubia et al. (2005). Here I take pre-tax incomes as given,
without considering the impact that taxes could have on them through labour market/investment
decisions.
15The choice of 1982 is due to the availability of PIT micro-data starting then: “PANEL PURO Y
EXTENDIDO IRPF 1982/1998 IEF-AEAT (Declarantes)”. These data have been used for the years
1982 and 1990 (tax returns filed in 1983 and 1991).
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My analysis takes an annual approach, as is usual in most of the literature. There
are, however, other options, suggested by several scholars to tackle the variability
of income across the life cycle: using yearly taxes on “permanent income” or
applying a lifetime perspective.
In the first case, permanent income is normally obtained with an econometric es-
timation or proxied by the level of current consumption (Poterba, 1989). Such an
approach would be valid in the presence of perfect capital markets; nonetheless,
taking this as a baseline assumption seems rather unrealistic to the author.
The lifetime-income-lifetime-burden perspective is conceptually different. It at-
tempts to calculate the total amount earned and paid in taxes by an individual
throughout her life (Davies et al., 1984; Fullerton and Rogers, 1993). Given the
inconsistency of tax policy in such a long term, this exercise reflects only a hypo-
thetical scenario. However, if it is thoroughly undertaken, the lifetime analysis
would allow disentangling interpersonal from inter-temporal redistribution: its re-
sults would correspond only to the first one (Bengtsson et al., 2015).16 Nonethe-
less, income smoothing is also an important dimension in the Welfare State, taken
into account in the present research with the annual calculations. This framework
is also less demanding in terms of data (a hard constraint in our case) and more
consistent in a context of changing tax policy.
It should also be noted that this paper does not consider any dynamics: when
discussing the effects of the tax system on income inequality, it is always inside
the annual benchmark, between different “phases” of income defined in the main
text. I am not trying to assess the effects of taxation in one year on inequality in
subsequent years.
3.4.2 Incidence hypotheses
As is well known, the long-term economic incidence of taxes does not necessarily
coincide with the legal one. Regrettably, this is a matter which theoretical and
empirical works still have not completely clarified. I have only considered one
hypothesis regarding income, wealth and consumption taxes, since there is quite
a wide consensus about their real incidence in applied literature. On the other
hand, alternative possibilities are calculated for the most controversial cases: so-
cial contributions, the corporation tax and real estate taxes (see table 3.1).
16I am referring to inter-temporal “life-cycle” redistribution, not between generations.
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TABLE 3.1: Tax incidence hypotheses
BASELINE ALTERNATIVES
Income No shifting -
Wealth No shifting -
Real Estate Occupier 50% Owner - 50% Occupier
Social Contributions Worker
50% Worker - 25% Employer -
25% Consumption
Corporate
34% Capital - a) 100% Capital
33% Labour - b) 30% Capital - 70% Labour
33% Consumption c) 70% Capital - 30% Consumption
Consumption Consumer -
Stamp Duties Purchaser -
Source: Author’s compilation.
Social contributions have been the centre of important debate in the country, spe-
cially in relation to the causes of unemployment. The question whether em-
ployers’ contributions are borne by them or by the worker (via a smaller net
salary) remains unsolved. International literature concludes that workers would
eventually assume the whole burden (Gruber, 1997; Gruber and Krueger, 1991),
but studies with Spanish data show no consensus. Most cited is Argimón and
González-Páramo (1987), which states a 100% impact on workers; however, oth-
ers have reached different results: for Toharia (1981) there would be shifting to
prices, Escobedo (1991) found incidence on salaries around 40% and finally Mel-
guizo (2007) concluded that the cost was borne by enterprises.
The institutional framework in which Social Security was introduced in the coun-
try, together with evidence on the scarce initial resistance of employers to the con-
tributions (Molinero and Ysàs, 1998) point towards incidence on workers. Ac-
cording to theory, this would be the result with rigid labour supply, which is
close to the findings of international and national empirical work (Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999; Fernández Val, 2003). I therefore use this as the baseline hy-
pothesis, but in combination with a mixed alternative, since several studies point
to social contributions among the causes of high unemployment in the country
(something that would not be the case if they were completely paid by workers).
The political and institutional change might have favoured a decrease in shift-
ing, given that workers’ bargaining power grew with the legalization of labour
unions. Towards the end of the 1970s businesses started to make noisier com-
plaints about the burden of social contributions (Cabrera and Del Rey, 2002). The
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alternative hypothesis imputes 50% of the tax to employees, 25% to the employer
and 25% to consumers (these calculations are available in Appendix C.3.2).17
Concerning the Corporation tax, there is barely any empirical evidence for Spain:
only a study from the seventies that concluded shifting to prices, related to oligopo-
lization (Lagares, 1976). The conventional assumption is that in an economy with
fixed capital supply, this factor will bear the burden, while a portion would pass
on to labour if that condition is relaxed (effects on savings or international cap-
ital mobility). The openness of the Spanish economy was increasing during our
period of study, but departing from a very low level; it could therefore be consid-
ered plausible that shifting towards labour was weak. The lack of solid evidence,
however, makes me turn to a balanced incidence between the three possible bear-
ers of the tax (Appendix C.3.3 includes alternative estimations).
There has also been discussion in the case of Real Estate taxes. They can be con-
sidered a tax on housing services, borne by the tenant in rented properties; it has
also been maintained that a part of the tax could be falling on the owners and po-
tentially shifted to other forms of capital (Mieszkowski, 1972). Applied literature
has mostly imputed it on occupiers, be them owners or tenants. Nevertheless, the
rigid regulation of the Spanish housing market since the 1920s (freeze on rental
prices until liberalization in 1985), leads me to consider an alternative estimation
with 50% of the tax paid by owners (see Appendix C.3.4).
The estimation of tax payments consists in allocating the revenue of each tax us-
ing the distribution of the corresponding tax base across households. It generally
relies on the implicit assumption that fraud is uniformly distributed (not that it is
non-existent, given the use of real tax revenue instead of legal simulation accord-
ing to income). This has been a necessary simplification. It may be argued that
the direction of the bias is an overestimation of progressivity, because tax evasion
was historically concentrated on high incomes (Comín et al., 1995) and in recent
work it has been found to be more extended in capital and self-employment in-
comes (see Domínguez et al., 2016 and also the results of chapter 4).
17The same incidence hypotheses are applied to both workers’ and employers’ social contribu-
tions. Although studies have always considered the first paid by workers, it is inconsistent with
incidence theory to make a distinction.
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3.4.3 Data and income concepts
To make the results representative for the whole of the tax system, I use data
from all Public Administrations: central State, Social Security and sub-central
governments (accrual basis). A complete list can be found in Appendix A. Non-
tax public revenue is not included. Full disaggregation is not available, specially
for local taxes at the beginning of the period (when the tax system was more
complex and statistics are of less quality). All in all, the study covers over 90% of
tax revenue.
Regarding the distribution of tax bases, I employ the Household Budget Surveys
(HBSs) as previously adjusted for under-reporting in chapter 2. Income is used
to impute tax payments and also as an indicator of economic capacity by which
to rank households. The following phases are distinguished:
• PRE-TAX INCOME = Gross Monetary Income (Net Monetary Income + Factor
Taxes & Social Contributions) + Imputed Income (Self-production + Owner-occupied
housing)
• NET FACTOR INCOME = Pre-Tax Income – Factor Taxes & Social Contributions
• POST-TAX INCOME = Net Factor Income – Consumption Taxes
• DISPOSABLE INCOME = Net Factor Income + Public Benefits + Private Transfers
• POST-TAX-AND-TRANSFER INCOME = Disposable Income – Consumption Taxes
Factor taxes are those falling on the households’ production factors (e.g. wages
or capital income), while consumption taxes are paid in the process of acquiring
goods or services. This distinction is close to the legal definition of direct and
indirect taxes, but does not match it exactly, since consumption taxes include the
share of direct taxes of businesses that are shifted onto prices.
Post-tax income is a statistical construction, not directly perceived by the house-
holds but necessary for the goal of this paper: the distributive effects of the total
tax system, before adding public benefits. Inequality of Disposable income and
Post-tax-and-transfer income will also be shown, as a reflection of consumption
capacity and to evaluate joint tax-and-transfer incidence.
A further word has to be said about public benefits. The capitalization component
in them corresponds to Pre-tax income, while the redistributive part is a transfer
from the State and belongs only to Disposable income. It is out of the scope of this
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paper to distinguish among both: I have considered all the amount as transfers.18
Nonetheless, an alternative estimation is performed in Appendix C.3.2 placing
pensions as part of Pre-tax income.
3.4.4 Indicators, equivalization and weighting
• Average Effective Tax Rates by income range:
AETR =
n∑
h=1
(Th/Yh)Wh
n∑
h=1
Wh
, h = 1...n, (3.1)
where Th is total tax payments by household h, Yh her total pre-tax income,
Wh her weight in the calculation (product of sampling weight ρ and the
household’s real size Sh), and n is the total number of households in the
range. If the profile of AETR is increasing in income, the tax (system) is
progressive (Musgrave and Thin, 1948).
• Kakwani index: progressivity indicator, obtained as the difference between
the concentration of tax payments CT and the Gini of Pre-tax income GY :
K = CT −GY (3.2)
It takes value 0 for a proportional tax, positive for a progressive one.
• Reynolds-Smolensky index: redistribution indicator. GY being the Gini in-
dex for Pre-Tax income and GY−T the corresponding Gini for Post-tax in-
come, it is defined as:
RS = GY −GY−T (3.3)
A tax is redistributive if RS>0. This change in inequality can be decom-
posed as follows:
GY −GY−T = (GY − CY−T )− (GY−T − CY−T ) = V E −RR, (3.4)
whereCY−T is the concentration of Post-tax income with households ranked
by Pre-tax incomes. V E captures the Vertical Effect (redistribution among
households with their ranking fixed) and RR is Re-Ranking (if households
18Recall the findings of Bandrés and Cuenca (1996).
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get re-ordered, V E overestimates (underestimates) the decline (increase) in
inequality caused by taxation).19
RS is related to the progressivity index K in the following way:
RS =
t
(1− t)K −RR (3.5)
Redistribution is a combined result of progressivity (K) and the average tax rate
(level effect given by t) – and the possible re-ranking. This relation will be impor-
tant to keep in mind.
I take equivalent pre-tax incomes as a reference for all calculations.20 Since be-
tween the different scenarios both the base distribution and tax regulations change,
the evolution in all indices is a joint effect (proposals such as Dardanoni and Lam-
bert, 2002 or Kasten et al., 1994 aim to disentangle both components). The same
issue, of course, is present when comparing tax systems in different countries.
Following the standard in welfare literature, all income data are equivalized be-
fore calculating inequality indices. An equivalence scale is a transformation of
household incomes to obtain an adjusted “per capita” value that takes into ac-
count economies of scale within the family (and assumes that all members share
their income equally). I use the OECD scale, which gives value 1 to the first adult,
0.7 to the subsequent ones and 0.5 to minors (up to 14 years old). This choice is
consistent with empirical results based on Spanish data (Bosch-Domenech, 1991;
Duclos and Mercader-Prats, 1999; Labeaga et al., 2004).
Households are then weighted by their real size. This implies that the results
are given in terms of inequality among individuals, not households: attributing
the same importance to all persons regardless of the family they belong to (but I
provide some indices with household weighting as well).
19All indices have been calculated in Stata, using the ‘progres’ module (Peichl and Van Kerm,
2007).
20Making a sequential analysis is misleading, since the order of the calculations has an impact
on the results; many taxes are simultaneously paid, so it would be an arbitrary choice. This point
is made by Onrubia et al. (2013).
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3.5 Results
I first show my main results for tax imputation in the years 1970, 1982 and 1990.
The following subsection includes a consideration of monetary household bene-
fits, so as to display the effects of the joint tax-and-transfer system. Then, I com-
pare these data with similar estimations for other countries. Finally, I provide
some insights about the evolution during the sixties, which was not possible to
include in the main calculations because of data deficiencies.
3.5.1 The tax system between 1970 and 1990
Average Effective Tax Rates by deciles are shown in tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. The
top is further disaggregated, because of the huge dispersion in it, and the fact
that these taxpayers concentrate a significant portion of total income and tax pay-
ments.
TABLE 3.2: Average Effective Tax Rates in 1970
Direct
Social
Indirect Total
Indirect over
Contributions Disp. Income
Decile 1 11.22 5.92 87.21 104.40 11.01
Decile 2 3.11 11.53 13.65 28.31 12.52
Decile 3 3.17 12.86 11.53 27.57 11.70
Decile 4 3.41 12.76 10.88 27.06 11.57
Decile 5 3.55 11.85 10.72 26.12 11.69
Decile 6 3.79 11.38 10.00 25.19 10.98
Decile 7 3.90 10.64 9.55 24.10 10.60
Decile 8 4.20 9.23 9.27 22.71 10.26
Decile 9 4.70 7.94 9.31 21.96 10.31
Decile 10 6.09 5.80 8.10 19.98 8.91
Top 5% 6.91 4.78 7.39 19.06 8.07
Top 1% 8.87 2.55 4.99 16.37 5.45
Source: Author’s calculations.
Deciles of individuals ranked by Equivalent pre-tax income. Pre-tax household income is the denominator in
all except the last column.
‘Direct’ includes all taxes paid on income and wealth (of which the main are the Corporation tax and the
Labour tax), ‘Social Contributions’ includes those of employers, workers, civil servants and the self-employed.
‘Indirect’ means taxes incurred in the consumption of goods and services (the main being Tariffs, the Luxury
tax and the General Sales tax). For a complete list, see Appendix A.
In all tables, total tax rates faced by households are bigger in the first deciles
that in the upper ones. Rates estimated for the lower levels of income are very
high, even above 100% in some cases, because there are households with very
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TABLE 3.3: Average Effective Tax Rates in 1982
Direct
Social
Indirect Total
Indirect over
Contributions Disp. Income
Decile 1 19.31 11.44 98.36 129.12 7.77
Decile 2 6.62 18.39 18.55 43.56 10.11
Decile 3 7.22 16.59 11.56 35.37 10.93
Decile 4 7.81 17.28 10.45 35.54 11.29
Decile 5 8.10 18.14 9.37 35.61 10.89
Decile 6 8.38 18.26 9.14 35.78 11.01
Decile 7 8.73 18.12 8.64 35.49 10.73
Decile 8 9.03 18.04 8.11 35.18 10.24
Decile 9 9.49 18.10 7.56 35.15 9.74
Decile 10 11.97 16.54 6.41 34.92 8.57
Top 5% 13.73 14.43 6.13 34.29 8.22
Top 1% 18.32 9.35 4.62 32.29 6.20
Source: Author’s calculations.
Deciles of individuals ranked by Equivalent pre-tax income. Pre-tax household income is the denominator in
all except the last column.
‘Direct’ includes all taxes paid on income and wealth (of which the main are PIT and the Corporation tax),
‘Social Contributions’ includes those of employers, workers, civil servants and the self-employed. ‘Indirect’
means taxes incurred in the consumption of goods and services (the main being the General Sales tax, Excises
and Tariffs). For a complete list, see Appendix A.
scarce or null market income. But leaving the first decile aside, the downward
slope is still present all over the period: from the second to the tenth deciles, in
1970 the AETRs go from 28% to 20%, in 1982 from 44% to 35% and in 1990 from
70% to 46%. The tax system was regressive, placing more burden on low-income
classes. This conclusion is also clear at the tail of the distribution: the top 1% paid
16% of their pre-tax income in taxes in 1970, 32% in 1982 and 44% in 1990 – i.e.,
significantly below the rates faced at the bottom.
This result was driven by social contributions and consumption taxes. The latter
fell overwhelmingly on the poor in spite of mitigating aspects such as the Lux-
ury tax or the different tax rates in VAT.21 This feature is an unsurprising effect
of consumption being less unequally distributed than income. Over disposable
income (last column of each table) the rates appear less markedly decreasing, but
are still so because of the different propensities to save and consume.
21Initially, 6% for foodstuff and other favourably treated goods, 12% for general goods and
33% for certain sumptuous consumption items. The higher rate was abolished in 1992, while the
general one grew progressively up to 21% and the reduced rate was split in two (at present, 4 and
10%).
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TABLE 3.4: Average Effective Tax Rates in 1990
Direct
Social
Indirect Total
Indirect over
Contributions Disp. Income
Decile 1 42.18 8.33 182.41 232.92 17.88
Decile 2 17.16 16.52 37.03 70.71 21.01
Decile 3 13.50 17.64 22.15 53.29 20.22
Decile 4 12.89 18.96 18.26 50.11 19.98
Decile 5 13.54 19.04 16.61 49.19 19.70
Decile 6 14.15 18.87 14.15 47.17 17.75
Decile 7 14.75 19.46 13.47 47.68 17.47
Decile 8 15.53 19.01 12.57 47.11 17.13
Decile 9 16.79 18.17 10.86 45.83 15.04
Decile 10 20.73 16.39 9.35 46.47 13.74
Top 5% 22.63 15.33 7.96 45.91 12.01
Top 1% 29.66 9.49 5.24 44.39 7.73
Source: Author’s calculations.
Deciles of individuals ranked by Equivalent pre-tax income. Pre-tax household income is the denominator in
all except the last column.
‘Direct’ includes all taxes paid on income and wealth (of which the main are PIT and the Corporation tax),
‘Social Contributions’ includes those of employers, workers, civil servants and the self-employed. ‘Indirect’
means taxes incurred in the consumption of goods and services (the main being VAT and Excises). For a
complete list, see Appendix A.
Regarding social contributions, their burden was largely determined by the dis-
tribution of salary income, but not proportionally. The amount to be paid was up
to 1972 assessed upon a legal base set for ten categories in the workforce, with a
regressive effect (there were ten of these for industry and services workers, some-
thing which obviously did not correctly reflect differences in pay). During the
seventies reforms brought the base progressively closer to real salaries, but never
fully. Since 1978, the taxable base is the salary (but not all of its components) up to
an upper cap for each category, which still distorts proportionality for the better
paid workers.22
Direct taxes, on the other hand, had a progressive behaviour.23 This was already
true in 1970, albeit at low rates (near 6% at the top while for almost all the rest it
laid under 4%); more so in 1982 and 1990 (top decile rates had gone up to 12%
and 21% respectively). This shows the effects of the reform undertaken during
the political transition. Several works had already established the progressivity
22A good description of the Social Security contributory system can be found in Monasterio
(1992). See section 5.3.1 for further analysis of the changes in social contributions during the
1980s.
23The first decile is an exception, as a result of low pre-tax incomes combined with the shifting
of real estate and corporation taxes on the prices of goods.
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of PIT, the central tax in this category (e.g. Onrubia et al., 2007).24
Progressivity and redistribution indices in table 3.5 confirm and clarify these ob-
servations. The tax system became less regressive (the Kakwani index is nega-
tive, but its absolute value got smaller), due to the reform in direct taxation and
the changes in the Social Security contributory system. On the other hand, in-
direct taxes became more regressive, even during the seventies in the absence of
significant reform. Such a result can be attributed to some extent to changes in
the underlying structure of consumption: more households started consuming
items subject to Luxury tax, and a reduction in expenditure inequality (favoured
by the development of State benefits in the second sub-period) paradoxically had
the same effect.25 Combined tax regressivity was mitigated but persisted, being
more intense at both ends of the income distribution.
TABLE 3.5: Progressivity and redistribution over the period
1970
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1227 -0.1479 -0.1288 -0.0849
AETR 4.78 8.88 9.73 23.40
RS 0.0059 -0.0170 -0.0163 -0.0332
1982
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1040 -0.0303 -0.1796 -0.0274
AETR 10.25 16.86 8.53 35.64
RS 0.0115 -0.0110 -0.0182 -0.0239
1990
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.0784 -0.0311 -0.2355 -0.0485
AETR 17.57 17.37 13.53 48.46
RS 0.0147 -0.0103 -0.0414 -0.0667
Source: Author’s calculations.
Pre-tax equivalent incomes, weighting by household size.
AETRs for each category are displayed in the second row to show how direct
taxation was powerless to impact positively on the income distribution, when
compared to the weight of the other components. Social contributions grew a lot,
and consumption taxes were reinforced in 1986: the regressive elements outdid
24This tax, however, was affected during the eighties by significant fiscal drag, which made
it less progressive (by bringing up mostly the rates of taxpayers at the bottom), but also more
redistributive (because of the increase in the average tax rate). See e.g. Salas (1997).
25The Gini index for total consumption among individuals was 35.09 in 1970 and had gone
down to 33.13 by 1982 and 32.06 by 1990. Increasing regressivity in indirect taxation was already
observed by Argimón et al. (1987). A similar observation on increasing negative impact of indirect
taxation was made for the case of the UK in the 1980s and 1990s by Glennerster (2006).
Chapter 3. The distribution of the tax burden 61
the progressive ones. All in all, this means that taxation effected an inverse redis-
tribution not only in 1970 but also in 1982 and 1990, in the first years of the new
parliamentary regime and after it was consolidated. The Reynolds-Smolensky
index became larger in absolute value, because of the increase in the tax burden:
in 1970 taxation increased the Gini index in around 3.3 points, 2.4 in 1982, and 6.7
in 1990.
These results seem unexpected at first sight. They are at odds with the stated
objectives of the reform and the equalization demands we would expect a demo-
cratic country to fulfil. There was no fiscal revolution: we can confirm our hy-
pothesis about the transition not sustaining a deep enough change in tax inci-
dence. The first stage of the reform, that of direct taxation, was quite successful
in expanding redistribution, but faced some significant obstacles (notably persis-
tent tax evasion – see chapter 4). The original joint plan, moreover, did not get
fulfilled. It included, among other, new inheritance and wealth taxes and the in-
troduction of VAT: these further developments were not possible after the break-
ing of the initial consensus period around 1979 – after the Constitution had been
passed the year before. The tax reform is connected to the crisis of the governing
UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático, Suárez’s party), which ultimately led to its di-
vision and loss of electoral support. Internal and external criticism from the right
was becoming intense.26 A prominent role was played by the entrepreneurs’ as-
sociation CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales), lobbying
for policies in favour of savings and private investment (Mella, 1992).
This scenario inspired the term “fiscal counter-reform” (Pan-Montojo, 1996). The
initial phase of consensus in the critical moments of the transition was followed
by increased organization and lobbying capacity in the right (employers’ unions
and growth of the right-wing party Alianza Popular). The elections in 1982 brought
to government the social-democratic party PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Es-
pañol): it would stay in power until 1996, culminating some aspects of the plan.
In this sense, table 3.3 represents the first phase of tax developments, and table
3.4 the results of the first PSOE administrations.
26In the words of L. Calvo Sotelo, prime minister in 1981-82: “Fernández Ordóñez and his tax
reform attracted very soon the anger of the right: ‘You are making left-wing politics with votes you got
from the right’” (Calvo Sotelo, 1990, p. 163). A similar perception is transmitted by E. Fuentes
Quintana (architect of the reform, Vice-president of the government and Minister of Economic
Affairs in 1977-78), in an interview published in the 1990s: “The reform measures were effectively
stopped. A big part of the tax changes were paralysed by vested interests” (Fuentes Quintana, 2004).
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During this period, however, the political and economic context had changed,
with support for progressivity considerably weakened. Significantly, the ad-
justments made in the PIT schedule during the eighties reduced the number of
brackets and cut down top marginal tax rates.27 This makes it difficult to read
changes in tax incidence as a reflection of strongly opposed party positions. In-
direct taxation was not only modernized but also reinforced, specially affecting
the lower classes, at the same time that Welfare state transfers and services were
expanded.28
To directly assess the effects of taxation (and transfers) on inequality, table 3.6
displays the Gini index for the previously defined income phases. The difference
between pre-tax and post-tax income Gini indices equals the RS index shown
above. In 1970, even factor taxes caused inequality to increase (difference be-
tween columns 1 and 2), while in the later years the improvement in the redis-
tributive effect of direct taxation comes through. The general impact on Post-tax
incomes, nevertheless, is still negative: what the tax system did in one phase, it
undid in the following.
TABLE 3.6: Taxation and income inequality (Gini index)
PRE-TAX NET F.I. POST-TAX DISP.I. P-TRANS
1970 38.04 38.99 41.36 34.66 36.19
1982 42.12 41.51 44.51 32.96 34.49
1990 42.50 40.83 49.17 32.88 37.26
Source: Author’s calculations.
Equivalent income, weighted by household size. ’P-TRANS’ stands for Post-tax-and-transfer
income.
Of course, this does not mean that the overall effect of the public sector towards
the lower classes was extractive. Welfare State development was the other side
of the coin to this augmented taxing power. Benefits were extended and public
education and health systems were funded, so the expenditure side of the bud-
get allowed for improvements in income distribution and towards equality of
opportunity. I turn to this now.
27There were 28 brackets in 1978 (maximum of 34 in 1982), which were brought down to 16 in
1988. At the same time, the top marginal tax rate was set at 56% (it had been over 68%).
28This evolution can be related to the previously mentioned insights of Timmons (2005) about
the correspondence in both sides of the budget, or Lindert (2004) in that tax progressivity and
fiscal redistribution need not go hand in hand. The issue will be taken up in chapter 5.
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3.5.2 Considering the effect of benefits
Table 3.6 shows that the distribution of disposable income decreased very slightly
in the period, as was obtained in chapter 2. Disposable income is the result of
adding to net factor incomes both public and private transfers (recall that they are
not disaggregated in the HBSs until 1990, so e.g. remittances sent by emigrants
would be included). These flows caused a decrease in inequality of around 4 Gini
points in 1970, 8.5 in 1982 and 8 in 1990 (difference between columns 2 and 4). So,
what the fiscal system did in one phase, it undid in the following?29
Post-tax-and-transfer income is the net result of all these flows, the inequality
finally existing in the country in terms of net consumption capacity. The total tax-
benefit system had an equalizing effect (respectively, 1.7, 7.5 and 4.5 Gini points
in 1970, 1982 and 1990). This final income has grown more unevenly distributed
over the decades under study, but considerably less than market incomes (1.1 vs.
4.5 Gini points).
Figure 3.3 tries to cast some further light on the issue, by plotting tax rates that
include transfers as a negative tax. Here, percentiles with positive rates are net
contributors: approximately the upper 70-75% of individuals. The ones with rates
under zero, on the contrary, received more money than they paid in taxes. These
rates are growing with income, entailing that the joint fiscal system did provide
redistribution (as was shown above).
The fiscal system in 1970 was clearly less progressive than in later years, since the
profile is flatter and the line crosses 0 earlier (i.e., households being net contribu-
tors back then were poorer than their counterparts in the following decades, both
in relative and in absolute terms). Among net-recipient households, the rates
were lower in 1982 than in 1990. This is presumably an effect of the increase in
tax rates for the poorer families which followed the introduction of VAT, thus re-
inforcing the convenience of analysing together the distribution of tax payments
and what they are financing.30 At the top, where in 1970 we find a negative-slope
stretch, in the next years there is a flat plateau or slightly increasing rates. The
29In 1990, public benefits were 89.5% of total transfers received by households according to the
HBSs. This percentage was likely lower in earlier years, so “redistribution” shown by the Gini
indices would be overestimated, with the bias probably decreasing over time.
30In fact, and quite surprisingly, if we compare the mean of post-tax-and-transfer real incomes
by deciles between 1982 and 1990 we can see that the poorest households actually lost net pur-
chasing power during the decade. This does not seem so when looking at disposable income
figures, but it comes through once taking into account indirect taxation.
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FIGURE 3.3: Average Effective Tax-and-Transfer Rates
Source: Author’s calculations.
The lowest percentiles are not included because of their extreme values. For
1990 I show two calculations: one with the total (comparable to the previous
years) and one considering only public benefits (a better representation of the
tax-and-transfer system in place).
change is significant, but tax-and-transfer progressivity was rather weak after
the middle of the income scale.
These calculations do not include in-kind benefits (mainly, health and education),
which are also inequality-reducing. Thorough approaches to the incidence of to-
tal social public expenditure can be found in the literature. According to Ban-
drés (1993), in-kind social expenditure would have reduced the Gini index in
3.61 points in 1980; 3.99 in 1994 following Calero (2001). These impacts are in any
case smaller than those of monetary benefits, which stand between 6 and 15 Gini
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points in the same studies.31
It can therefore be said that the public sector as a whole impeded the increase in
market-given inequality to be completely translated onto post-tax-and-transfer
incomes. But it certainly does not seem to have done so by means of the tax sys-
tem, and did not manage to effectively counteract the trend of rising inequality.
3.5.3 How different was Spain from other countries?
The international comparison will show if the objective of convergence with the
developed European neighbours was attained, and will also contrast this experi-
ence with that of other countries with similar or differing political histories. The
following discussion is however deeply dependent on the availability of com-
parable calculations: studies on income redistribution are often not general, but
focused on PIT (often along with social contributions) and household benefits.
The first question is whether Spain converged to the developed countries, taken
as a model at the time of the reform. In order to investigate the issue, figure 3.4
plots direct AETRs (including social contributions) for the United States, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, France and Spain (UK and France only available in 1970).32
Spain stands out for its regressivity in 1970 and 1982. There is partial conver-
gence, driven by changes in both sides: loss of progressivity in Sweden and the
US combined with the opposite path in Spain, which by 1990 had near-proportional
direct taxation. Higher rates arrived first to the middle-upper class and later – in-
completely – to the top. The evolution towards progressivity, delayed by the
dictatorship, did not fully reach the levels seen in these other countries.
What about other nations, and specially those experiencing democratization in
similar periods? In figure 3.5 I attempt a comparison with Portugal, Greece and
Italy. The first two underwent resembling political upheavals, while Italy has
economic and cultural parallels but has enjoyed unbroken democracy since the
mid 20th Century. I have also included the mean of EU-11 (other EU-15) and
31The cited works make an imputation of monetary public transfers that goes far beyond my
simple exercise above. Regrettably, their results are not readily integrated with mine because of
methodological differences.
32The Spanish case includes PIT (for 1970: taxes on labour and capital income), social contri-
butions, and taxes on corporations, inheritance and wealth. Corporate taxation is not considered
in the calculations for France, UK and Sweden. The AETRs for Spain shown in the figure are
different from my baseline results because, out of coherence, the weighting unit is the household
and pre-tax income excludes imputations from owner-occupied housing.
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FIGURE 3.4: Direct Tax Rates. International comparison
Source: see Appendix C.4.
Abbreviations: SP (Spain), US (United States), SE (Sweden).
(1) In the data for France, P40-60 is P0-90.
(2) In the data for France, the US and the UK, the last two values represented are respectively those for
P99-99.5 and the mean of rates for P99.5-99.9, P99.9-99.99, and P99.99-100. Similarly, for Sweden the
first value is P0-40 and the last two values P99-99.9 and P99.9-100. This means that my top rates refer
to relatively lower percentiles, and might therefore be slightly underestimated (overestimated) if there
is progression (regression). Because of the imprecision of calculating such very disaggregated rates in
my data, this presentation has been deemed preferable.
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other OECD countries as a benchmark. Regrettably, data on total redistribution
is not available, and the exercise is limited to direct taxes plus public benefits.33
FIGURE 3.5: Redistribution by Direct Taxes and Transfers
Source: see Appendix C.4.
Abbreviations: SP (Spain), GR (Greece), IT (Italy), PO (Portugal). The “other
OECD” average includes Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ice-
land, South Korea, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the US; mostly
calculations for the year 2004.
The graph shows my historical estimations for Spain together with more recent
ones for the rest of the countries. Our trend seems consistent with the situation in
the other Southern European countries at the end of the nineties, and their levels
appear near to those of the EU-11 core – but a significant differential remained
if we look at relative redistribution (equalization of incomes with respect to the
need for it). The data, however, need to be interpreted with caution. Immervoll et
al. (2007), the source for European countries, use a simulation procedure which
does not account for the revenue effect of tax evasion: given that this problem
more acute in the South, redistribution in this area is likely overestimated with
respect to the EU-11.
Interestingly, Italy does not appear different from the other, in spite of its long
standing democracy. In fact, during the seventies the country underwent tax
reforms with similar spirit than the Spanish ones, related to the construction of
the European common market.
33The comparison is thus affected by the relative weight of indirect taxation, which according
to OECD data has historically been higher in Portugal and Greece.
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In figure 3.6 I deal with total monetary redistribution (i.e., now considering also
indirect taxes). Again it can be seen that Spain in 1970-90 stands clearly behind
the UK or the US in the same years. Convergence with these countries (small,
liberal welfare states) was not attained throughout the period of analysis. Regret-
tably, I have not found such data for other cases in Europe.34
FIGURE 3.6: Redistribution in Tax-Benefit systems
Source: see Appendix C.4.
Abbreviations: SP (Spain), AR (Argentina), BR (Brazil), CH (Chile), CO
(Colombia), ME (Mexico), UR (Uruguay), UK (United Kingdom), US (United
States of America).
34The comparison with the US is not completely accurate, since general sales taxes collected
by the states are not included. Those have nevertheless lower rates than VAT, generally well
under 10%. It should also be mentioned that in-kind transfers might change the conclusion; see
Garfinkel et al. (2006).
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With Latin America, similarities are stronger. Today’s Chile or Uruguay display
levels of redistribution quite close to the Spanish ones in 1990. The recent trend
towards increased redistribution in this region is comparable to the Spanish re-
form studied here (Lustig, 2011). A new “fiscal pact” is sought to contribute
to a more equitable society, after the eighties witnessed the introduction of VAT
and the flattening of income tax schedules. These early changes contributed to
strengthen the tax administration, which may be a positive legacy (Bird and Zolt,
2013). The order is contrary to that of Spain, where direct taxation was reformed
first, following the economic thought of the sixties, and to a certain extent lacked
the capacity to be enforced.
3.5.4 Some insights into the 1960s
We have insufficient information to include these years in the main estimation,
but some conclusions about the trends during the decade are allowed. Regres-
sivity probably increased, due to two concurrent changes. On the one hand,
a growth of indirect relative to direct taxation: the balance between both went
from 68.9% to 53.3% in 1960-70 (likely related to a loss of efficiency in direct taxa-
tion, because of evasion and defective tax base estimation procedures). Another
composition effect arose from the major increase in social contributions. Because
these taxes were borne by labour, they had an undoubtedly negative impact on
the distribution of net incomes (notwithstanding their being the basis to finance
more generous pensions in the decades to come).
A comparison with the work by Perona (1972) for 1965 allows getting a little
closer. In figure 3.7 I plot tax rates by income ranges for 1965 and 1970; the latter
have been obtained replicating Perona’s methodology, so they are not directly
comparable to my main results. Here, I have left aside non-central taxes, used
“wide” pre-tax income as denominator (includes all public and private transfers),
established the household as the weighting unit, and grouped them according to
disposable income.35
We can see lack of significant change in direct taxes (neither in their profile nor
in the average level), while indirect tax rates grew over all ranges. Social contri-
butions also experienced a very significant increase, specially affecting the lower
35I have replicated the ranges in Perona’s work by keeping the same percentage of households
in each group. Approximately, range 1 corresponds to the first decile, range 2 to deciles 2 and 3,
range 3 to deciles 4 to 7, range 4 to deciles 8 and 9, and the three upper ranges to the top decile.
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FIGURE 3.7: Average Effective Tax Rates over the 1960s
Source: for 1965, Perona (1972); for 1970, author’s calculations.
Households are ranked by disposable income, but the denominator for the tax
rates is wide income (pre-tax plus all transfers).
Chapter 3. The distribution of the tax burden 71
income classes. As a joint result, regressivity in terms of total tax rates had been
strongly exacerbated.36
3.6 Conclusions
During the years under study, fundamental political changes took place in Spain.
After forty years, dictatorship reluctantly gave way to parliamentarism. At the
same time, a tax reform was initiated, promising to bring the country closer to
its European neighbours and towards progressivity. But how big a change did
it entail in terms of tax burden distribution? Was convergence reached? Did the
political transition have a fiscal counterpart?
I have shown that the tax system was regressive in 1970, and still so twenty years
later, albeit a lot less. The evolution was thanks to the reforms in direct taxa-
tion (fundamentally PIT) and social contributions (which nevertheless remained
regressive), while indirect taxation had an increasingly negative impact, given
changes in the underlying distribution of consumption. The lack of overall tax
progressivity contradicts the predominant political discourse about the objectives
and effects of the tax reform.37
The tax system exacerbated income inequality: it effected inverse redistribution.
Moreover, this unequalising impact grew bigger over time, due to the increase in
average tax rates (the expansion of public revenues, from 18% of GDP in 1970 to
33% in 1990, is one of the most important features of the period).38 Both pre-
tax and post-tax incomes grew more unequal. Disposable income inequality,
however, was quite constant, and post-tax-and-transfer income remained signifi-
cantly less concentrated. This means that private and, especially, public transfers
counteracted the growth in market inequality and the increasingly negative effect
36Recall that rates are calculated here over “wide” income: over pre-tax incomes the systems
will look more regressive, since transfers represent a bigger percentage of income for the lower
ranges.
37To be found in official documentation, such as the Moncloa Pacts or the Spanish Constitution
(art. 31), but also e.g. in press testimonies: according to F. Fernández Ordóñez, minister of Public
Finance between 1977 and 1979, the reform had the goal of “paying better; that is, in a fair way,
following the old principle and desire that those who have more pay more. [...] Tax progressivity has been
extended completely to all revenues, whichever their origin and size, radically altering the pre-existing
situation” (Fco. Fernández Ordóñez: “La reforma fiscal, ¿un ademán solitario?”, El País, 18th June
1980).
38GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2003).
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of taxation. The study of public expenditure reveals itself as an essential comple-
ment.
The Spanish experience is thus an example of a “third wave” democratization
that was followed by a very significant tax reform, which nevertheless failed to
radically alter the distribution of the burden. As a result, inequality was not effec-
tively reduced, challenging again the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model.
There was no ‘fiscal revolution’: the path was hindered by changes in the polit-
ical and economic environment. Similar situations might be found in other late-
democratising Southern European countries – but also, significantly, in Italy.39
Some questions are still open. As has been explained, these calculations do not
account for the distributive impact of tax evasion, which is expected to erode
progressivity: therefore, the introduction of this aspect would reinforce the re-
sults obtained here, which could be read as an upper bound. In the next chapter
I study the topic with respect to the personal income tax.
Moreover, the explanation of the findings in a political economy framework, with
a comparative perspective, is also required. An in-depth study of attitudes to-
wards taxation and redistribution, and of their transmission to public policies,
will follow in chapter 5 – helping us understand why Spain did not reach con-
vergence with its more developed neighbours, and continued to fund its public
sector with regressive taxation.
39However, the comparisons presented here are only preliminary, until more homogeneous
data are available.
Chapter 4
Fraud and base erosion in personal
income taxation
In this chapter I estimate under-assessment of incomes in the Personal Income Tax during
the years following its introduction in Spain. The methodology combines an analysis
of discrepancy with National Accounts and an econometric exercise, which follows and
slightly modifies the Feldman and Slemrod (2007) procedure, based on the relation of
reported charitable donations with the composition of income in tax micro-data.
Both calculations show that concealment of income differed substantially across sources
and levels, with better compliance at the bottom of the distribution of taxpayers. Because
of this, fraud made the tax less progressive than it was on paper. Compliance improved
over the next decades, but the overall levels were still far from those attained in developed
countries, because of lack of administrative capacity or political will to enforce the new
regulation. In this way, general, comprehensive income taxation was hardly a reality
twenty years after its introduction.1
4.1 Introduction
Personal income taxation was at the centre of developed countries’ tax systems
in the second half of the 20th Century. It provided a significant share of revenues
and occupied a pivotal place in the tax debate. In theory, it was designed to fol-
low the “ability to pay” principle, and for that reason rested on two pillars: gen-
erality (affecting all citizens over a given income threshold) and comprehensive
1An adapted version of this chapter has been published as IEB Working Paper no. 2015/31 in
November 2015, under the title “Bypassing progressive taxation: fraud and base erosion in the
Spanish income tax, 1970-2001”.
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income definition. These traits made it something different from Ancien Régime
taxation, the realm of privileges, and also from 19th Century factor taxes, which
targeted each revenue source independently. Generality and a comprehensive in-
come definition, together with the consideration of personal circumstances in the
tax, make it possible to introduce effective progressivity and redistribution.
However, in the presence of fraud and base erosion, practice might differ consid-
erably from theory. That was the sense of Gunnar Myrdal’s tough critique of the
Swedish income tax in 1978. He argued that high marginal tax rates created in-
centives to avoid and evade taxes, and hence equity – specially horizontal equity
– was not at place. According to Björklund et al. (1995), this opinion influenced
his society’s views and drove towards reform in 1991.
A corollary to Myrdal’s argument was that formal progressivity did not translate
itself into redistribution from rich to poor. The Spanish economist Fuentes Quin-
tana thought likewise in the second half of the eighties. He had been a strong
advocate of tax reform in the preceding decades, pushing for a central place of
a progressive income tax in the system. It was under his guidance that, as we
have seen, this model was introduced in Spain in 1977-78, when the country was
transitioning into democracy. But in the following years Fuentes was very critical
of the result, specially in relation to persistent evasion, and became a proponent
of the “flat tax”.
One may or may not share this proposal as a solution for evasion. But the concern
about fraud – in a broad sense – was and is crucial, since it carries negative conse-
quences on the tax system and society in many dimensions. On the one hand, it
reduces tax revenue, imposing heavier spending constraints on the government.
It also represents a cost for society because of the effort spent in otherwise un-
productive concealment and punishment activities. Horizontal inequity, on the
other hand, is likely to erode the perceived legitimacy of the tax system. Finally,
fraud also affects vertical equity, if the ability to evade (and maybe the propen-
sity) changes along the income scale. In this paper, I focus on the last issue.
What do we know about how tax evasion is actually distributed? Economic the-
ory has attempted to model the individual decision on whether or not to evade
as a choice of the taxpayer in face of risk. In the classical “deterrence model” of
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the individual under-reports her income to a cer-
tain extent, to minimize the tax bill, taking into account the possibility of being
caught and the heaviness of the sanction. Related literature has abounded on the
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relation between marginal tax rates, the income level and evasion. Conclusions
are dependent on the specific assumptions about the nature of risk aversion, but
tend to point towards higher incentives to evade at higher levels of income and
maybe also in front of higher tax rates; since these tend to grow with income,
which of the two forces prevails is an empirical question.2
These models were shown to predict much higher levels of non-compliance than
found in reality. In response to that, further work paid attention to other possi-
ble determinants of the reporting behaviour, such as tax morale (Andreoni et al.,
1998; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). The importance of withholding at source and
third-party information reporting has been recently underlined as a key factor by
Kleven et al. (2011). What about the relation of those with income levels? We
do not know much about how tax morale can differ across the income schedule,
but, by contrast, it is well known that some kinds of revenue are subject to much
stricter control than others, and having distinct distributions: income from labour
versus income from capital.
The empirical literature has provided us with several analyses pointing towards a
possible positive impact of income on under-reporting, but with considerable un-
certainty because of econometric issues. The seminal work of Clotfelter (1983) for
the United States and those of Valdés (1982) and Raymond-Barà (1987) for Spain
found high-income taxpayers to under-report more, but the effect of income was
difficult to disentangle from that of marginal tax rates because of the intense cor-
relation between both.3 Indeed, Feinstein (1991) contradicted Clotfelter in not
finding a significant effect of income on the reporting behaviour.4
Work addressed to study the distribution of fraud has also suggested a rate of
under-reporting increasing with income. For the United States, the data have
been available thanks to the Tax Compliance Measurement Program (later on, the
2In Allingham and Sandmo (1972)’s paper, the income level would increase evasion (i.e., the
percentage of income non-reported) if relative risk aversion is decreasing with income. The im-
pact of the tax rate was found to be ambiguous in the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA, the most accepted possibility). Yitzhaki (1974) contemplated the common case where the
sanction depends of the evaded tax – as opposed to the under-reported income in Allingham and
Sandmo (1972)’s model. His specification does not change the expected effect of income, while
it does alter the impact of the tax rate, that would now decrease evasion, in presence of DARA.
(Allingham and Sandmo’s results also stated that with DARA the absolute level of reported in-
come will only increase when the sanction is a factor at least equal to 1).
3In spite of this, Raymond-Barà blamed the tax rates and thus made strong policy recommen-
dations.
4This kind of empirical analyses have also analysed the effect of other factors, such as age,
education level, marital status... The discussion of those is out of the scope of the chapter.
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National Research Program), providing samples of randomly audited tax returns.
Using them, Johns and Slemrod (2010) found evasion to reach maximums in the
top percentiles. This was partially a result of the composition of incomes, but not
exclusively.5 Similar conclusions were obtained by Feldman and Slemrod (2007),
who estimated under-reporting with un-audited data:6 it was increasing with
income levels for self-employment non-farm income and for capital income. The
analyses closest to mine are Alm et al., 1991; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010
and Benedek and Lelkes, 2011; specially the first one, which estimates total tax
base erosion for the case of Jamaica in 1983. To my knowledge, an analysis of
the distribution of evasion across the income scale has not yet been undertaken
in Spain, although we have some intuitions from studies that will be reviewed in
the following section.
My preliminary hypothesis is that evasion in a broad sense (income concealment)
was higher at the top of the income scale, and that, therefore, the tax was less pro-
gressive de facto than de jure. This would stem from the easier avoidance and non-
reporting of capital incomes, while wages and salaries were most likely withheld
at source. If the theoretical models are right, incentives to evade more at higher
income levels or tax rates would push in the same direction.
I also propose here a methodological innovation, slightly modifying Feldman and
Slemrod (2007)’s model to estimate evasion across filers by income source. Be-
cause the calculation is based on the relationship between reported incomes and
deducted donations, the regression is performed using a restricted sample (those
who itemized donations in a given year). The reason to do this is that the results
of a baseline estimation may be biased in a context were donation behaviour is
not as widespread as in the United States: in this case, a two-step procedure à la
Heckman (1979) might provide better results. This is the first time that such an
approach is taken in the tax evasion literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 I review previous
work about tax evasion in Spain, while some aggregate data about compliance
and inspection is presented in section 4.3. I next explain the methodology applied
to estimate tax evasion in the personal income tax between 1971 and 2001 (section
4.4) and show the results obtained and the impact of evasion on progressivity
5Bishop et al. (2000) used the same kind of data for the 1980s, estimating the changes in the
indices of inequality caused by including evaded income. They found that vertical equity was
affected, although less than horizontal equity.
6Their methodology will be reviewed and closely replicated in section 4.4.2 of this paper.
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(section 4.5). Finally, a general summary and some conclusions are presented in
section 4.6.
4.2 Previous estimates of income tax evasion
Spain usually scores high among European countries in studies about the un-
derground economy: Schneider (2009)’s estimates of 16%-23% of GDP make the
country rank third in his sample in 2009, only after Greece and Italy. National
studies generally agree about an increasing shadow economy during the eighties,
with a peak around 1993-95, and its inability to fall below 15% of GDP thereafter
(Pickhardt and Sardà, 2015).
Tax fraud is directly related to this phenomenon, though not equivalent. Some at-
tempts have been made to estimate evasion in several taxes in the country, such as
the Corporation tax (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2012; Truyols, 1994) or the
Value added tax (Díaz and Romero, 1994; Enterría et al., 1998). In this paper, how-
ever, the focus is on personal income taxation, where evasion has been known to
be widespread. Gota Losada (1970) underlined this issue in a classic study about
the first such tax (the Contribución General sobre la Renta introduced in 1932), with
data on the fraud discovered by the tax inspection between the forties and the
sixties. The problem was addressed in further reports by the Spanish Institute for
Fiscal Studies (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973), but has remained one of the
main unresolved issues in the system after the 1978 reform, which introduced the
modern Personal Income Tax (Comín, 1994; Fuentes Quintana, 1990).
There are some estimations available. Albi (1975) studied the year 1971 (which
corresponds to the Impuesto General sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, introduced
in 1964). He calculated that total under-reporting of income tax bases amounted
to 78% of the aggregate tax base declared that year (which meant 33% of Spain’s
GDP).7 The so-called personal income tax in Spain was, until 1978, a super-tax:
it only affected those whose income exceeded a high threshold (under which in-
comes were taxed by factor taxes –“impuestos de producto"–, targeted at different
kinds of revenue separately). Albi’s calculation uses the whole group of factor
taxes as a reference, adding up their respective tax bases, so his result is not com-
parable to the specific collection of the income tax per se: this was a negligible
part of the total, as we shall see. The most important of those factor taxes during
7All calculations involving GDP levels are made with data from Prados de la Escosura (2003).
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the seventies was the Labour tax (Impuesto sobre los rendimientos del trabajo per-
sonal), which can be fairly considered the main real precedent to the current PIT.
Fraud in this labour tax was estimated by Santos Peñas (1975) to be around 56%
for the years 1964-72 (also in terms of base under-reporting).8
In the process of introduction of the modern personal income tax, Alcaide (1980;
1981) performed some analyses on compliance. He shows that around 20% of
the obliged households filed a return in 1977, going up to around 59% two years
later. In both cases, however, ratios were decreasing with income, which points
towards significant under-reporting: reported incomes were around 21% of real
estimated household revenues in 1977, and 61% in 1979.9
Under the modern Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas, concern for this
issue did not diminish. Fuentes Quintana (1990) shows how 27.5% of a random
sample of returns from 1979 were found fraudulent by inspectors, with the per-
centage of tax evaders increasing with income, which supports the initial hy-
pothesis in this paper. During the 1980s, a Commission was appointed by the
government to estimate evasion in several taxes. The PIT study group yielded
results for the years 1979-86, after which its existence was put to an end.10 Their
estimations are shown in table 4.1: levels of compliance generally beneath 70% in
all concepts, but increasing over the period. The filing obligation was fulfilled by
52 to 64% of those legally obliged, and 43 to 55% of the total taxable income in
the country was reported.11
8This general estimate conceals acute differences among categories of workers: evasion from
civil servants was calculated as 5.6%, in industry workers 28.5%, in service workers 43.1% and
finally professionals were found to evade the most, at a rate of 71.0%.
9For the income category of more than 6 million ptas, the ratio returns/households was under
8% and 19% in 1977 and 1979 respectively. It is important to explain that this does not necessarily
mean that the wealthiest families did not file a return, but that they probably did not report a
significant share of their true income. It should also be noted that such a big improvement in
compliance in just two years seems unlikely: the estimations are surely not very precise, since
they rely on faulty data on household incomes and their distribution. Many low-income house-
holds may have paid their share in the factor taxes and simply not filed a return for PIT, which
would maybe not have increased their tax due anyway. The fundamental changes in the system
of personal taxation make comparison difficult across regimes.
10M.J. Lagares, the head of this Commission, recalled that "It was not easy [...] to present the results
obtained, because these showed a reality far from what had been expected by the Tax Administration, still
divorced from the actual magnitudes of our national incomes, and from what could have pleased politicians"
(Lagares, 1999), page 606.
11Because of their distinct systems of tax administration, the Commission could not include
Navarra and the Basque country in their study. Unfortunately, this data problem is quite common
in the area. We do however have an estimation for the Basque provinces in 1983-89 using the same
methodology: Sasigain (1993) found a slightly higher level of compliance (60 to 64% in the period)
and the same strong contrast between wage incomes (70 to 84%) and that of revenues from capital
or self-employment (31-33% with no clear trend).
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TABLE 4.1: Compliance in the Spanish income tax according to the
Comisión para el Estudio del Fraude en el IRPF
Filing
Tax base reporting
Total Labour Other
1979 52% 43% 54% 22%
1980 57% 48% 62% 24%
1981 56% 49% 63% 25%
1982 56% 50% 65% 25%
1983 59% 51% 67% 23%
1984 59% 51% 67% 25%
1985 61% 52% 69% 26%
1986 64% 55% 71% 30%
Source: Comisión para el Estudio del Fraude en el
IRPF (1988).
Note: only regions under the common fiscal rule (i.e., ex-
cluding the Basque Country – only Álava in 1979-80 – and
Navarra).
Unsurprisingly, concealment of revenue was significantly more intense in non-
labour yields. In a similar way, Díaz and Melis (1993) found that evasion could
be very roughly estimated to be around half the real tax base for entrepreneurial
incomes in 1989.12
Has this situation improved in more recent years? Díaz and Fernández (1993)
estimated 6.2% of under-reporting in wages in 1990, down from 11.6% in 1987.
Their figures are shockingly different from those obtained by the Commission,
because they are based on a different source and method: these authors use with-
holding data from firms (Estadística Anual de Retenedores), which allows disentan-
gling salaries from pensions, and limiting the scope to wages of those actually
obligated to file a return. Díaz and Fernández attribute the difference in the re-
sults precisely to the incidence of the income threshold, which they seem to think
that the Commission did not correctly estimate. Other possible sources of dis-
crepancy are the 85% coverage in their source, or the fact that this estimation
isolates the under-reporting of the filers, while the Commission data subsumes
the effect of non-filing.
12If the taxpayers with this kind of revenue were imputed the average wage reported in tax, and
their relatives working with them were imputed the minimum wage, business incomes would be
estimated at more than double than the reported magnitudes. The authors state: "This approxima-
tion to personal businesses’ under-reporting in PIT, whatever crude, yields an index of concealment equal
to the average index obtained by the Tax Inspection in the sample investigation that served as a base for the
establishment of assessments for the reform of presumptive taxation" (p. 189).
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In terms of total tax base, Esteller-Moré (2011) also obtained a more positive re-
sult for the period 1993-2000, with average compliance estimated at 80%. Us-
ing micro-data of the year 2008, Domínguez et al. (2016) have recently calculated
under-reporting of non-wage incomes as 40-55%, which is also a favourable evo-
lution from 70% in 1986 (their method is largely replicated in section 4.4.2 of this
paper): they assume salary incomes to be completely reported, since having a
reliable reference category is a requisite of the estimation method. If this refer-
ence income is limited to pensions, wages are found to have a compliance ratio
of around 81%.
To sum up, studies point to a decrease in tax evasion, but at the same time to
persistent differences in the subjection of incomes to the tax depending on their
source. The issue deserves further attention, since it violates basic principles of
fiscal equity and also affects tax revenue.
4.3 The struggle for compliance in Spain
The path towards general income taxation in Spain was slow and painful. Ini-
tially, the cause was not only persistent lack of compliance, but also a very high
threshold.13 Table 4.2 represents this evolution by showing the number of total
returns, and of returns with positive tax due, and putting them in relation to the
number of inhabitants and households in the country.14 Columns (8) and (9) are
more illustrative of generality than (5) and (6), because these taxes were during
almost the whole period conceived as family taxation, and implied until 1989
joint compulsory filing for married couples.
In figure 4.1 I plot the series of tax filers and taxpayers over the total number of
households, for the period 1933-1990 (again, the number of tax filers is that of tax
returns, while ‘taxpayers’ refers only to those who had positive tax due as a re-
sult of filing). Filing gradually became more and more widespread until the late
1980s, when the process was quite complete. Several turning points correspond
13Under this threshold, individuals were subjected to factor taxation, in general not progressive,
as was consistent with the conservatism of the political regime.
14Under the old tax regime, returns with no positive tax due correspond to individuals who
did not pay any personal income tax in addition to factor taxation (although they were required
to file); column (2) therefore represents more closely the concept of ‘taxpayer’ than column (1).
For the modern tax (after 1979), it is important not to mistake “positive tax due” with “positive
differential tax due” (“cuota diferencial a pagar”): column (2) still represents the number of effective
taxpayers, not only those who had to pay an additional quantity during the filing season.
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TABLE 4.2: Generality of personal income taxation in Spain
(thousands of returns, adults, households)
Period Returns
Positive Pos/ Adults Ret/ Pos/ House- Ret/ Pos/tax due returns adults adults holds (Hh.) (Hh.)
(1) (2) (3=1/2) (4) (5=1/4) (6=2/4) (7) (8=1/7) (9=2/7)
1933-54 19 7 55% 16,794 0.1% 0.0% 6,124 0.3% 0.1%
1955-67 211 65 31% 19,383 0.7% 0.2% 7,779 2.7% 0.8%
1968-79 956 77 7% 22,129 1.4% 0.1% 9,508 9.6% 0.8%
1980-90 7,641 6,020 75% 24,530 31.9% 17.7% 11,140 68.2% 53.2%
1991-00 13,776 11,286 81% 27,981 49.2% 40.2% 12,310 111.8% 91.4%
Source: author’s calculations with data about number of returns from Gota Losada (1970),
Ministerio de Hacienda (1980, 1981), and Valdés (1982), IEF-BADESPE and PIT microdata. For
adults, Alvaredo and Saez (2009), tables in Appendix (population over 20, excluding regions
with special regimes). For households, INE (series históricas) and Household Budget Surveys,
interpolated.
All data are averaged over the periods given by the first column, which correspond to reforms in the tax. ‘Hh’=
Households.
Note: since 1983, the number of returns corresponds only to the regions under the common fiscal rule (i.e., excluding
the Basque Country and Navarra).
to major reforms in the tax in 1954, 1967 and 1978. The line of effective taxpay-
ers (solid line) runs parallel to that of filers in the first decades, but then drops
very significantly in 1967. During the period of the IGRPF, indeed (that is, until
1978), this tax was filed by an increasing number of taxpayers, but only under
10% of those who filed actually paid some tax: all others had already fulfilled
their obligations with the factor taxes. This meant, among other things, that rev-
enue collection through the IGRPF was insignificant, and its progressive rates did
not generally apply. The reform in personal taxation during the sixties therefore
did not have a redistributive impact, as it was presented at the time – it might
actually have had just the opposite effect.
Under the modern PIT, on the other hand, 80-90% of tax filers had positive tax
due, which was translated to 50-60% of households (since 55-85% of them filed
a tax return). During the nineties, the tax attained generality, with returns out-
numbering households (separate taxation of married couples was introduced as
an option in 1989-91). In the first decade of its existence, nonetheless, there was
still considerable distance to 100%. As we shall see, this does not only reflect the
legal threshold, but also to failure to comply with the system.
The results of the tax inspection activity can shed further light on evasion. It
should be kept in mind, however, that these data show in all cases a lower bound,
and their trends do not necessarily coincide with those of actual fraud (since re-
sources and efficiency in tax inspection also play a role in the outcome). In figure
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FIGURE 4.1: Generality in Spanish personal income taxation
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4.2 I depict the relative importance of uncovered tax fraud in the precedents of
PIT. Evaded tax due is shown as a percentage of the total tax liquidated in the
corresponding year (this, of course, does not mean that all uncovered tax was
eventually paid): it stands near 50% of revenue, showing that it should have
been indeed a big concern. The relative decrease in the sixties is associated, ac-
cording to Gota Losada (1970), with the use of presumptive assessment in several
of the components of income, which therefore were no longer subject to this tax
inspection. It is thus not a clear indicator of improvement.
The same evolution is mirrored in the series of discovered non-filers (as a per-
centage of filers plus discovered non-filers): in the forties, near 15% of the total
number of filers eventually known by the tax administration had failed to make
their tax return. The norm was widely overlooked. After 1955, however, this
number dropped down to under 3%.15 Was tax fraud overcome?
Both data series are unfortunately not complete, but the ratios significantly de-
crease after 1978 (not shown in the graph), when the denominators experienced
very significant growth due to the introduction of the modern tax (both in rev-
enue and number of filers). It should not be concluded, however, that the problem
15This could be related to the re-introduction of the use of “signos externos”, objective criteria for
subjection to the tax, like dwellings or vehicles owned, or number of servants. This instrument
had been relegated following the Civil War.
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FIGURE 4.2: Results of inspection in the personal income tax
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‘Evaded tax due’ is that discovered by auditors, and shown as percentage of each
years’ liquidated collection. ‘Discovered non-filers’ are individuals not presenting a
tax return and being caught by inspection; they are displayed as a percentage of the
number of filers after including them.
disappeared. If we look at the importance of the discovered evaded tax in terms
of GDP, a different picture emerges (figure 4.3): the relative magnitude is around
0.10% of GDP, with no clear difference between the period of the old income taxes
(pre-1978) and that of modern PIT, where the tax base was now much wider be-
cause of the inclusion of new taxpayers.16 The fact that the discovered tax bill did
not significantly increase after the 1978 reform calls into question the ability of
the inspection body to adapt to the new tax, which undoubtedly required higher
control resources if it were to be effective.
The lack of capacity in the tax administration is one of the explanatory factors for
the historically high levels of fraud in Spanish personal income taxation, together
with tax morale or economic structure considerations. Indeed, evasion was for
a long time a profitable strategy for taxpayers, given the probability of being in-
vestigated and the sanction structure. Lagares (1974) made some calculations on
expected income and fines, and obtained that the rational choice for a risk-neutral
16The revenue of the old taxes in the period 1958-78 was around 0.2% of GDP, while in 1979-90
it attained 5.7%: i.e., its share had been multiplied by a factor of 28.
84 Chapter 4. Fraud and base erosion in personal income taxation
FIGURE 4.3: Tax due discovered by inspection,
as percentage of GDP
0,00%
1,00%
2,00%
3,00%
4,00%
5,00%
6,00%
7,00%
8,00%
9,00%
0,00%
0,02%
0,04%
0,06%
0,08%
0,10%
0,12%
0,14%
0,16%
0,18%
1
9
4
2
1
9
4
5
1
9
4
8
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
7
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
P
IT
 t
ax
 r
ev
en
u
e 
as
 a
 %
 o
f 
G
D
P
Ta
x 
d
u
e 
d
is
co
ve
re
d
 b
y 
in
sp
ec
ti
o
n
 a
s 
a 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
Discovered tax due (left axis) Tax revenue (right axis)
Sources: Same as in fig. 4.2, with GDP from Prados de la Escosura
(2003).
individual would be not to declare her income. This was the combined effect of
low and un-progressive sanctions, meagre probabilities of detection, and quite
high interest rates in the economy.17 Still in 1986, according to Castillo (1994), this
was the optimal strategy for a “rational” citizen.
These observations are of course at odds with the reality, where some tax was
paid. In fact, many were constrained to comply due to withholding at source
of their (labour) income, while others had the option not to (notably in the case
of self-employment and capital incomes). The lack of knowledge of the tax ad-
ministration about the real incomes of citizens and firms was so notorious that
collective presumptive assessment was established as an alternative to the direct
estimation of tax bases (i.e. derived from individual accountancy) as late as 1957-
64 in several taxes. This model still partially survives in the form of presump-
tive taxation schemes for self-employment activities, although only in individual
terms (Estimación Objetiva).
Already in 1940, a Registry of Income and Wealth of individuals was created
17The use of a model of risk neutrality (that is, direct maximization of expected income) leads to
corner solutions. If we considered a more complex model with risk aversion, the optimal strategy
would be less extreme.
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by the dictatorial government (Registro de Rentas y Patrimonios), to which banks,
stock exchange agents and other establishments were supposed to inform about
their clients’ assets. But this does not mean that third-party information report-
ing was a reality. In fact, it took several decades to painfully introduce it as an
automatic part of economic life. Banking secrecy was abolished by law in 1977,
at the same time as tax crime was introduced; however, the first was appealed to
the supreme Constitutional Court, paralysing its application for years, while the
second had very limited practical results up to at least 1990 (Castillo, 1994).18
Some improvements came about during the eighties. The introduction of VAT in
1986 was expected to foster compliance, given the incentives of the different par-
ties involved to report economic activity in order to request refunds (according
to the results in table 4.1, this was at least partly effective). At the same time, in
1985 a new law reinforced the withholding and reporting obligations of financial
institutions. In the preamble of this law it was acknowledged that labour income
had a disproportionate weight in the aggregate tax base, as a result of unequal
compliance. The immediate effects of the 1985 regulation, however, were not out-
standing. The banking sector found ways to avoid fiscal transparency, with the
creation of several opaque instruments that had considerable success during the
second half of the decade (notably, the “primas únicas” and “cesiones de crédito”).19
It is remarkable that the State issued one also opaque public debt asset, the Pa-
garés del Tesoro, which it swapped in 1991 for another kind of anonymous debt
(Deuda Pública Especial) granting complete impunity.20 In this way, the govern-
ment conceded amnesty to black money, in exchange of finance under market
price.
At the same time, reinforcement of the tax administration was taking place, with
the proliferation of new offices around the territory, a reform of the structure
of tax inspection in 1986 (Castillo, 1994; Pan-Montojo, 2007), and a process of
computerization. Finally, the body was given higher autonomy in 1991 with the
creation of the AEAT (Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria), which was
expected to bring higher efficiency with a more flexible operation than that of the
18Banking secrecy is further treated in chapter 5.
19Descriptions and some data on these assets can be found in Esteve (1990) and Castillo (1994).
20The identity of the holders would only be known to the government at the time of expiration,
in 1997, when the tax crime could no longer be prosecuted. On these events, see López-Laborda
and Rodrigo Sauco (2003).
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general public sector.21 In spite of that, Onrubia (2007; 2012) shows how insuffi-
ciencies in terms of personnel and organisation prevailed during the last decades
of the 20th Century and are significant even today, compared with other Western
European countries.
Withholding at source has been pointed by Kleven et al. (2011) as a key element
for enforcing compliance. Financial incomes were not the only revenues where
this was hard to introduce. The legal definition of the tax base in 1978 was very
comprehensive, also including payments in kind, but there was no regulation of
withholding in them. As a consequence, during the next decade fringe benefits
came to be a vehicle for avoidance. This situation was tackled in 1989 and reme-
died in the tax reform of 1991.
Rental incomes have also been difficult to control, with no withholding at all until
very recently. A law in 1998 established the obligation of tenants to withhold part
of their payments, as a response to widespread non-reporting of these incomes.
But the obligation only concerns legal entities and not individuals or households
(due to the associated compliance costs to the withholder). Rents of housing be-
tween individuals are therefore still lacking automatic control. Indeed, shifting
of income from financial to fixed assets in the aftermath of the reforms of the mid
1980s was suggested by Castillo (1994) as one of the elements contributing to the
first housing bubble of 1986-89.
4.4 An estimation of the incidence of tax evasion
In the empirical part of this chapter, I estimate under-reporting of income tax
bases in the country for selected years between 1971 and 2001, following two dif-
ferent methodologies. While both of them have their shortcomings, a joint exam-
ination of the results might reinforce their plausibility. The next section compares
my estimates with those of previous works and international cases. I also attempt
to go one step further and approximate the impact of fraud on the progressivity
of the tax.
Under-assessment of incomes for tax purposes arises in at least three distinct
ways, and all three will be considered here (and, from now on, generally referred
21Notably, the ability of granting higher salaries to inspectors, to fight the draining of qualified
personnel towards the private sector which was an acute phenomenon in the 1980s.
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to jointly as "income under-assessment" or "income concealment"; also as tax eva-
sion in a broad sense). The first one is the existence of non-filers: individuals who
were legally obliged to pay taxes and file the corresponding tax return, but failed
to do so. As we have seen in section 4.3, this was a problem of considerable mag-
nitude in Spain during most of the 20th Century. Unfortunately, there is hardly
any available information on them (for the case of the United States, see Erard
and Ho, 2001).
The other ways for income to escape taxation are legal under-valuation and (il-
legal) under-reporting by taxpayers. Both are jointly studied here, since they are
difficult to disentangle from the available data. Of course, only under-reporting
is fraud from a legal point of view, while the first entails no punishable behaviour.
It does, however, limit the capacity of the income tax to be precisely a general con-
tribution falling on all kinds of income equally. Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré
(2007) already made the point that the government did not target full taxable ca-
pacity in the case of wealth taxation. I consider under-valuation to be the result
of a base-voidening strategy, where the state implicitly recognises its partial inca-
pacity to tax certain revenues.22
In the Spanish case, legal under-valuation arises notably in self-employment ac-
tivities under certain threshold, which can make use of presumptive standard
estimation, and in imputed incomes of owner-occupied housing (included in the
tax base as a percentage of the cadastral value of the dwellings). Both procedures
are known to have greatly under-assessed market values.23 Under-valuation of
certain revenues, of course, affects equity among taxpayers because they all have
different weights in each citizen’s total income.
The privileged treatment of capital incomes is a related phenomenon, which grew
propelled by international and specially European integration, as e.g. Pérez Royo
(1990) explains.24 Gradually, capital incomes have been offered tax advantages,
22This definition includes tax allowances, exemptions and reductions, but not tax credits, which
are deducted from the tax bill instead of the base. These instruments can be thought of as similar,
but have normally clearly different distributive effects, with tax credits being potentially more
progressive.
23Regarding housing, the percentage was first set at 3% and downgraded to 2% in 1988; cur-
rently 1.1% is applied if the cadastral value was assessed after 1994. Naredo (1993) found that un-
dervaluation with respect to market values increased during the eighties (in a context of growing
housing prices), and applied correction factors ranging in 1982 from 2.48 to 3.42 for urban prop-
erties and 6.7-8.4 for rural ones. Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré (2010b) calculated that cadastral
values were 20-30% of market values in the period 1987-2001.
24“A minimally realistic position [...] will have to acknowledge that the trend of our legislation, mainly
since the Law 14/85 and RD 2027/85, towards an increasingly effective control and taxation of capital
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culminating in the dualization of PIT, which exceeds our time range. Procedures
for the total or partial exemption of these incomes impact on our estimates, while
they may be covered only indirectly and imprecisely. Also, because of the spe-
cial treatment given to collective investment institutions, mobile capital incomes
could be shifted to a considerable extent into these arrangements, thereby low-
ering the burden on the “personal income" of their recipients (Carbajo Vasco,
1991 reviews these special regimes, which were deepened in 1985 and 1992). In-
come shifting might be detected by the econometric equations in subsection 4.4.2,
though it is much less likely to be captured by the discrepancy exercise of subsec-
tion 4.4.1.
4.4.1 The discrepancy approach
The international literature has attempted to measure under-reporting with the
comparison between tax returns and household surveys or national accounting.
This approach has been widely applied in Italy, where tax evasion issues are also
acute (Bernardi and Bernasconi, 1997; Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2005; Marino and
Zizza, 2012); and also in some tax gap estimations performed by states in the
United States (as cited by Alm and Borders, 2014). The intuition behind it is
that the incentive to conceal income in a tax return is not present at an anony-
mous interview, so the answers to the latter would be more honest (which does
not preclude possible errors). In this sense, the difference between both sources
would indicate lack of generality in the taxation of income. It is important to keep
in mind, as has been said, that this difference is not only illegal fraud, but also
avoidance and other escapes from taxation in a broad sense – including incom-
prehensive legal definitions of the tax base, which can be difficult or impossible
to discern. Offshore unreported revenues will not show up in this calculation, to
the extent that they are not present either in National Accounts (on this source of
evasion, see e.g. Johannesen, 2014; Zucman, 2013).
The data used here comes from two sources. One is the PIT returns micro-data
provided by the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies (IEF), which offers a 2% ran-
domised sample of all taxpayers in each year since 1982.25 The other arises from
the Household Budget Surveys (from now on, HBSs) undertaken by the Spanish
incomes, whose last steps have been taken with R. Decree-Laws 1/89 and 5/89, will to some extent have to
be retraced”.
25The design has changed in the later years, being more complex since 1999.
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Statistical Institute (INE). The comparison of both databases poses several chal-
lenges. Firstly, income data in HBSs are known to be also widely under-assessed,
so they have been previously adjusted to the magnitudes in National Accounts
(chapter 2).26 On the other hand, incomes in the HBSs are always given in net
terms, so gross revenues can only be obtained after imputation of the tax paid,
which was tackled in chapter 3. Other adjustments in the homogenization of the
data are explained in the methodological Appendix D.1. The information does
not include Ceuta, Melilla, the Canary Islands, and the regions with special tax
regimes (Basque Country and Navarra).
The categories of income to be analysed need to be identifiable in both databases.
This restricts the analysis to four components: labour income, capital income,
self-employment income and the total sum of household revenues.27 Several non-
monetary items are included in the taxable base: imputed income from owner-
occupied housing (in capital income), in-kind compensation (labour income) and
self-supply (self-employment income).
The aggregate composition of incomes of taxpayers in both sources serves as an
indication of total evasion in a very broad sense. Figure 4.4 reflects the compli-
ance ratio obtained by dividing the reported magnitudes by the real estimated
flows of household incomes of each kind. In 1990, over-reporting of Labour rev-
enues has been obtained, likely arising because of the total being underestimated
in the HBS data; this figure has thus been adapted to 100% and the other ratios
have been adjusted accordingly.28
26Recall that the scaling-up procedure used different factors by income source. This prior ad-
justment will directly affect the levels of the ratios obtained (which would be higher relative to the
raw HBS data), but only indirectly their variation across income levels, by affecting the relative
ranking of households. Because the same factor was used to all income of a certain kind irre-
spective of the income level of the recipient, incomes might be under-estimated in high ranks and
therefore the ratios would suffer from upward biases (because of known non-response among
affluent households). It should also be taken into account, however, that were item non-reporting
is an issue in the HBS, factorization is not a completely correct adjustment methodology (imputa-
tion should go along). This additional problem entails a downward bias on the compliance ratios
for incomes where item non-reporting in the HBSs is significant. This could be the case for capital
incomes.
27Labour income includes pensions in 1990, but they are not available in the HBSs in previous
years. Pensions are thus added from other sources for the aggregate discrepancy in 1982, while
pensioners are dropped for the calculations of under-reporting by levels. See the methodological
appendix for details.
28Recall the note on the adjustment procedure applied: high incomes might have been under-
adjusted, and low incomes over-adjusted (this entails that the income share of non-taxpayers
appears bigger in our corrected HBS data than it actually was, thus pushing the compliance ratios
up). It is also possible that the problem arises because of imperfect matching between the survey
and the tax database.
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FIGURE 4.4: Compliance ratios by income source
(obliged taxpayers)
Sources: author’s calculations with aggregated tax data of 1971 from
Dirección General de Tributos (1980), p. 34; tax return micro-data
1982 and 1990 from IEF; household budget surveys from INE, ad-
justed in Torregrosa (2015; 2015) using aggregate magnitudes from
INE (1979; 1993).
Calculations for 1971 are undertaken under the assumption that the share of income
of each kind accruing to the households over the threshold is the same as in the HBS
of 1973-74.
Labour and total ratios for 1982 are approximated by adding subjected pensions to the
denominator (data from Ministerio de Trabajo, 1991) and using their distribution by
deciles given in Bandrés (1993).
It can be seen that labour incomes were the most correctly reported, already in
1971, but specially since the eighties.29 On the other hand, capital incomes show
the most deceiving behaviour, while self-employment starts as the kind evad-
ing the most but experiences a very significant improvement. The total tax base
shows a remarkable increase, but lack of compliance was still calling for concern
in the last decade of the 20th Century.
These ratios subsume the impact of non-filing (which was specially acute in 1971),
under-valuation and under-reporting. In the rest of the paper, I attempt to con-
centrate only on the last two aspects. However, non-filers cannot be directly ex-
cluded from the HBS sample, because we do not have information on who they
were exactly. Therefore, my procedure relies on re-weighting the survey sample
29The 17% compliance estimated in 1971 might indicate that most wages accrued to taxpayers
who failed to make a return, but this does not imply that they weren’t paying the corresponding
labour tax, which was withheld at source. Recall that the declared tax base data here is only for
the “general” tax, not a comprehensive one for all the range of factor taxes.
Chapter 4. Fraud and base erosion in personal income taxation 91
to match the population of effective tax filers (i.e., that of the tax database), by
region, marital status, and labour market status (active versus pensioner). In this
way, the weighted averages of the survey data will reflect the values of those who
did file their returns. This procedure, of course, is only an approximation, which
may be biased if inside each category the differences in income between filers and
non-filers are significant.30
A comparison of the distribution of the tax bases, shown in figure 4.5, indicates
that the incomes reported to the tax authorities were more concentrated than
those in the survey. In the lower-middle range there is an ‘excess mass’ of tax
data observations, which would correspond to higher income taxpayers under-
reporting their incomes (and as a consequence, implying an ‘excess’ of survey
observations at the top). At the bottom of the distribution, there are also more
observations from the survey, which would signal to the impact of non-filers not
being completely adjusted by the re-weighting procedure.
FIGURE 4.5: Comparing the distributions in the tax
and survey data
Source: author’s calculations with IEF panel data and HBSs.
The survey data have been re-weighted to match the population of effective filers.
To calculate the compliance ratios by income levels, I follow Matsaganis et al.
(2010). Under-reporting is calculated for each income source separately, as a ratio
of the means in each database for each region. The underlying hypothesis here
is thus that any difference between taxpayers at different income levels arises
because of their location and the composition of their income:
Csk =
YRsk
YSsk
(4.1)
30If non-filers have lower incomes than filers inside a given combined category, the estimated
compliance will be upward biased (because mean incomes in the re-weighted survey will be un-
derestimated), and the other way around.
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where Csk stands for compliance ratio of income source s at region k, YR repre-
sents average income reported in the tax returns and YS average income reported
in the HBSs.31
Once these compliance ratios are obtained, they are used to make an estimation
of the real incomes of taxpayers in the tax-return database, at the individual level
(imputing the average compliance behaviour):
YEisk =
YRsk
Csk
(4.2)
where YEisk represents the real estimated income from source s of individual i,
living in region k.32
Finally, compliance behaviour by income level can then be calculated as:
Csj =
YRsj
YEsj
(4.3)
Figure 4.6 shows the results.
FIGURE 4.6: Estimated compliance ratios by income deciles
Source: author’s calculations with IEF panel data and HBSs (re-weighted; see
text). Following Matsaganis et al. (2010).
Again, in the case of income from labour we do not find any detectable under-
reporting (a plausible consequence of their higher control). On the other hand,
in both years we can see total compliance decreasing in income, with behaviour
31Of course, it may be argued that different income levels behave differently inside a given
source of income. Therefore, in Appendix D.2 I show an alternative calculation following the
earlier work of Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005), who directly estimate these ratios by income levels.
This procedure, however, will be biased if the reporting decision causes significant re-ranking
between the observations, to the extent that they change their quantile.
32When the income of a given category is negative, it is multiplied by the compliance ratio
instead of divided, thus assuming symmetric behaviour.
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worsening significantly at the top decile, where it is estimated at 60-80%. Self-
employment and specially capital incomes had worse compliance levels, which
are driving the total because of the changing composition of tax bases across in-
come levels.33
There is a remarkable improvement between both years in the total and self-
employment compliance rates. The exception is the persistent sheltering of cap-
ital incomes (a part of which is channelled as legal under-valuation procedures).
When interpreting the results, it should also be kept in mind that high incomes
are possibly under-adjusted in the survey data, because of the use of a single fac-
tor for each kind of income in the up-scaling of the HBSs (these factors should
probably be increasing with income to confront the higher reluctance to partic-
ipate or give accurate answers of higher-income households). This means that
compliance ratios are likely over-estimated in the upper part of the distribution,
while the opposite effect would be found at the base.
The different rates obtained for the income deciles are likely to have had a very
relevant impact on the progressivity of the tax, as we will see in section 4.5. Hor-
izontal equity would of course also be affected. Even though equity would also
be deteriorated if the lowest deciles under-reported the most, the fact that it is
the top that specially escaped taxation would make fraud more worrisome, since
the 10% of wealthiest taxpayers concentrated (as well as today) a much higher
percentage of the total taxable base than their share in population. The leaking of
a third of their incomes was therefore a vast obstacle for the revenue capacity of
the tax – and the fiscal system in general, of which it was an important pillar.
4.4.2 Econometrics: too generous to be true?
My second estimation follows Feldman and Slemrod (2007) and Domínguez et
al. (2016), who applied the formers’ framework to the Spanish PIT in 2008. The
method is based on Pissarides and Weber (1989)’s insight about relative under-
reporting in household surveys: the self-employed were shown to be untruthful
reporters of their income, because of their seemingly higher expenditure in food
relative to the (reliable) wage-earners. The truthful category in Feldman and
Slemrod’s elaboration is no longer a type of individual (like the self-employed
33Some compliance ratios over 1 were obtained for labour incomes (and have been adjusted to
1). These indicate that the re-weighting applied does not fully account for the impact of non-filers,
which would have lower incomes than filers in the given categories.
94 Chapter 4. Fraud and base erosion in personal income taxation
versus the wage earners), but an income source: labour; and the “consumption”
item, that might be related to the level of income but in principle not to its compo-
sition, is here charitable donations. We may think of many characteristics which
determine the income share that an individual wishes to give to others, but it is
plausible that this decision is not influenced by whether the income was obtained
as wages, business revenues, or interests.
If we accept these assumptions, we can estimate an equation of the following
form:
lnDONATIONSi = α + βln(Li + k2MCi + k3FCi + k4SEi + k7Ni + k8Oi)
+ γXi + ui (4.4)
where Xi is a vector of taxpayer characteristics including her age, marital status,
number of dependants, region of residence, city size, type of tax return, wealth
dummy, differential tax due before the deduction for donations, and investment
in housing.34 Total income is expressed as the sum of its sources: L from labour,
MC from movable capital, FC from fixed capital, SE from self-employment,
N represents negative flows of all kinds and O other incomes (mostly irregular
ones). Revenues from different sources are always defined as broadly as possi-
ble from the data (i.e., they are meant to represent the total yield, net of costs of
obtainment but not of other tax allowances). β is the elasticity of donations to
total (real) income, and ui the error term. The coefficients of interest are the k: 1/k
indicates the compliance ratio of each component of income. Labour income is
taken to be fully reported, and therefore has no corresponding k.35
Again, it should be noted that the coefficients k subsume two different kinds of
under-assessment of incomes: actual evasion and legal understatement, arising
from tax code’s rules. This can be potentially important, as we have previously
34Age is not available as such in 1982, so a dummy variable for being retired is used as an
approximation. The type of tax return is needed after 1989, when the option of separate filing for
couples was introduced.
35Following Domínguez et al. (2016), an alternative estimation has been performed for 2001,
where pensions are taken to be the only fully compliant income source. In our case, however,
there is no significant change in the coefficients, and the behaviour of wage incomes cannot be
statistically distinguished from that of pensions (this is similar to the later results in Domínguez
et al., 2015 for 2005-2007).
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mentioned, in fixed capital and economic activities under presumptive assess-
ment.36
Notice that, in contrast to Feldman and Slemrod (2007)’s estimation and other
similar works, there is no variable here representing the ‘price’ of the donation.
This is because in Spain charitable contributions are treated as a tax credit (a given
percentage of the donation is deducted from the tax bill), and not as a deduc-
tion from the taxable base, which implies that they are not affected by different
marginal tax rates.
Another potential issue is the possibility that the taxpayers over-report their do-
nations so as to obtain an excessive tax credit. Indeed, Slemrod (1989) found an
average overestimation of 7.2% in audited tax returns in the United States. It
would be a problem for our estimation if propensity to this behaviour were re-
lated to the composition of an individual’s income. But this is not clear; in fact,
Feldman and Slemrod argue that it would not be rational in combination with
an under-reporting of income, because it could trigger the attention of the tax
administration. It is as well possible that the apparent higher charitable inclina-
tions of wealthy taxpayers arise partly because they have better control on their
donations and report them more accurately. If this were the case, our calculation
would over-estimate fraud (given the correlation between the level of income and
certain changes in its composition).37
The biggest problem, however, seems to be the possibility of sample selection
bias, if we apply this procedure to the data directly, using only the observations
which have donations deducted in their returns. This would be specially worri-
some in Spain, compared to the United States, where giving-deducting behaviour
has traditionally been more extended. Table 4.3 shows that returns with itemized
donations (s=1) were 3% of the sample in 1982 and 14% in 2001, and that their
mean income was significantly higher than that of the whole universe of tax-
payers. This casts reasonable doubt on the possibility of obtaining generalizable
36In 1982 we cannot include these incomes separately in the estimations, because all tax returns
with explicit charitable donations were done in the “ordinary” model, which does not include the
possibility of presumptive assessment. For 2001, on the contrary, we introduce them separately
in the equation, as Domínguez et al. (2016) did.
37However, the direction of the bias is difficult to establish. Fack and Landais (2013) find that, in
France, wage earners and low income taxpayers tended to over-report their donations to a greater
extent (given their having less capacity to under-report incomes or abuse other deductions). If this
were the case in our data too, the results would be an under-estimation. Informal conversation
with a tax adviser in Barcelona suggested that these deductions are not very prone to evasion
because of their low quantitative importance.
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results from what is a small, particular sub-sample.
TABLE 4.3: Composition of the sample regarding
reported donations
1982 2001
s Freq. Percent Mean income Freq. Percent Mean income
0 116,308 97.4% 1,021,411 300,089 85.7% 3,501,217
1 3,082 2.6% 2,524,057 50,084 14.3% 6,093,974
Total 119,390 100.0% 1,060,201 350,173 100.0% 3,754,349
Source: author’s calculations on the IEF tax return microdata.
Income is in nominal pesetas, and refers to the sum of net revenues from each source (which is higher
than the taxable base, given legal deductions applied). 2001: weighted means, but percent refers to the
unweighted distribution.
This issue can be solved by using a two-stage estimation, following Heckman
(1979), as has previously been done in García and Marcuello (2001) to estimate
the giving behaviour in the Spanish household budget survey data for 1990. The
first equation is a Probit aimed at explaining the ‘donating or not’ behaviour, run
over all observations:
Prob(si = 1|lnBIi, Zi) = Φ(α + βlnBIi + γZi), (4.5)
s = 1 meaning that the taxpayer made a deductible donation during the year. Φ
is the normal cumulative function. Zi is a vector of taxpayer characteristics which
includes all those inXi but also some extra variables expected to affect the yes/no
decision, but not the amount (‘exclusion restriction’). In this case, city size and
regional dummies are used. The rationale for the first one is that in bigger cities
individuals are more likely to face direct appeals for making donations, which
may make them more prone to do them, but not necessarily more generous once
they have made the first decision (this exclusion restriction is also applied in Gar-
cía and Marcuello (2001), although they do not provide a theoretical justification).
The regional dummies are also used following the intuition that the level of pub-
lic goods, social cohesion, or other such aspects might affect the perceived need of
individuals in different communities to make charitable donations (in that sense,
Bradley et al. (2005) include the level of regional public expenditure). Once again,
we expect the impact to be through a higher probability of donating, rather than
giving more money after having decided to donate, since it is unlikely that the
taxpayers in general have a very sophisticated knowledge of the level of need in
different locations.
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After estimating the Probit equation, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio (λ),
which in Heckman (1979)’s procedure accounts for the probability of selection
of the observations (more specifically, the ‘nonselection hazard’):
λi =
φ(α + βˆlnBIi + γˆZi)
Φ(α + βˆlnBIi + γˆZi)
, (4.6)
where φ and Φ are the normal density function and normal cumulative function
of the predicted values in the probit estimation. This new variable λ is included in
the second equation, to correct the bias arising from the truncation of the sample
(here, we only use the observations with s = 1):38
lnDONATIONSi = α + βln(Li + k2MCi + k3FCi + k4SEi + k7Ni + k8Oi)
+ γXi + δλi + ui (4.7)
I apply this methodology to the analysis of the years 1982 and 2001. Other years
have data problems that preclude successful estimation.39 The number of vari-
ables and observations available increases between the two years, and some fea-
tures of the tax had changed (namely, imputed income from owner-occupied
housing is no longer included in the taxable base for the first dwelling, and a non-
taxable threshold was introduced). In the year 2001 we can separately estimate
compliance for different kinds of self-employment income categories, according
to the assessment procedure (accountancy-based or presumptive).
Table 4.4 shows some indicators of the goodness-of-fit of the probit equations.
38In principle, a Tobit estimation is another option to deal with this problem. The condition
for this strategy, however, is that the two decisions (to give or not to give, and what amount to
donate in the first case) are essentially affected in the same direction by the same factors. This is
not necessarily true, and in fact different signs are obtained for some variables in the two stages
of the estimation, suggesting that there are two qualitatively different decisions involved. This
was found also by García and Marcuello (2001).
39Namely, very low number of observations from 1985 to 1991 because deductible donations
were restricted, and from 1992 to 1998 the inability to correctly calculate the quantities donated
because of the existence of different percentages of deduction (in the microdata, only the quantity
deducted is available, which represented 10-15-20-25% of the donation, depending on the year).
A new panel begins in 1999, but in the first two years the variable ‘age’ is missing for many
observations. I have also estimated the models for 1983: the results are similar to those in 1982
and therefore serve as a reassurance. Compliance, however, seems slightly higher, which points
to the low precision of these early data estimates because of the low number of observations.
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The overall performance is good, even though predicting accuracy is low for ob-
servations with s=1. This is not surprising in such an unbalanced sample, ac-
cording to Greene (2003). It points to the estimated probabilities being generally
low. There might be a problem of omitted variable bias because of not including
educational level (not available in the tax data), which has been shown to be sig-
nificant in related studies, including García and Marcuello (2001) for Spain. This
feature is, however, expected to be highly correlated with income and other vari-
ables in the model, which would reduce the extent of problem. In any case, the
results have to be read with caution.
TABLE 4.4: Goodness-of-fit measures of the Probit estimation
1982 2001
Prob>χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 25.60 11.73
% correctly classified
Total 99.83% 85.54%
s=1 2.82% 5.71%
s=0 97.33% 98.86%
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 4.5 presents the estimated coefficients. They are generally not at odds with
other studies of charitable donations (Backus, 2010; Bradley et al., 2005; Brooks,
2003; Domínguez et al., 2016; García and Marcuello, 2001). The income elastic-
ity of donations is lower than one. Demographic variables have the expected
signs: older taxpayers and women are more likely to donate, and also those with
children. The tax due variable (not shown because of space considerations) cor-
responds to the differential tax due resulting from the return (not the total of the
tax bill, most of which has normally been deducted at source), before the applica-
tion of the tax credit for donations. It intends to control for the incentive to make
(or report) donations because of anticipating a high payment at the filing season,
which could arise in relation to variability in yearly incomes. This seems to be the
case in 1982, where it has a positive, significant value in both the one-step and the
two-step estimations; in 2001, on the other hand, the coefficient is negative in the
one-step and the probit equation.40 The significance of lambda in the two-step
estimation shows that there is indeed a sample selection problem, which causes
the one-step estimation to be biased.
40I interpret this as weak evidence pointing towards over-reporting of donations in 1982.
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TABLE 4.5: Regression results. Dependent variable: log donations
(marginal effects in Probit)
1982 2001
One-step Two-step Heckman One-step Two-step Heckman
Censored nl Probit Censored nl Censored nl Probit Censored nl
lnIncome 0.462*** 0.052*** 1.018*** 0.534*** 0.083*** 0.305***
(0.074) (0.001) (0.180) (0.008) (0.001) (0.024)
Movable cap. 5.065** - 2.363*** 2.001*** - 3.143***
(1.978) - (0.521) (0.152) - (0.466)
Fixed cap. 6.142** - 2.705*** 1.403*** - 1.932***
(2.761) - (0.785) (0.116) - (0.289)
Self-empl. 5.992*** - 2.625*** - - -
(2.074) - (0.546) - - -
SE Direct - - - 1.228*** - 1.493***
- - - (0.051) - (0.122)
SE Objective - - - 1.110*** - 1.325***
- - - (0.131) - (0.288)
SE Agrarian - - - 1.326*** - 1.491***
- - - (0.160) - (0.330)
Negative inc. 1.710 - 1.491*** -0.388 - -4.017*
(1.170) - (0.576) (0.558) - (2.164)
Other inc. 5.684 - 2.402** 1.176*** - 1.653***
(5.355) - (1.071) (0.115) - (0.283)
Married -0.566*** -0.005*** -0.579*** -0.204*** 0.043*** -0.353***
(0.088) (0.001) (0.090) (0.026) (0.002) (0.027)
Female - - - 0.197*** 0.086*** -0.084**
- - - (0.027) (0.002) (0.034)
Age 0.627** 0.002 0.618** -0.037*** 0.004*** -0.054***
(0.257) (0.003) (0.251) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.003)
Dependants 0.066*** 0.001*** 0.102*** 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.005***
(0.018) (0.0003) (0.019) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001)
Citysize1 0.059 0.003 - 0.158*** 0.050*** -
(0.150) (0.002) - (0.036) (0.004) -
Citysize2 -0.110 -8.85e-06 - 0.154*** 0.036*** -
(0.161) (0.003) - (0.034) (0.003) -
Citysize3 -0.076 0.006*** - 0.228*** 0.045*** -
(0.113) (0.002) - (0.026) (0.002) -
Citysize4 -0.044 0.011*** - 0.162*** 0.034*** -
(0.083) (0.001) - (0.017) (0.002) -
lambda - - 0.665*** - - -0.842***
- - (0.161) - - (0.059)
Regions yes yes no yes yes no
Obs. 3,082 119,387 3,082 50,084 350,173 50,084
R2 0.161 0.256 0.131 0.165 0.117 0.159
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The one-step procedure corresponds to equation (4.4), while the two-step calculations follow equa-
tions (4.5) to (4.7).
‘Dependants’ captures the needs of the household (in 2001 the variable corresponds to the income exempted according to
family situation). ‘lambda’ is the inverse Mills ratio. Other controls include a dummy for joint filing of marriages (compul-
sory in 1982), the differential tax due prior to the deduction for donations, the investment in acquiring a house, a dummy for
disability (1982), age squared (only in 2001), the interaction of ‘married’ with ‘female’ (only in 2001), a ’wealth’ dummy, and
a constant.
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The coefficients of interest k indicate the presence of under-reporting when they
are significantly bigger than one. Table 4.6 displays the estimated compliance ra-
tios under both estimation strategies, although the two-step method is considered
more accurate while the first one would be biased. The estimated compliance ra-
tios are higher in 1982 when we apply Heckman, and lower in 2001. The story
thus changes considerably. With the first results, we would have concluded that
under-reporting lay above 80% in the beginning of the eighties, and was strongly
pulled back during the following two decades. The Heckman estimates, how-
ever, yield under-reporting levels near 60% for all non-labour incomes in 1982,
with the behaviour of movable capital actually getting slightly worse (around 70%
still escaping taxation at the end of the century). Only self-employment incomes
improved very significantly, while fixed capital incomes did so more slightly.41
TABLE 4.6: Compliance ratios à la Feldman-Slemrod
1982 2001
1-step 2-step 1-step 2-step
Movable capital 20%** 42%*** 50%*** 32%***
Fixed capital 16%* 37%** 71%*** 52%***
Self-employment 17%** 38%*** - -
SE Direct - - 81%*** 67%***
SE Objective - - 90% 75%
SE Agrarian - - 75%** 67%
Other incomes 18% 42% 85% 60%**
Source: author’s calculations with the coefficients from table 4.5.
The compliance ratio is 1/ki for each income source. Self-employment activities
are separated in 2001 according to the valuation procedure: ‘SE Direct’ are those
under accountancy-based assessment, while ‘SE Objective’ correspond to those
under presumptive assessment, where we further distinguish agrarian activities
(‘SE Agrarian’).
*** Different from 1 at p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.5 Discussion
Table 4.7 shows an overview of the results in terms of estimated compliance for
different income sources by all the methods applied. An improvement can be
seen across the years, but also persistence in the differences in compliance degrees
41The behaviour of the self-employed in 2001 under presumptive taxation, also in agrarian
activities, cannot be statistically distinguished from total compliance. This might be shocking for
readers familiar with the Spanish context. A plausible explanation is the relatively low number
of observations for these categories, which does not allow to obtain precise estimates.
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depending on the source, with the increase concentrated on self-employment in-
comes.42 Because of that, from representing 53% of all under-reporting in 1982,
self-employment incomes went down to 31%, nearly trading positions with mov-
able capital incomes (from 30 to 53%). The share due to real estate incomes is
quite stable (17 to 16%).
The table allows to make a decomposition of total evasion, where the estimations
for filers are only a part of the aggregate discrepancy (which includes the effect
of non-filing). Both estimations are consistent with each other: in 1982, aggregate
non-labour incomes were hidden by over 70% – but near half of that fraud was
due to non-filers.43 Those who did file declared non-labour revenues around a
half or a third of what they actually earned, in average. Similar appreciations can
be made for the following years.
While total compliance increased over the years, the aggregate behaviour of filers
appears to have been more stable. This would point to the extension of filing as a
significant part of the explanation of the improvement during the eighties – also
implying that the bias in the re-weighted estimates related to non-filers’ incomes,
presumably an over-estimation of compliance, is less important in the 1990 data
(recall footnote 30).
The favourable evolution in the case of business incomes can be related to the
aforementioned introduction of the Value Added Tax in 1986 (which encouraged
the report of activity in order to claim back taxes paid on purchases, improving
compliance in directly assessed establishments), and secondly, to a reform in the
system of presumptive taxation in 1991: given that in the eighties the low in-
comes reported by this group were worrisome for tax authorities, a new model
was introduced for the standard assessment of these revenues, which seems to
42My results in terms of under-reporting by filers can be compared with those of Domínguez
et al. (2016), whose work is closely replicated in the 1-step procedure. They calculated for the
year 2008 a rate of compliance of 60% for movable capital, 70% for fixed capital, and 65% for
self-employment activities under direct estimation (78% in the case of presumptive assessment).
These levels are near the ones I get using the same method for 2001, so improvement in compli-
ance seems to have been concentrated to a large extent in the last decades of the 20th century.
43Indeed, if we estimate aggregate incomes of filers using the k as up-scaling factors, we find
them to be around 60-70% of the aggregate incomes of those obliged to pay the tax (obtained
from the HBS in section 4.4.1). The rest of the discrepancy is due to non-filers. If we up-scale
incomes by the factors obtained in the 1-step estimation, the aggregate is significantly higher than
the macro framework.
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TABLE 4.7: Estimated compliance ratios by sources of income
1982 1990 2001
Total Filers Total Filers Filers
Discr. Discr. 2-step Discr. Discr. 2-step
Labour 73% 100% ass. 100% 100% 100% ass. 100%
Movable capital
30% 45%
42%
36% 37%
32%
Fixed capital 37% 52%
Self-employment 22% 32% 38% 64% 62% -
SE Direct - - - - - 67%
SE Objective - - - - - 75%
SE Agrarian - - - - - 67%
Other incomes - - - - - 60%
Total 57% 89% 79% 83% 84% 83%
Source: author’s calculations.
Total discrepancy results are those in figure 4.4, thus subsuming the effect of non-filing. Filers’ discrepancy estimates
correspond to the ratios of the re-weighted values, referring only to active population in 1982 (and adjusting to
Labour = 100% in 1990). The econometric estimations for filers are obtained from the coefficients in table 4.5, the
compliance ratio being 1/k for each income source (only the two-step results are shown). Self-employment activities
are separated in 2001 according to the valuation procedure: direct assessment (accountancy-based) or presumptive,
where we further distinguish agrarian activities. The results shown in italics are not statistically significant at the
10% level. Total compliance for filers in the 2-step estimations is calculated as the weighted average of compliance
of the different income sources (using the ‘SE Direct’ coefficient for all self-employment incomes in 2001).
have brought up the reported yields.44 It might also be suggested that a “learn-
ing” process took place after the introduction of the modern tax, in the context of
higher legitimacy of the system under democracy.
Regarding fixed capital incomes, there were two potentially opposing changes.
On the one hand, imputed rents from the main home were no longer subject to
tax after a reform in 1998 (this would push down estimated compliance, given
that all “loopholes” in the definition of the tax base are included as such). On
the other, a withholding mechanism was introduced for rental incomes in the
same year, supposedly enhancing compliance. The evolution of cadastral values,
which were updated during the 1990s, surely also played a role.45
44In the 1978 law, the method for presumptive taxation was the Estimación Objetiva Singular,
based on turnover. The 1991 reform introduced a new method, Estimación por signos, índices y
módulos, which uses parameters such as the number of employees or the situation or size of the
business premises. This system seems to have improved the reporting of entrepreneurial incomes,
but is still fiercely criticised because of non-neutrality and not following the principle of economic
capacity (Navarro, 1993). In the taxpayers data (positive tax due), presumptive estimation was
applied in 8% of the returns in 1982, 14% in 1990 and 11% in 2001 – 28%, 74% and 52% respectively
of those with some business income reported.
45Cadastral values were brought up, which would have reduced the legal “base-voidening”
and thus should have a positive impact on estimated compliance. However, this operation was
highly controversial and triggered an important opposition (these values are also the base for
other housing taxes, fundamentally a local real estate tax). It came to be known as “Catastrazo”,
with implications of being an authoritarian policy, ill-treating taxpayers – which could thus have
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The persistently low values obtained for movable capital, on the other hand,
could seem harder to explain, considering the improvements in withholding and
information reporting by the financial sector. One possible cause is the changing
composition of filers, with the new ones under-reporting more. On the other
hand, the results could be pointing to the role of financial sophistication and
avoidance, including international mobility and use of tax havens. Piketty (2003)
provides some similar insights for the case of France.46 The answer is to be given
by further research.
4.5.1 The equity concern: impact on progressivity
A second consistency check between the discrepancy and econometric methods is
whether they yield similar profiles of compliance by income levels. What would
be the ratios for each income level using the coefficients from the donations equa-
tion? To calculate them, I assign the obtained ks to each individual in the sample,
thus imputing them the average behaviour in each income source. This allows
to calculate “real” incomes, and contrast them with reported ones, in a similar
manner as with Matsaganis et al. (2010)’s calculations. These ratios are shown
in figure 4.7, and, for 1982, they can be compared with the compliance profile
in figure 4.6. As can be seen, they are very similar and the general results hold:
concealment was concentrated at the top.
Intuitively, it is easy to imagine that this distributional pattern of under-reporting
necessarily had an impact on progressivity estimations. Three different scenarios
are shown in table 4.8 to illustrate this. Scenario 1, ‘Apparent’, is calculated as
the combination of reported incomes and actual tax payments (i.e., the original
data). In the presence of fraud, these indicators are a miscalculation of real pro-
gressivity.47 In scenarios 2 and 3, I use “real” incomes, obtained factoring up the
reported revenues with the ks (i.e., necessarily assuming that under-statement of
caused tax resistance. See the parallels with the reforms of property taxation in the United States
(Martin, 2008).
46He reports a falling ratio of dividends in tax returns to those in National Accounts in the
period 1927-95, and relates it to the development of funded pension plans and retirement saving
accounts.
47This applies also to the exercise in chapter 2, which may be read as a lower-bound calculation
of regressivity.
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FIGURE 4.7: Estimated compliance ratios by income deciles à la
Feldman & Slemrod
Source: author’s calculations with IEF panel data.
The lines for different sources of income represent the compliance ratios from table 4.6, which are used
to estimate total incomes.
incomes is uniformly distributed for each income source).48 The ‘corrected’ col-
umn in table 4.8 represents the effective behaviour of the tax, with these “real”,
factored-up incomes in combination with actual tax payments (which derive from
reported decisions). Furthermore, in a ‘no under-reporting’ scenario, the distribu-
tion of the tax burden and thus the reduction in inequality would have been very
different. These calculations (real incomes, alternative simulated tax payments)
are shown in the fifth column of the table.
Real inequality would be around 7-24% higher than it looks in the reported data,
and the average tax rate around 14-20% lower (difference between columns ‘ap-
parent’ and ‘corrected’). The redistribution estimates are the most affected: the
index would be 64% lower than apparent in 1982, 49% in 1990 and 30% in 2001;
while progressivity was 51-32-15% overestimated respectively. This is a very sig-
nificant impact, which would be a lower bound if under-reporting were increas-
ing within income source. On the other hand, the negative impact has also very
clearly decreased between the three estimations, following the changes in the dis-
tributional patterns of fraud.
Without evasion, the personal income tax would have behaved in a notably dif-
ferent way. The ‘no under-reporting’ column shows that, as expected from the
progressive rate schedule, the taxation of high incomes would have been much
48I use the results of the donations equations for 1982 and 2001, while the coefficients obtained
from the discrepancy analysis are applied for 1990. In 1982, using these alternative coefficients
does not change the results.
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TABLE 4.8: Impact of under-reporting on progressivity
estimations
1982
Apparent Corrected Difference No under-reporting Difference
(1) (2) (2-1)/(1) (3) (3-2)/(2)
Pre-tax Gini 31.66 37.13 17% 37.13 0%
Post-tax Gini 29.19 36.25 24% 32.52 -10%
Average tax rate 12.05 9.63 -20% 16.50 71%
Redistribution 2.46 0.88 -64% 4.61 424%
Progressivity 18.40 8.99 -51% 23.56 162%
Tax rate top 10% 15.64 10.82 -31% 21.58 99%
Tax rate top 1% 22.69 11.53 -49% 38.67 235%
1990
Apparent Corrected Difference No under-reporting Difference
(1) (2) (2-1)/(1) (3) (3-2)/(2)
Pre-tax Gini 34.47 38.58 12% 38.58 0%
Post-tax Gini 30.97 36.80 19% 31.40 -15%
Average tax rate 15.36 12.38 -19% 22.55 82%
Redistribution 3.50 1.78 -49% 7.18 303%
Progressivity 19.87 13.47 -32% 24.86 85%
Tax rate top 10% 19.81 14.54 -27% 32.66 125%
Tax rate top 1% 27.52 16.50 -40% 46.81 184%
2001
Apparent Corrected Difference No under-reporting Difference
(1) (2) (2-1)/(1) (3) (3-2)/(2)
Pre-tax Gini 36.99 39.55 7% 39.55 0%
Post-tax Gini 32.25 36.22 12% 32.91 -9%
Average tax rate 15.97 13.81 -14% 20.11 46%
Redistribution 4.73 3.33 -30% 6.64 99%
Progressivity 25.39 21.47 -15% 26.73 24%
Tax rate top 10% 23.04 19.22 -17% 28.84 50%
Tax rate top 1% 30.07 22.14 -26% 41.17 86%
Source: author’s calculations.
In all cases, instead of the legal tax base, the sum of net revenues from all sources has been used (which is closer to the
concept of “total pre-tax income"). The ‘Apparent’ scenario is the estimate readily obtained from the data, affected by
under-reporting. ‘Corrected’ shows the real behaviour of the tax, if evasion was distributed as obtained, while the ’No
under-reporting’ scenario shows how the tax would be distributed under full compliance.
The redistribution indicator is the Reynolds-Smolensky index, corresponding to the difference between the Gini of
pre-tax and post-tax incomes. The progressivity indicator is the Kakwani index, calculated as the difference between
pre-tax Gini and concentration of tax payments. The tax rates for the top 10 and 1% refer to the distribution of corrected
incomes. To improve readability, all indices have been multiplied by 100.
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more intense if the spirit of the law had been followed.49 The Spanish tax sys-
tem has been historically criticised for applying high legal rates on narrow tax
bases; to a certain extent the appreciation seemed to hold as late as the end of the
20th Century. Differences are very intense, again specially in the first year shown,
but still in 2001 redistribution would have been doubled if income sheltering were
eradicated.50
4.5.2 An international comparison
Placing the Spanish experience in international perspective might shed some fur-
ther light. Table 4.9 presents rates of compliance taken from many different stud-
ies (which normally presented rates of evasion, 1 - compliance). The total esti-
mates for Spain during our time period are lower than many other available in
the literature, which correspond to more developed countries or later periods.
Our case appears close, however, to the results for Italy in 1991-94 and Chile in
1996, and also to the US estimates for the 1980s, obtained through the discrepancy
method (i.e., subsuming the effect of non-filing and exemptions).
Compliance rates for self-employment incomes are always lower than those from
dependent labour or the general tax base. The behaviour in Spain does not stand
out a lot in this respect. Rates of 20-30% are also found among small informal
business suppliers in the United States, suggesting that a significant part of the
difference between countries could be due to the business structure. Small enter-
prises are more frequently informal, and also often taxed following presumptive
methods: this regime, as has been said, historically under-estimated these rev-
enues in the Spanish PIT. Similar systems exist in developing countries and also
in places like France or Belgium, although they tend to loose importance. Pre-
sumptive methods are not applied, or very marginally, in developed economies
49In 2001, the existence of a special treatment for long-term capital gains has been considered a
tax privilege, and thus the ‘no under-reporting’ scenario locates these revenues together will all
the rest (i.e., I do not distinguish between the ‘Base General’ and the ‘Base Especial’, and apply the
general, progressive tax schedule to the total – the ‘Base Especial’ had a 18% uniform tax rate). The
quantitative incidence of this choice, however, is very limited.
50Of course, such a result is highly implausible. The exercise serves as an indication of the
intensity of the distortion, and not as a credible policy objective. Furthermore, the government
surely took into account the existence of fraud when designing tax schedules, so the ‘no under-
reporting’ scenario would not be their real goal. The estimated tax gap in terms of tax liability
lies between 2.4 and 4.9% of GDP – a lower-bound, since our data does not include the Basque
Country, Navarra nor the Canary Islands.
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TABLE 4.9: A comparison of Personal Income Tax compliance
estimates across countries
Study Country Year
Evasion as % of...
Tax Tax base
liability Total Self-empl.
This study Spain
1982* 58% 62% 22-38%
1990 64-55% 83% 64-...%
2001 71-83%** ...-67%
Esteller-Moré (2011) Spain 1993-2000 80%
Domínguez et al. (2015) Spain 2005 76%
Domínguez et al. (2016) Spain 2008 65-78%
Klepper and Nagin (1989) US 1982 68-26-52%**
Internal Revenue Service (1996) US
1985 86% 69% 65-27-69%**
1988 87% 74% 68-19-68%***
1992 87% 68-19-68%***
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) US 1999 65-26-22%***
Johns and Slemrod (2010) US 2001 82% 89% 57%
Black et al. (2012) US 2006 77% 64%
Kleven et al. (2011) Denmark 2007 98% 98% 63%****
Galbiati and Zanella (2012) Italy 1987 54%
Bernardi and Bernasconi (1997) Italy 1991 74% 37%
Bernardi (1996) Italy 1994 77% 40%
Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) Italy 2000 22-92%
Marino and Zizza (2012) Italy 2004 86% 64%
Albarea et al. (2015) Italy 2010 93% 76%
Matsaganis et al. (2010) Italy 2002 79% 89%
Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2010) Greece 2004 74% 90% 76%
Artavanis et al. (2015) Greece 2003-09 57%
Leventi et al. (2013) Greece 2005-09 70% 88% 57%
Benedek and Lelkes (2011) Hungary 2005 84-80% 91-87% 33%
Engel et al. (1999) Chile 1996 46% 77%
Jiménez et al. (2010)
Chile 2003 54%
Ecuador 2005 42%
El Salvador 2005 64%
Guatemala 2006 30%
Mexico 2004 62%
Peru 2006 66%
Argentina 2005 50%
Compliance is presented as % of the estimated total in each case. Most of these studies apply different variants of
the discrepancy method. The estimates for the United States and Denmark, on the other hand, are based on audit
data (except for Feldman and Slemrod, 2007), as well as those from Galbiati and Zanella (2012). Numbers in italics
refer to compliance calculated including non-filing and underpayment. The tax liability calculations of this study refer
exclusively to filers.
* 1982 refers only to the active population.
** The first figure includes the effect of the reduced tax rate on long-term capital gains.
*** Refers respectively to Non-farm proprietor income, Informal supplier income and Farm income.
**** Refers to all self-reported income, as opposed to that subject to third-party information.
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where businesses are deemed capable of managing a basic accountancy. This el-
ement, therefore, clearly affects the comparison of Spain with countries such as
Sweden or the United States.
The process of salarization and the growing size of enterprises therefore seem im-
portant determinants of the increased compliance in developed countries. And
indeed, both these indicators were comparatively low in Spain at the start of the
period, but tended to increase over time. The share of employed workers over
the workforce, according to the OECD database, was around 75% in Spain in the
middle of the 1970s and grew up to near 85% thirty years later, converging signif-
icantly with its level in richer economies (at around 90%). This evolution entails
that the share of incomes that lacks accurate third-party control is decreasing. In
the framework of Kleven et al. (2015), the size of businesses is also important, be-
cause it makes collusion difficult and generates more accurate accountancy. Firm
size was indeed growing in Spain during this period, with small and medium
enterprises decreasing considerably as a share of total employment (from 92% in
1986 to 79% in 1998).51
The previous appreciation with respect to labour and self-employment incomes
cannot be easily extended to capital yields. It is difficult to find examples to
make a comparison, since not many works provide with estimates for capital in-
comes escaping taxation. In the case of discrepancy work, it is normally difficult
to obtain an adequate comparable magnitude. The extent to which the above-
mentioned processes also affected capital incomes in different countries is un-
known, and in any case they have been potentially counteracted by increasing
capital mobility, avoidance schemes and development of tax privileges, which
can be seen as a “white-collar” substitute for outright evasion.
4.6 Conclusions
Tax evasion is a very popular topic in the Spanish public debate today. Folk wis-
dom has it that it is still very pervasive, and unequally distributed – concentrating
among the rich and the self-employed. Its existence would render the tax system
51Which is nevertheless still a high value compared to developed countries; see Tafunell, 2005,
p. 721, where the figure for Germany is 65% in 1986, similar to other central-northern European
countries. The contrast is specially acute when we focus on the share of micro-enterprises, with
less than 10 employees (over 40% of total employment in Spain versus 18% in Germany in 1986).
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unfair, and there is much claim for fighting against it, specially under the zeitgeist
brought about by the economic crisis. What is the origin of these impressions?
This chapter has reviewed the slow and twisted path toward generality in income
taxation in the country. The principle that all citizens should contribute according
to their economic capacities was not followed for a long time. During most of the
20th Century, personal taxation was only directed at the very rich households, so
for most of the income scale there was no progressivity (and hardly at the top,
given acute non-filing). With the reforms in the seventies and the introduction
of the modern tax in 1978, the nature of the problem changed: the tax was now
supposed to capture all incomes and treat them equally; but resistances were
hard. A high percentage of individuals did not even file a tax return, and those
who did reported incomes well below their real value on average. The new tax
was severely affected by lack of compliance and low legal valuations, in spite of
several administrative and legislative developments during the next decades.
I have estimated under-assessment of incomes in tax returns, including non-
filing, legal under-valuation and under-reporting by filers. Discrepancy between
macro aggregates gives us an approximation to the total impact of these ele-
ments, which lies around 42% evasion in 1982 for the total tax base, and ranging
from 27% in wages to around 70-80% in other yields – with an improvement in
self-employment incomes to around 36% in 1990. As a second step, restricting
the attention to the behaviour of filers, I try to assess how reporting compliance
changed across income sources and the income scale. To do that, I have followed
two proposals in the literature. The first is a discrepancy analysis between tax
return microdata and survey data (after adjusting these to National Accounts for
each income source), following Matsaganis et al. (2010)’s approach.
The second method is an econometric estimation with tax return microdata, ex-
ploiting the relation between reported charitable donations and the composition
of income (under the assumption that donations should not be affected by the
latter, only by its level). This idea was developed by Feldman and Slemrod (2007)
and applied to Spain for 2008 by Domínguez et al. (2016). Nevertheless, here I
have slightly modified the procedure to correct for a plausible sample selection
problem using Heckman’s estimation method, because returns with charitable
donations are a small – and distinct – part of the total.
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The discrepancy analysis shows very high levels of compliance in labour in-
comes, while they were much lower for self-employment and, specially, capi-
tal yields. As a result both of composition and of differing rates of compliance
across deciles within income source, evasion in the total tax base is found to be
increasing as we move towards the top of the income distribution. The donation
equations confirm the different behaviours of incomes from disparate sources.
Taking labour as fully compliant, all other yields would be reported at near 40%
of their real value in 1982. Nineteen years later, at our second estimation, com-
pliance had gone up slightly in fixed capital incomes (now at 52%), and specially
self-employment activities (67%), but down in the case of movable capital (32%).
Because of the varying composition of incomes across the society’s income dis-
tribution, we expected a negative impact of these results on progressivity. Thus,
the estimations we get from the reported data concerning redistribution and pro-
gressivity would be upwards biased. This is confirmed by a back-of-the-envelope
calculation that gives an estimate of that bias as around 60-30% for the redistri-
bution index and between 15 and 50% for the progressivity indicator, depending
on the year. The results seem to confirm Comín’s insight that, at least for some
time, “the regressivity of the tax system, however, has not been banished in practice, be-
cause fraud is still very flagrant in incomes with no withholding at source. Widespread
evasion in high-income taxpayers and non-labour revenues has made PIT a tax on labour
incomes” (Comín et al., 1995).
The bad news is that undermined progressivity of PIT, which was – and is – the
only real progressive tax with some weight in the system, calls into question the
image of the ensemble of taxation and the joint tax-and-transfer scheme. Tax
evasion and avoidance have proven pervasive in the country. The good news,
however, is that efforts to reduce fraud, despite being slow, have reaped some
rewards, specially with regards to self-employment incomes. A lot is left to be
done, judging by the results in this paper and the ones from Domínguez et al.
(2016), but at least we know where the big tax gaps are.
Further work would benefit from access to audit data, as has been possible in
the United States, allowing the development of rich research in the area (Bishop
et al., 2000; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007; Johns and Slemrod, 2010), and also in
Denmark (Kleven et al., 2011). This would make much more precise estimations
possible. They are without a doubt interesting not only for economic history, but
also for societal awareness and policy design.
Chapter 5
Public opinion and political
institutions in the fiscal transition
After the tax reform undertaken in Spain between 1977 and 1986, the practical results
in terms of progressivity and redistribution were not outstanding. Inequality did not
significantly decrease after the transition to democracy, as political economy literature
would suggest. In recent times, the system has shown its incapacity to sustain European-
level welfare services. But why?
This paper analyses the main contenders which might explain the issue: ideologies and
the decision-making institutions. Perhaps the general citizen – or the decisive voter – was
not so keen on redistribution. Alternatively, the political system may have not translated
effectively the public stances onto policies. Some of these elements were significantly mod-
ified during the political transition. Other were affected by international developments,
such as the general change of emphasis from equity to efficiency in tax system design, and
capital increasing its mobility and its resulting higher capacity to escape from taxation.
5.1 Introduction
As the previous pages have shown, the Spanish fiscal system underwent a deep
change during the transition period. It has been thoroughly studied by previous
literature, both with respect to revenues (Comín, 1993, 2007; Pan-Montojo, 1996)
and expenditures (Espuelas, 2013). The reform was initiated in 1977, with the ob-
jectives of increasing direct tax revenue and modernizing the system, to provide
funding for the nascent welfare state.
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However, my quantitative results in this thesis establish the limited success of the
new tax system with respect to progressivity and redistribution. A summary is
presented in table 5.1. Inequality did not substantially decrease after democrati-
sation, and the tax system as a whole was not progressive, which limited the joint
redistributive effect of the public budget. In order to understand this result, in
the following pages I analyse the design of tax policy, based on primary sources,
and under the light of the interpretative frameworks of international literature.
TABLE 5.1: The impact of taxation on inequality in Spain, 1970-90
1970 1982 1990
Pre-tax income inequality 38.0 42.1 42.5
Net factor income inequality 39.0 41.5 40.8
Post-tax income inequality 41.4 44.5 49.2
Disposable income inequality 34.7 33.0 32.9
Post-tax-and-transfer income inequality 36.2 34.5 37.3
AETR on 2nd decile 28.3 43.6 70.7
AETR on 10th decile 20.0 34.9 46.5
AETR on top 1% 16.4 32.3 44.4
Progressivity index -0.0849 -0.0274 -0.0485
Redistribution index -0.0332 -0.0239 -0.0667
PIT tax base discrepancy 89% 43% 17%
PIT apparent tax rate 10th decile - 15.6 19.8
PIT corrected tax rate 10th decile - 10.8 14.5
PIT apparent tax rate top 1% - 22.7 27.5
PIT corrected tax rate top 1% - 11.5 16.5
Source: chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Notes: income inequality is expressed using the Gini index, in percentage terms. Households are
the unit of analysis, but the OECD equivalence scale and individual weighting is used. AETRs
are obtained adding all taxes paid by households, directly or indirectly (and including Social
contributions). The progressivity index is Kakwani’s, and the redistribution index is Reynolds-
Smolensky’s. The ‘apparent’ tax rates correspond to reported incomes, while ‘corrected’ tax rates
relate PIT payments with real estimated incomes.
I will study two interrelated aspects: social preferences and the mechanisms of
their translation into actual policies. Demand for redistribution is the result of
a complex process, with intervening factors such as the evolution of dominant
ideas about fairness in income distribution, and the capacity of the tax system
to approach the desired ideal (Steinmo, 2003). Prevailing economic theory about
taxation, and the policies applied in leading countries, have changed deeply since
the mid 20th Century: from defence of progressivity to extended attacks on it
as an obstacle to efficiency, giving rise to the privileged treatment of capital in-
comes. On the other hand, the degree of inequality and its different dimensions
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(e.g. subjective perceptions or polarization) also condition social demands, and
the possible formation of different interest coalitions (Kristov et al., 1992; Lupu
and Pontusson, 2011). The first focus of this chapter is therefore the analysis of
Spanish attitudes towards tax equity and their evolution during the democratic
transition. I approach the issue following the ideas of distributive justice, progres-
sivity and income redistribution in sociological surveys, the press, and political
debates.
The second question is the translation of citizen preferences into political action.
In the period under analysis, an authoritarian decision-making mechanism was
replaced by a parliamentarian one, based on political parties. Did that mean
going from the “only voter” of francoism to the “median” or “swing” voter of
democratic political economy? To what extent were social demands reflected in
policies? What aspects can explain a certain degree of persistence in tax incidence,
despite extensive fiscal reforms?
I will analyse the impact of the configuration of the regime during its early years
on the distribution of political power, with a special focus on the electoral sys-
tem: as a mechanism translating the distribution of citizens’ preferences onto a
certain distribution of seats, its importance cannot be overrated – and the choice
of its features would be explained by its expected effects. In that sense, even
though the Spanish system is formally proportional (which, according to Persson
and Tabellini (2003) and Iversen and Soskice (2006), would favour the introduc-
tion of redistributive policies), in its actual operation it deviates significantly from
proportionality, favouring conservative stances (Gunther, 1989; Montero and Ri-
era, 2009). Differences in political participation would further extend this bias,
because lower turnout of low income groups generally decreases the chances of
pro-redistribution parties (Montero, 1986).
As was advanced in the introduction, international comparisons provide some in-
tuitions about the relationship between political institutions and the level of pro-
gressivity and redistribution achieved in different societies. Steinmo (1989, 1993)
related the Swedish political system (centralized, proportional and corporatist),
with relatively regressive taxes, which had nonetheless high revenue capacity to
finance redistributive spending. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon model was charac-
terized by more progressive but lower taxes. Piketty and Saez (2007) and Prasad
and Deng (2009) have explored this assertion empirically. Our intention is to dis-
cern the position of Spain in this general framework.
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Among political institutions, the international ones should not be neglected: in
the globalised world of the last decades of the 20th century, capital mobility and
tax competition are key factors in our understanding of the pressures against
fiscal progressivity. During the period of study, Spain was increasing its economic
openness, with the milestone of accession to EEC/EU in 1986 and the subsequent
process of construction of the EMU. Nevertheless, even before that, substantial
international flows of capital existed (including illegal offshore movements).
This last chapter thus intends to contrast the explanatory capacity of two possible
factors behind the non-progressivity of the tax system. Was the Spanish citizenry
not demanding tax progression? Or was the political system not translating their
demands onto policies? If the answer to the second question is positive, we can
further focus either on national institutional issues (disproportionality in repre-
sentation) or international ones (international integration and capital mobility).
In the rest of the chapter, I analyse the sources about public opinion on tax equity
among Spaniards (section 5.2), and then I review the institutional framework and
how it interplayed with citizens’ preferences to bring about decisions about taxes
(section 5.3). Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Public opinion on taxes
Whether Spaniards were in favour of progressive taxation, or just of the provision
of public services irrespective of the distribution of the corresponding tax burden,
needs to be explored in the data. This section approaches the issue on the basis
of surveys, petitions, and the media.
5.2.1 Surveys
An extensive Fiscal sociology literature analyses the attitudes of the public with
respect to taxes. Survey evidence starts in the mid 1960s in the case of Spain.
Early studies were generally focused on the opinions about legitimacy and tax
evasion, in an effort to provide useful insights to tax administration design. The
first ones were undertaken by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, in cooperation with
scholars from the University of Cologne. The Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS)
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conducted similar studies since 1980. For the present, we have also international
sources such as the International Social Survey Program or the World Values Surveys.
Unfortunately, this evidence is scattered and heterogeneous across time. It al-
lows, however, to extract some conclusions, which I have organized in three sec-
tions: progressivity, tax burden, and evasion. I am working here with published
data (not individual observations), which in some cases allow disaggregation by
professional group, income level, age, social class, or educational attainment (the
exact classifications vary between surveys; some also include political orientation
and gender of the respondent). See Appendix E for the list of surveys used.
Tax progressivity perceptions and demand
Spaniards usually show high concern with inequality in social surveys. In 1971,
60% considered inequality a serious problem of the Spanish society.1 Reducing
wealth and income inequality was the 3rd out of 14 issues in the worries of the
citizens, an opinion which did not vary a lot across social classes (García, 1972,
1975). The percentage of those claiming to be worried had gone up to 74% in 1996
(Del Pino, 2005). In 1995, 96% thought that the government should take measures
to reduce what they perceived as intense income differences, and the actual re-
distribution policies were judged non existent or ineffective by 88% (Centro de
Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social, 1995).
Furthermore, a high percentage of Spanish citizens hold a “collectivist” approach
to welfare, where the individual is not the sole responsible for her life, but the
government should also play a significant role (see figure 5.1). In some other
countries, these attitudes are significantly less frequent (around 25% in the USA
and 50% in France according to Gandarias, 1999, p. 188).
Over the last decades, Spaniards have not found their tax system to be fair. Al-
ways over half of the survey respondents consider the distribution of the tax bur-
den not progressive (see figure 5.2). Discontent rose during the last years of the
dictatorship, if a comparison between the surveys from 1965 and 1971 is to be
given credit: in 1965, only 60% of respondents meant that taxes were unfairly dis-
tributed, while in 1971 the same answer was given by 86%. The most criticised
1All percentages are given over valid answers, unless in some cases where this information is
missing from the sources.
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FIGURE 5.1: Collectivist attitudes towards welfare in Spain, 1985-
2011
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Source: Del Pino (2005).
tax in the pre-reform system was the Labour Tax (Impuesto sobre las Rentas del Tra-
bajo Personal), which placed a high burden on wage earners (this issue will be
commented on in section 5.2.2). Significantly, in 1965 businessmen directed their
hatred towards the corporation tax: self-interest seems to be in the base of these
opinions, with each social group despising the tax that burdened themselves.
FIGURE 5.2: Is the tax system fair? Spain, 1965-1998
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Sources: see Appendix E.
In spite of the persistent “no” to the fairness question, during the second half
of the nineties other surveys depict the respondents as more and more satisfied
with the redistributive role of their tax system (Delgado and San Vicente, 1998).
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The apparent contradiction might suggest a framing effect, or a decrease in the
redistributive preferences of the citizens during this last part of the period. How-
ever, it is also possible that there is some confusion with the way questions were
asked: “Do you think that, generally, taxes are fairly collected? That is, that those who
own more pay more? Or do you think otherwise?”, as can be seen, implies that fairly
collected taxes would be equivalent to progressivity. It is unclear what an indi-
vidual should answer if he did not agree with the value judgement implicit in the
question.
We can try to find out to what extent fairness actually meant progressivity in the
minds of the respondents. In 1971, 67% of direct taxpayers thought that direct
taxes were fairer than indirect ones (García, 1975), and 60% of direct taxpayers in
the city of Madrid were in favour of the direct estimation of tax bases rather than
objective assessments (Margallo and García, 1971). Both aspects indirectly point
towards progressivity, since it is direct, personal taxes that make it possible.
In the 1975 survey, the issue was directly addressed, and 89% of the respondents
agreed with progressivity postulates (versus 11% who favoured a proportional
system, with no regressivity option provided). This was a general stance in the
public, with very similar percentages of approval across different ages and levels
of education. The lowest level of approval of progressivity was 83% among those
with higher incomes.2 68% of the surveyed supported the personal income tax as
a good revenue method.
Theoretical questions of this kind, however, have been found to be problematic
in previous literature. Often, inconsistency arises when theoretical and empirical
questions are compared (see the discussions in Bartels, 2005; Edlund, 2003 and
Singhal, 2013). The low educational attainment of most of the sample has to be
taken into account in this case, since a significant part of Spaniards in the 1970s
had very low formal schooling.3 Many of the respondents of these surveys may
have lacked the basic mathematical skills to provide an adequate answer to quan-
titative questions about progressive taxation, even if they adhered to the principle
in itself.4
2But this difference may well be not statistically significant, given the high standard errors in
the survey sub-groups, of around +/-5 percentage points.
3In the household survey of 1973-74, 85% of household heads had only up to primary educa-
tion, with 26% answering not to have completed the basic level.
4Inconsistencies clearly appear in the 1991 survey, for example. Demand of progressivity is
shown in questions about decreasing or increasing the tax share of certain social groups, with
highly educated and upper-middle class individuals specially prone to increasing progressivity.
However, when required to choose between increasing the income tax or the VAT, opinions are
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We only have two examples of “empirical” questions, and they are quite far apart
in time (1971 and 1996).5 Comparing them is not straightforward, since the fram-
ing of the questions was quite dissimilar, specially with respect to three dimen-
sions. In 1971, the survey asked about the overall tax system, regarding the per-
ceived and ideal tax rate in each income level, while in 1996, only direct personal
taxation was dealt with. All kinds of citizens were surveyed in 1996, whereas the
data for 1971 refer to a specific group of taxpayers, namely businessmen, liberal
professionals and public employees.6 Another important difference is that, in the
1971 survey, respondents were only asked about their own ideal tax burden, and
not about a general profile of tax rates across different income levels. This means
that, when comparing both years, we can quite safely assume that the ideal pro-
gression for 1971 would have been higher if everyone answered about all income
levels (because of self-interest of the less well-off, being a majority).7
Figure 5.3 compares the answers given in both years. The ‘ideal’ rates described
are contrasted with the actual burden faced in each level. For 1971, the IEF study
provides a rate structure of reference, but I have found it to be quite imprecise, so
I am using instead my own calculations from chapter 3.8 For the second survey,
I have calculated the rates from the official microdata of the personal income tax
divided at approximately 50% for both. The upper groups now followed their self-interest in
showing opposition to increases in direct income taxation.
5The 1971 survey was carried out by the IEF, while the 1996 one corresponds to the wave "Role
of Government III" of the International Social Survey Program, carried out in Spain by CIS.
6The distance in this sense can be nuanced because these more “modern” groups of society
– as they appeared in the 1970s, with more progressive views on taxation in the studies – were
more numerous in the Spanish society of the late nineties.
7The exact question in 1971 was: “Teniendo en cuenta todos sus ingresos [...], ¿qué porcentaje aprox-
imado viene usted a pagar en conceptos de impuestos? Y ¿qué porcentaje cree usted que le correspondería
pagar?”, which can be translated as: “Considering all your income, which percentage approximately do
you pay in tax? And what do you think would be a fair amount?”. In the 1996 survey, the question was:
"¿Cuánto cree Vd. que debería pagar anualmente en impuestos una persona cuyo salario anual bruto fuera
de un millón y medio de pesetas? ¿O no debería pagar nada? (Nos estamos refiriendo a todos los impuestos
que se deducen del salario, es decir, las retenciones salariales y el impuesto sobre la renta: IRPF)", which
again can be translated as: "How much do you think a person earning one and a half million ptas should
pay in taxes? Or should she not pay anything? (We refer to all taxes deducted from salaries, withholdings
at source and tax due of the personal income tax)." The questions were asked for the average wage
and subsequent levels doubling it (x2, x4, x8).
8These rates refer to the year 1970, and specifically to the corresponding socio-economic
groups. The correspondence is not exact, since I have included four groups from the survey,
which contain businessmen, liberal professionals, independent workers, and white-collar work-
ers (“employees”). As for the tax rates given in Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973), they are
based on an actualization of the simulation carried out for 1965 by Valle (1974) for the general
population, adding an imputation of social contributions (calculated from the ratio total social
contributions / total taxes in 1966). This procedure is not very accurate, since social security taxes
grew significantly over the next years, and they were not equal for each income level.
Chapter 5. Public opinion and political institutions in the fiscal transition 119
corresponding to 1995 (returns to be filed in spring 1996).9
FIGURE 5.3: Ideal versus real tax burden
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(2015b), ISSP "Role of Government III" (Spain) and PIT micro-
data from the IEF.
The question in 1971 referred to the joint tax system, while in 1996 it was
about direct personal taxation (PIT + workers’ Social Contributions). For other
important differences between both years, see text.
Percentiles are built on “wide” income from the Household Budget Survey
in 1971 (gross earnings plus all transfers received), with the households from
the categories considered (mean percentile of the observations in the income
intervals from the survey – but 60.6% of those were in the upper one). In
1997, the universe is that of individual taxpayers, and the income used to
order them is the Base Imponible Regular (gross income after some adjustments,
particularly removing irregular flows).
Some similarities between these results are striking, considering all the men-
tioned differences in the surveys. As is usual, respondents demanded lower tax-
ation than they actually faced. In general, taxes are tough to pay and everyone
seems to want their own part reduced. This is not a surprising finding. At the
same time, when combined with questions about public expenditures, citizens
always appear more sensitive towards the need to contribute.10
9“PANEL PURO Y EXTENDIDO IRPF 1982/1998 IEF-AEAT (Declarantes)”. I have used the
rates of individual and separate returns (as the question is asked in individual terms), using a
range of +/-5% around each income point. Social contributions, approximated by the correspond-
ing allowance in the tax base, have been added to the tax due (“cuota líquida”).
10The difference between both 1971 series in figure 5.3 would be even bigger if the reference
were the “subjective” tax burden, i.e. what respondents thought they were paying, which was
below their actual payments. This seems to confirm contemporary analysts’ suggestion that there
was acute fiscal illusion, related to the widespread use of indirect taxes. This issue, however, must
be taken with caution, given the small sample size and the fact that the survey was undertaken
under a dictatorship. By contrast, using UK data for 1995, for instance, Gemmell et al. (2004) find
over-estimation of the taxes paid, both direct and indirect.
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We can also see evidence of the dramatic change in the desired size of the govern-
ment. The rates chosen by respondents in 1996 would imply public expenditure
to represent a much higher share of the national income than in the 1971 answers.
Actually, the change was larger than it looks in the graph, because in 1996 only
a fraction of taxation was considered, while in 1971 the question dealt with the
whole tax system. The slope is also more acute, with a difference of 20 percentage
points between the minimum and maximum desired tax rates in 1996, compared
with only 10 in 1971; although this is specially sensitive to the just mentioned
difference, and to the income levels that were covered in each survey.11
The answers can also be interpreted as a demand for higher progressivity. Figure
5.4 shows the difference between the ideal and real tax burdens for each income
level, as a percentage of the latter (i.e., it would answer to the question “In which
proportion do you wish to increase/decrease the tax rate paid by citizens making ... a
year?”). In both years, the slope of the line is clearly increasing: respondents wish
to reduce rates more on the lower-earnings population than on the wealthy. In
1971, since the question only asked about the income level of the respondent, the
results reported actually mean that the wealthiest demanded a lower decrease
of their own taxes, while the the opposite was true for the poorest – who were
experiencing higher effective taxation.
Recall that in 1996 this data refer only to the personal income tax, together with
the workers’ social contributions. If we looked exclusively at PIT payments, the
actual shape of the tax rates distribution was remarkably similar to that of the
desired rates. So it is difficult to sustain that respondents in the mid nineties
favoured a strong increase (or decrease) in the progressivity of this specific tax.
Their dissatisfaction would arise from other aspects of the system, like the regres-
sive character of other taxes (among which social contributions) or the efficacy
with which public revenues seemed to be used. We turn to this issue in the next
paragraphs.
11This is a general problem in this kind of studies. It is often not very clear if the questions or
answers refer only to personal direct taxes, which are easier to perceive by citizens, or to overall
taxation.
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FIGURE 5.4: Demand of higher progressivity: reduction of burden
desired for each income level
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Notes: same as figure 5.3.
Tax burden and equilibrium with respect to public services
A related dimension is that of the level of tax burden. Across the decades under
analysis, Spaniards came to think increasingly that they paid high taxes, follow-
ing the actual evolution of tax revenues (see figure 5.5). This perception started
to decrease around 1990, at the same time as the ratio of tax revenues to GDP was
stabilizing (as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent efforts to
control public expenditure).
But the perception of the tax burden not only depended on its actual level but
also on the public services provided. During these years, taxpayers seem to have
noticed immediately the increase in their taxes, while the benefits of extended
expenditures took longer or where less visible (especially considering non-cash
benefits). This is confirmed in figure 5.6, which shows the evolution of the “in-
dex of taxpayer feeling”, with a trend opposed to that of the perception of high
tax burden. This index intends to capture the equilibrium that citizens perceived
between the taxes they paid and the public services they were provided with in
exchange. Its value never becomes positive (which is also common internation-
ally), but satisfaction was clearly increasing since the mid-1980s.
Other elements could be playing a complementary role. One of them is the re-
gressivity of taxation. In fact, the tax burden was very high for those at the bot-
tom, and maybe their answers were driving the total to some extent. This aspect
122 Chapter 5. Public opinion and political institutions in the fiscal transition
FIGURE 5.5: The perception of a high tax burden (percentage agree)
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Sources: for the perception of the tax burden, Alvira and Gar-
cía (1976, 1981), Alvira et al. (2000), and Strümpel and Alvira
(1975). For the actual tax burden, 3 for 1960 to 1990, with GDP
from Prados de la Escosura (2003); rest of the period from IEF
(Badespe) and INE (GDP base 1986 and 1995, online access).
FIGURE 5.6: Index of taxpayer “feeling” (equilibrium)
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Note: the index is designed to take a value between 2 and -2, where a positive
answer would mean that benefits are perceived to be larger than sacrifices.
would lose importance as regressivity decreased during the period. However, fis-
cal drag was also in place during the eighties, when consistent inflation was not
accompanied by deflating of the tax rate structure, thus causing strong increases
in the rates faced by low and middle income taxpayers (González-Páramo, 1988;
Salas, 1997). The economic cycle is also expected to have driven responses to a
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certain extent, in this case negatively affecting taxpayers’ perceptions in the first
half of the nineties.
Tax evasion
Tax evasion was a central topic in the surveys, and one the reformers of the 1970s
and 80 attached high importance to. For Spaniards in general, in an abstract
way, fraud was also worrisome: it came in the 5th place in 1971 (out of 14 sug-
gested problems), with 57% of respondents sharing this opinion. It is significant,
however, that these worries were less acute among liberal professionals and man-
agers – precisely those social groups identified by their fellow citizens as being
more able and prone to evade (Margallo and García, 1971). Furthermore, when
asked about social sanctions against tax evaders, very few of total respondents
had clear rejection attitudes: only 14% in 1971 and 10% in 1976. So, most of them
were aware of the issue, but tended to be indulgent about it.
Throughout the period, the perception seems to be that evasion was high and
persistent. Figure 5.7 shows that during the nineties a growing number of re-
spondents claimed to have been audited, which would point to higher efficiency
of the tax administration in this respect. However, when asked if less people
evaded at the time of the survey than in the past, they clearly showed negative
perceptions on the evolution of fraud. Their perception of the fiscal behaviour of
acquaintances shows no clear trend. We might venture that the slight decrease in
fraud (as found in chapter 4 and comparing with Domínguez et al., 2015) coex-
isted with a growing concern and rejection among the public, which are indeed
evident in more recent surveys.
Summing up
Some general conclusions may be extracted from this review of survey data.
Alvira and García, who took part in the design and treatment of the surveys,
summarized the results in three “popular critiques” of the tax system in the 1970s
(Alvira and García, 2005): unfair distribution of the burden, excessive complex-
ity, and inequitable impact of tax evasion. My own interpretation, taking into
account subsequent surveys, would include some further points:
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FIGURE 5.7: Citizens’ perceptions of tax evasion
(percentage agree)
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1. Spaniards were strongly in favour of redistribution by the government, and
a large majority did not believe their tax system to be effective in this re-
spect. Such was the situation both before and after the tax reform of the
1970s.
2. Spaniards wanted higher progressivity, but also lower levels of overall tax-
ation (this can be in part related to framing inconsistency). Nowadays, they
also appear to be clearly against any cuts in welfare state services (Del Pino,
2005).
3. During the eighties there was a strong feeling of bearing high taxes, which
can be related to the disequilibrium with respect to services (i.e. the de-
lays in building the welfare state) and also to the regressivity of taxation
in general. An “anti-fiscal” feeling seems to have developed, which comes
through also in answers to interviews (see e.g. Díaz and Delgado, 2005). It
seems to be related to:
a) A significant fiscal drag, which increased PIT revenues during the decade,
by making the tax heavier among the low-middle income classes. This
seems to have strongly affected its legitimacy, given that tax increases
were higher than those of real earnings during several years (a point
made by Lagares, 1990).
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b) The effect of economic distress and the growing public indebtedness,
causing an image of bad management and squandering.
4. Tax evasion can also play a role in this regard, and has been persistent in the
eye of citizens. Some indicators point towards higher repeal of this practice,
which seemed to enjoy widespread indulgence at the beginning of the pe-
riod.
Remarkably, these conclusions are quite similar to those reached by Edlund (2000)
with Swedish data, for the period 1981-1997. The Swedes also seemed to think
that their taxes were unfair and too high, but not so much if they were explicitly
compared to the level of public services. When asked about desired taxes by
income level, they also demanded higher progressivity, specially a decrease of
taxation on poor households.
Singhal (2013)’s analysis of seven OECD countries yielded similar perceptions,
using the same 1996 data presented in section 5.2.1 (International Social Survey
Program, Role of Government III). She found that 87% of respondents were in
favour of progressivity postulates, although only 38% provided strictly progres-
sive answers (i.e., across all income levels asked about). Spain was the coun-
try with the highest level of strictly progressive answers, with 63%. Fernández-
Albertos (2011) confirms the strong pro-redistribution stance taken by Spaniards
in a comparative perspective.12 Boeri et al. (2001) showed strong support for the
status quo of welfare states in four European countries, among which Spain (the
other are France, Germany and Italy). Interviews conducted in 2000 found that
Spain was the country where a higher percentage preferred an increase in taxes
and benefits (30% of respondents, versus 14-17% in the other countries – which
is consistent with the incomplete process of Spanish fiscal convergence with the
Western European systems).
5.2.2 Petitions
Some popular perceptions of taxes can also be found in petitions made to the
fiscal authorities throughout the period. I have analysed a sample of 69 petitions
12Out of a sample of 25 countries, Spain’s demand for redistribution was higher than in the
other non-communist states. Support for redistribution was found even among those with in-
comes within the richest 15%. The author relates this result to the fact that in a 1993 CIS survey a
majority thought they would benefit from greater income equality.
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dated from 1964 to 1979 which can be found in the Archive of the Ministry of
Public Finance.13
Most of these letters were petitions by organizations (75%), namely businesses
or branches of the official “vertical” trade unions. Missives by individuals are
very scarce before the transition to democracy, but their number increases a lot
since 1977. What is most significant is that 88% of them referred to the same
tax: the Labour Tax (IRTP, Impuesto sobre las Rentas del Trabajo Personal). There
was a general complaint against its non-taxable threshold, which was strongly
decreasing in real terms because of inflation. This might be one of the explana-
tions why the revenue of this tax increased substantially during the 1970s, and
bears a strong resemblance to the criticisms about the personal income tax in the
following decade.
Letters by individuals come sometimes from highly educated workers, such as
doctors, with specific issues. But some of them are reflection of popular dis-
content, normally expressed as a petition more than a demand, and frequently
related to inflation and to the hard situation of large families. A man from Denia
in July 1977 wrote “I welcome your tax reform, increasing the Labour Tax; but as I am
a worker with a large family (6 sons), I want to ask you to keep in mind these families
in your taxes, because it is not the same to have 500.000 ptas and share between 4, than
between 8, which is my case”.
Many of the petitions signed by organisms of the vertical unions have a technical
character, but some introduce arguments of progressivity. For example, in March
1977 a letter coming from workers of a building enterprise asked explicitly for
progressive reform: “A progressive and fair economic policy requires a deep tax reform,
so many times announced and never carried out [...] which taxes progressively, and
not merely proportionally, the highest wages or incomes”, and increased control over
unreported earnings. A year earlier, the president of the national vertical union of
workers from the Metal sector criticised the system with the following statements:
“We have an unfair and ineffective tax system, and that doesn’t mean that the burden
workers face is excessive, but that, in fact, capital incomes are undertaxed”.
Of course, the concentration of complaints around the Labour tax suggests that
lobbying about business taxation was funnelled through other channels, not that
it was non-existent.
13This sample cannot be considered random nor representative. Letters containing personal
data protected by the law were previously removed by the Archive staff. Source: General Index
1.851, box 57.762.
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5.2.3 Press
The media can also provide some information about prevailing social attitudes
about taxation. Journals of diverse orientation have been selected, as can be seen
in table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2: Press analysed for this study
Journal
Period
Orientation Source
Progress
active of research
ABC since 1891 Conservative online 1974-77
Cuadernos para el Diálogo 1963-78 Progressive BNE 1977
El País since 1976 Progressive online 1977-90
Note: BNE stands for Biblioteca Nacional de España, the National Library, where all Spanish
periodicals can be found.
ABC
This was a conservative journal, of monarchic orientation under the dictatorship,
and aligned to the right-wing party Alianza Popular during the transition period.
Its online search machine has allowed to investigate the articles relating to taxa-
tion issues with high efficiency, searching for the words ‘tax reform’.
During the years 1974-77, opinions voiced in ABC were clearly against redistri-
bution and against the need of any tax reform of this kind. Arguments provided
were generally of a technical nature: an administrative reform should go first as
a prerequisite, and fiscal effort in the country was high and could not, or should
not, be increased. One idea was to “start” by applying effectively the tax regula-
tions in place: "The possibilities in our tax system to obtain higher revenues are consid-
erable, so that these tax reforms are unnecessary"14, combating fraud with simplifica-
tion and improved administration and transparency in public expenditures. The
main “theoretical” critique against Fuentes Quintana’s position (the main figure
behind proposals for reform) was that the level of tax burden in Spain compared
to its European neighbours was not so low, when taking into account the income
level in the country.15 A clear anti-fiscal stance is taken by one of the contributors
14“Hojas de alcabala: El porqué y el para qué de una reforma”, ABC, 8/10/1974, p. 55.
15Recall from the surveys that the tax burden was seen to be quite high, but specially for the
poorest families, and not for the wealthiest. This point is avoided by the journal.
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when writing: "Like summer clouds announcing thunder and lightning, for a long time
the ordinary and overwhelmed citizen has been feeling the treat of a tax reform".16
In 1976, when talks about tax reform were becoming more frequent (related to
the projects of the Minister Villar Mir), ABC generally criticised these initiatives
as populism. Regular contributors were fiercely against the aspiration of using
the tax reform as a potent channel for the reduction of inequalities. For example,
former Minister Navarro Rubio claimed that reformers were pushing excessively
for this solution and that the economic crisis strongly advised not to increase the
tax burden.17
Cuadernos para el Diálogo
This periodical had a clear democratic orientation and was thus situated in the
opposition to the late Franco’s regime, with a prominent trajectory in criticizing
the tax system during its last years. Renowned personalities wrote in the pages of
Cuadernos, making it a good example of the progressive-centrist views on many
social and political issues. Several of its signatures were later incorporated to El
País.
In the year 1977, opinions voiced here were clearly favourable to a progressive tax
reform. As an example, in January the journalist J. Estefanía claimed that the state
budget was socially unjust and a profound redistributive reform was needed:
“The trend of increasing direct taxes is very slow, and, also, does not automati-
cally achieve a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. [...] For example, one of
the direct taxes increasing the most is the Labour Tax, against which Spanish work-
ers have repeatedly complained for years. [...] It is necessary to eradicate tax evasion
starting from above, so that the budget becomes indeed an instrument to reduce social
differences and achieve greater equality. [...] Political reform may be going forward;
the economic one lags behind because it touches more direct interests”.18
In July the journal published an interview with the new Public Finance Minis-
ter, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, with a very positive tone. Critiques focused
on pressure groups lobbying against the reform (fundamentally the banking sec-
tor), and the acknowledgement that, in spite of tax changes, the majority of the
16“Hojas de alcabala: Nuestro esfuerzo fiscal”, ABC, 11/8/1974, p. 43.
17“Teoría de la relatividad fiscal”, ABC, 11/6/1976, p. 3.
18Cuadernos para el Diálogo, n. 193, 8-14th January 1977.
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costs of the economic crisis were falling on the workers’ shoulders (due to the
containment of wage increases to fight inflation, as agreed in the Moncloa Pacts).
In November 1977, when the first tax reform law passed through Parliament, the
editorial took a clear position in defence of the project, which was facing resis-
tances from the right and even inside the government’s party, UCD. The under-
lying idea was that democracy implied not only a political change, but also an
economic one: “Enjoying democracy is not only the exhibition of a Parliament formed
by universal suffrage, or laws allowing to see films without prior censorship. It also means
enjoying higher distributive justice in the tax burdens and wider development of collective
services”. It also underlined that the reform was not anti-capitalist, but exactly the
opposite, since it meant reinforcing capitalism in a very critical context – there-
fore, rejecting it could provoke a radicalization of voters.19 Such a reasoning was,
according to the journal, precisely what made the project pass through Senate,
the most conservative chamber, where it had faced severe opposition among the
UCD seats.20
El País
Born in 1976, El País soon came to be the most read journal in Spain, a position
it still holds today. From its origins, it worked as a journal in a fully democratic
context would, and containing diverse opinions. The official orientation of the
journal, however, was quite clearly social-democratic.
During the years 1977 and 1978, the pages of El País monitored quite closely the
process of tax reform, explaining to its readership the main debates and projects
going through Parliament. Notably, some initiatives of the left were granted par-
ticular attention (e.g. the insistence on publication of individual tax data).
Editorials in the journal were very favourable to the tax reform, and specifically
to the principles of progressivity, generality and transparency. On July 1977, it
was stated: "The tax reform must serve as a stimulus to put in place an effort of national
solidarity, and must become the demonstration that the Government is willing to fight
for an equitable society”.21 Another editorial from April 1979 praised transparency
and cried out for more tax compliance among citizens, while also criticizing that
the highest burden still was placed on salaried workers: "Tax evasion is, first of all,
19Cuadernos para el Diálogo, n. 236, 5-11th November 1977.
20Cuadernos para el Diálogo, n. 238, 19-25th November 1977.
21“La reforma fiscal”, El País, Editorial, 31/7/1977.
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an active deed of lack of solidarity towards the community. In that sense, the publication
of tax returns can become useful to make many taxpayers report and pay more, even if it
only is to avoid public shame”.22
A series of interviews to the members of the Public Finance Commission in 1978
served to transmit the readers some of the main issues at stake in the negotia-
tions. They are interesting today, among other things, because they make clear to
what extent the principle of progressivity was of general acceptance in the public
opinion at the time. The MPs of UCD, PSOE (Socialist Party) and PCE (Commu-
nist Party) defended the application of this idea (notwithstanding some differ-
ences between them). Those of Alianza Popular and the Catalan Minority Groups,
however, were representatives of conservative voters and not so favourable to
progressivity. But this came through only in their proposals, on discussions of
detailed issues concerning tax exemptions, allowances or credits, and not as a
general statement or as a challenge to the rate structure proposed by the govern-
ment in Parliament (these issues are explored in section 5.3.1).23
In that sense, Ramón Trías Fargas, member of the Catalan Minority Group, stated:
"I have maintained since 1963 that strong and progressive taxation is a requisite for
liberty and democracy”, but alongside criticised what he considered to be excessive
rush in the reform process, and a tilt towards equity at the expense of efficiency.24
Laureano López Rodó from Alianza Popular showed a similar position: "In general
terms, the philosophy of our project would have been similar to that of UCD. I understand
that indeed the income tax must be the king of the system", which did not preclude him
from opposing particular aspects, also concerning savings and family treatment
particularly.25
5.3 Lost in institutions?
The second candidate for our initial paradox is that the new parliamentarian sys-
tem failed to channel citizen’s attitudes with respect to progressivity to effective
22“Reforma fiscal y reforma moral”, El País, Editorial, 1/4/1979.
23The same conclusion is reached by Pan-Montojo (1996) when discussing a businessmen sur-
vey from October 1977, where respondents did not criticise the existing system but acknowledged
the need to reform it. In Pan-Montojo’s words (p. 286): “Their resigned answers reveal the political
impossibility for its beneficiaries of openly defending the fiscal statu quo, and the absence of a coherent
model of taxation, alternative to that offered by the reformist tradition”.
24El País, 2/6/1978.
25El País, 3/6/1978.
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policy-making. Did it fail to be democratic in this regard? Were there contradic-
tions between different policy goals?
Several studies have explored possible explanations for the lack of a convincing
link between inequality and redistribution, such as Meltzer and Richard (1981)
initially posed – or progressive taxation, as is our focus here. General discussions
can be found in Saint Paul and Verdier (1996), Borck (2007) or Acemoglu et al.
(2013). I focus here on four factors.
First, the specific institutional setting can be more or less favourable to redistri-
bution. An extensive literature has developed in this area: Steinmo (1989) con-
trasted the Swedish centralized system with that of the US; Persson et al. (2000)
claimed that parliamentary systems would be more redistributive than presiden-
tial ones, Alesina et al. (2001) argued that the majoritarian and federal system of
the US worked against redistribution, and Iversen and Soskice (2006) pointed that
in proportional electoral systems centre-left parties would have more chances to
take office.
Secondly, it is widely known that political participation and influence increases
with income – and thus is higher among individuals we would expect to be less
favourable towards progressivity, given their self-interest. This has been pointed
by the literature on special interest politics (Becker, 1983; Grossman and Help-
man, 2001) and is also one of the arguments behind Acemoglu and Robinson’s
(2008) claim of the decisive de facto power of elites after a democratic transition.
Recently, Karabarbounis (2011) claimed to have found support for the “one dol-
lar, one vote” hypothesis, relating redistribution levels in several countries to dif-
ferent indicators of inequality which would proxy for the political influence of
each group. This approach is similar to that of Lupu and Pontusson (2011), who
pointed at the importance of the structure of inequality (skewness) for the reali-
sation of different social coalitions.
Other authors have explored the relation between consumption taxation and wel-
fare state development. Lindert (2004) argued that redistributive social spending
has been based on heavy indirect and labour taxes, because high revenue needs
could not be met with progressive schemes. Political resistance or economic con-
siderations (the disincentive effects) would make it difficult. Following his in-
sights, a growing literature has been finding that the most effective way to pro-
vide redistributive services would be to fund them with taxes on the lower classes
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(Ganghof, 2006; Kato, 2003; Prasad and Deng, 2009; Timmons, 2005; Wilensky,
2002).26
This relates to the international dimension. In Beramendi and Rueda (2007), an
open economy might reduce the feasibility of relying on progressive income taxes
for funding welfare state services. Therefore, international openness, specially
in financial flows, provides some taxpayers an easier “exit” option. Such was
posited already in the eighties by Bates and Lien (1985), and can also be found in
the more recent works of Boix (2003) and Freeman and Quinn (2012).
I merge these possible factors in two alternative stories – a national and an in-
ternational one. Of course, they are not mutually exclusive. Starting from the
inside helps considering the nature of the Spanish regime in itself, as it emerged
from the process of democratic transition, while the international context was
present during the whole time but increased its influence with advances in eco-
nomic openness and the integration in the EEC/EU.
5.3.1 Political transition and national power structures
Albertus and Menaldo (2014) discuss the importance of the process of democratic
transition, during which redistribution would only come through if the elite’s
control is hampered by revolutionary threat. This idea may be relevant in our
case. In Spain, as was mentioned in the introduction, the democratic transition
was not the result of a revolution, but came about only after Franco’s death in
1975. However, the political elite was not a compact block by then, since a part
had been developing a slightly reformist agenda.
The opposition was not fully united either, in spite of the efforts headed by the
Communist Party (PCE) to achieve a democratic breakout, after which a provi-
sional, concentration government would call for elections. This was not possible,
but significant social upheaval was taking place at the same time, with labour
conflicts and mobilization at different levels, undoubtedly influencing the pro-
cess of political change.
The usual interpretation, advanced earlier, is that neither Francoists nor the op-
position were strong or united enough to impose their views, so a compromise
arose. The transition process was a political reform, conducted from above by
26Lindert’s “free lunch puzzle” has a counterpart in Korpi and Palme (1998)’s “paradox of re-
distribution” with respect to social expenditure (universality versus targeting).
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Suárez – who had been appointed by the King, Franco’s designated successor
–, which did not openly reject the dictatorship’s legal framework, but aimed at
reforming it. The strength of the political and social opposition made it never-
theless possible to introduce some changes that meant a clear breakthrough in
comparison with the previous regime. Were those enough to ensure democratic
tax policy?
Malapportionment
Fernández-Albertos (2011) provides a list of political factors and their expected
impact on redistribution policies. The number of veto players and federalism
would reduce redistribution.27 On the other hand, proportional representation,
large and cohesive parties, and long governmental tenure of socialism would
have the opposite effect. Fernández-Albertos considers that these three last fac-
tors explain the presence of a developed system of redistributive policies in Spain.
In this regard, the influence of the long rule of the socialist party cannot be de-
nied (1982-1996), neither the fact that the party system is quite concentrated and
cohesive (and with strong internal party discipline). By contrast, it is much more
difficult to accept that the Spanish political system is characterised by a high de-
gree of proportional representation.
Spanish elections are known to have very low levels of proportionality when
compared to other European countries. One of the main reasons is district malap-
portionment. This term comes from Samuels and Snyder (2001), and refers to dis-
proportionality in territorial representation: it generally favours less populated
regions with more conservative voters; therefore hurting prospects for redistri-
bution.28
Samuels and Snyder (2001) suggested that the manipulation of electoral represen-
tation by means of malapportionment could in fact favour the chances of democ-
racy in a transitional context. Their paper analyses Latin America in recent years,
but the idea seems easily applicable to Spain, where several studies by politi-
cal scientists have underlined the interests evident in the design of the electoral
27The first element is not important in the Spanish case. The second is present to some extent, in
the special regimes granted to the Basque Country and Navarra. This aspect limits inter-territorial
(and, thus, also personal) redistribution. It is, however, out of the scope of this paper.
28This link is explored by Ardanaz and Scartascini (2013) with Latin American data on personal
taxation. Majoritarian systems have been found to be related to lower social spending in Persson
and Tabellini (2003).
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system during the transition (Gunther, 1989; Lago and Montero, 2005). Whereas
nominally proportional, in its operation the electoral system is affected by both a
majoritarian bias and a conservative bias (since rightist parties benefit more than
leftist ones from actual non-proportionality).
In Samuels and Snyder (2001)’s data, Spain’s malapportionment value is 0.0963
for 1996, number 16 in a sample of 78 countries.29 I have estimated the cor-
responding value for the first democratic elections in 1977 at 0.0929: the small
gradual deterioration over time is likely due to the lack of adjustment to demo-
graphic movements. The Loosemore-Hanby index of disproportionality in par-
ties’ outcomes, on which the malapportionment index is based, shows a different
evolution, with a decreasing time trend (see table 5.3). This has to do with the
adaptation of parties to the electoral system.
TABLE 5.3: Loosemore-Hanby index of disproportionality
in Spanish general elections, 1977-86 (%)
Parties with seats Incl. parties without seats
1977 15.05 18.81
1979 14.31 17.62
1982 12.21 14.27
1986 10.08 13.24
Source: author’s calculations with data from Junta Electoral
Central.
The index is calculated as the sum of differences between all parties’
shares in seats and votes, in absolute values, divided by two.
During the first years, the effects of the electoral system benefited specially Suárez’s
party, UCD (see table 5.4). It won a significant position in the first democratic
parliament, although not attaining the absolute majority, as had been its purpose.
The centrist party was also the most fortunate in 1979. As Gunther et al. (1986)
have discussed, the impact of the first election on the party system was very sig-
nificant. Parties obtaining representation in 1977 not only gained institutional
power, but also reinforced their access to public opinion, and – last but not least
– obtained funding from the state budget. The ones who did not, and they were
many, disappeared or were disadvantaged from then onwards. In that way, the
electoral system was an active element in the configuration of the party system
during the first years of the new regime. And, similarly, due to the defining char-
acter of this early period, the reinforced majorities enjoyed by UCD had a lasting
impact on public policy.
29The ranking becomes 4 out of 20 if only federal countries are considered.
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TABLE 5.4: Parties benefiting from electoral rules, 1977-86
UCD / AP (since 1982) PSOE
% votes % seats Diff. % votes % seats Diff.
1977 34.52 41.14 6.62 24.44 29.43 4.99
1979 35.08 48.00 12.92 30.54 34.57 4.03
1982 26.46 30.57 4.11 40.82 50.57 9.75
1986 26.13 30.00 3.87 37.86 46.57 8.71
Source: author’s calculations with data from Junta Electoral Cen-
tral.
In 1982 and 1986, the first columns correspond to electoral coalitions headed by
Alianza Popular, the new preponderant party in the right.
After 1982, the central party in the system was PSOE, the Socialist party, who
now enjoyed the bigger premiums in terms of parliamentary seats. As can be
seen, PSOE actually won an absolute majority in 1982, which entitled the party to
initiate programs in welfare state development and to complete the reform in tax-
ation, intensifying anti-fraud measures and finally introducing other new taxes.
The party and the context, however, had by then changed in many respects.30
The parties’ stances in Parliament
I have conducted an in-depth investigation of the political processes behind the
parliamentarian discussion of tax laws, and the measures defended by each party
in the debates. See the list in table 5.5.
A first approach suggests the existence of a bottleneck in the tasks of the Public
Finance Commission. Indeed, the net wealth, inheritance and value added taxes
were sent in by the government in 1978 but did not make it through the pro-
cess during the first legislature (1977-79), nor during the second (1979-82). The
processes were re-started each time. The same group of MPs was designated in
1978 to examine all three direct taxation projects, with the personal income tax
coming in the first place because of its highest priority. These parliamentarian
works also coincided with the process of elaboration of the Constitution, which
30Andrade Blanco (2012) reviews the ideological and tactical evolution of the Socialist party
during the years of the political transition. An inspection of its electoral programs shows how,
by 1986, tax progressivity had practically disappeared as an instrument for redistribution, and
attention was directed mainly to social expenditure.
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TABLE 5.5: Main tax law projects in 1977-79
Law Proposal Sanction No. amendments
LMURF: wealth tax, anti-fraud July 1977 Nov. 1977 139
Personal Income Tax Jan. 1978 Sept. 1978 202
Net Wealth Tax
Jan. 1978 - 82
April 1979 - 115 (incl. 57 prev.)*
Inheritance & Gift Tax
Jan. 1978 - 64
April 1979 - 80 (incl. 46 prev.)*
Value Added Tax
July 1978 - 54
April 1979 - 81 (incl. 48 prev.)*
Source: Archive of Congress, documentation from the Public Finance Commission: Folder
12, Legs. 1069, 1696-2, 1698-3, 1700, 1714-8 and 1715-1.
Notes: LMURF stands for Ley de Medidas Urgentes de Reforma Fiscal, Law of Urgent Measures of Fiscal Reform. A Net
Wealth Tax was finally passed in 1991; Inheritance & Gift in 1987, VAT in 1985.
‘(incl. ... prev.)’ refers to how many amendments from the previous parliamentary process were kept by parties for
the next debate.
undoubtedly concentrated the efforts of politicians at the time. The resulting de-
lays made it possible for the resistances to the reform to fight back and come up
with alternative models in the 1980s.
Already the initial deadline for sending in the projects by the Government was
not respected, which has been interpreted by Pan-Montojo (1996) as a result of
undercover pressures to moderate the laws. This was implied by the Communist
MP Ramón Tamames when complaining about the fact that “an important increase
in the degree of conservatism can be appreciated in these projects with respect to the initial
plans”.31
a) Law of Urgent Measures of Fiscal Reform (1977)
The first project of the minister Fernández Ordóñez was also the first law to
be passed by the new Parliament, elected in June 1977. The processing of
this law was made urgent, since the government meant to bring it to force
starting in 1978.
The LMURF was a first set of measures to introduce the tax reforms. It
attempted to set a bridge between the old taxes and the new ones to be
discussed during 1978. It included the creation of various transitory taxes
31Direct taxation projects had been agreed to be sent by the end of September 1977, but only
entered Parliament in January 1978 (the Corporation tax in June), while the time limit for indirect
taxes was the end of November 1977 and they arrived in June 1978. Tamames’ words come from
the report of the meeting of the Public Finance Commission on 9th February, 1978.
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(a Wealth tax and a surcharge on high labour incomes), changes in several
indirect ones, and a set of anti-evasion measures (tax amnesty, fiscal crime
and lifting of banking secrecy). These were supposed to bring about a new
beginning in the relations between taxpayers and the tax administration.
With respect to the initial project, the law that was finally approved shows
an increase in the progressivity of the Wealth tax rates, following quite
closely some of the proposals of the Catalan Socialists group. This increase
in progressivity, however, was accompanied by a reduction in the revenue
capacity of the tax, since rates were reduced for those with under 100 mil-
lion pesetas of wealth (where the majority of estates would be found), while
increased at the top, over 500 million (something with very low potential
practical effects). By contrast, the alternative structure put forward by the
Communist party was less progressive on paper, but would have brought
higher revenue from the propertied classes.32
No significant changes were introduced with respect to tax crime and bank
secrecy, while the right-wing party AP managed to get for his voters the
exemption of monuments and significant artworks from wealth taxation,
and the increase of deductions for new labour contracts in business taxes (a
point shared by UCD and the Basque and Catalan groups).33
The debate in Parliament (25th October 1977) focused on a couple of spe-
cially contested issues. The Socialists had strongly pushed for the inclusion
of corporations in the Wealth tax, arguing that leaving them out introduced
inequity among enterprises (at the expense of individual ones), and as such
they were included in the first project issued by the government. This point
was important, the speaker said, not because of revenue considerations, but
because the wealth tax was meant to serve as a registry of estates for the rest
of the prospective reform. Responding to this proposal, the UCD MP Gar-
cía Añoveros justified the change because of concerns about double taxa-
tion and possible negative impacts on investment. The speeches of Socialist
proponents suggest that opposition to openly and constructively discussing
32In fact, this may be part of the explanation of the distance between the initial revenue estimate
in the project (39,649 million pesetas, of which the government’s objective was to reach 20,000)
and the actual revenues (8,589 million in 1978 and over 15,000 in 1979).
33In this and other episodes, the points put forward by different parties can be read in the spirit
of Dixit and Londregan (1996). The introduction of exemptions and deductions clearly enters the
realm of special interest politics. Spanish parties in this initial period seem to be caring about
their own constituencies, while they could have evolved towards a more swing-voter approach
with the consolidation of democrac.
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this issue was fierce (Barón Crespo: “In this case we were told: ‘Positions are
completely opposed’, even though the first draft of the Ministry of Public Finance
[...] made reference to the wealth tax on corporations”), which might point to
the existence of external pressures explaining the change of opinion inside
of the government. The Socialist proposal was backed by the Communist
party in Congress, but was nevertheless rejected by 164 votes against 147.
The other discussed aspect was the date of start of the duty of cooperation
of financial entities, regarding the lifting of bank secrecy. The Catalan So-
cialists, represented by Ernest Lluch, suggested that this principle should
start to be effective since June 1977, before the law was sanctioned but after
the principle had been made public. They argued that during the year impor-
tant capital movements had taken place, and the government should be
able to investigate them, since the law did not change the legality of the be-
haviour of their owners.34 The Catalan right-wing party argued against this
proposal, defending the principle of non retroactivity. The point was also
rejected, but very narrowly: 147 against 142.
b) The Personal Income Tax (1978)
This was one of the cornerstones of the reform, and would be a key tax in
the new system. The project of the government is dated December 1977
and was discussed in the Commission between January and May 1978, to
be approved by the Parliament during the summer and finally sanctioned
in September. The processing of this law was successful in the sense that
the Government managed to pass it more or less in the time frame that had
been planned, which would not be the case with the following projects. The
debates took place right after the Moncloa Pacts and still during the period
of ‘consensus’, before a crisis in UCD completely unfolded the next year.
Nevertheless, some of the elements introduced in the regulation of this tax
opened the doors to avoidance by high income families, according to Pan-
Montojo (1996) and Comín (2007).35
34“Everyone knows that in this country since at least the 1st of January there have been a series of
financial movements, first, against the democratic process; then, speculating on the peseta, and, lastly, a
series of manoeuvres this summer that neither did help to consolidate the first democratic Government.
Ergo, the problem of the date is not a minor issue”.
35Comín refers to the possibilities to realise high capital losses against other incomes and the
mechanism of fiscal transparency established, among other aspects. See Comín (2007), p. 32, for
further detail.
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The discussions analysed here are undoubtedly related to the rifts in the
governmental party, whose MPs presented 19% of the amendments to the
law (38 out of 202). Jointly considered, all the parties in the centre-right (in-
cluding UCD) made 70% of the suggested amendments. The content of their
amendments was also more critical of the project, while the contributions of
the parties from the left had a more cooperative, sometimes technical, char-
acter.
Remarkably, the proposed rate structure was not much discussed. A pro-
gressive schedule was accepted by all parties, at least on paper. The main re-
sistances were related with tax credits and allowances, where the increases
defended by the conservative parties could be interpreted as a base-voidening
strategy. The design of tax credits profoundly affects the progressivity of a
tax, but it does so in a less transparent way, thus making it difficult for the
public opinion to express an informed preference.
The centre-right parties pushed for increased family allowances (together
with the Socialists in this case), and also greater credits for all kinds of in-
vestments, personal expenses and charitable donations. Some of these sug-
gestions were accepted at least partially, which meant a moderation of the
law during its passing through Congress.36
The same was not the case for the Communist party’s proposals or other
amendments by the Socialists, such as the elimination or strict limitation
of presumptive assessment (whose application was left to the discretion of
government). The obligation of the tax administration to publish fiscal data
at the individual level was the object of considerable controversy, with the
main argument against it being terrorist threats. It finally appeared both in
LMURF and the PIT law, only to be replaced in 1981 with the publication of
aggregate statistics.37
The power left in the hands of government was criticised by almost all
parties, particularly the executive’s capacity to adapt the PIT schedule and
credits by means of a yearly decree. This aspect was heavily contested, with
36Increase in family allowances, introduction of new investment deducible concepts, reduction
in the imputed incomes from home-ownership, and establishment of a limit of 40% effective tax-
ation.
37Lists of taxpayers of the years 1977 and 1978 were publicly displayed at the building of the
ministry of Public Finance in 1979 and 1980, with the press commenting on some dubious cases.
But these data corresponded to the old personal income tax. The regulation was changed to stop
publication of the (new PIT) 1979 data in 1981.
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almost all groups demanding a yearly compulsory adjustment to inflation
(which was high at the time). Those amendments were not accepted, lead-
ing as we know to strong fiscal drag during the 1980s.
c) The Net Wealth Tax
The initial wealth tax introduced in 1977 was meant to be transitory, and
thus was called “extraordinary” in the law. It was in force, however, for
fourteen years.
The project to replace it entered Parliament in January 1978, and raised sim-
ilar issues as its precedent. There were many technicalities, showing an in-
terest of the parties to debate the design of the tax in more depth than with
the transitory previous tax. The Commission did not reach an agreement
before the government was dissolved, and a similar process took place in
April 1979.
The Communist party defended again the need to include corporations in
the tax. Socialists suggested cadastral values to be adjusted yearly, accord-
ing to the evolution of prices in rental dwellings, which was meant to tackle
the widely known problem of under-valuation in these values, used as a
reference for this and other taxes.
The parties in the centre-right, on the other hand, strove for individual in-
stead of joint taxation, an increase of the exempted threshold and annual
adjustment to inflation; all measures geared towards limiting the revenue
potential of the tax. Another issue raised by them was the rejection of indi-
vidual tax data publication because of terrorist threats.
d) The Inheritance Tax
The history of this tax was similar to that of the wealth tax. The same project
entered twice in Parliament under UCD governments, without making it to
the plenary session.
The main novelty of the inheritance tax project of 1978, as defended by the
Public Finance Minister, was a greater personalization of the tax according
to the recipient of wealth, whose pre-existing property would be taken into
account to calculate the tax due. This had the effect of making the tax more
progressive. The proposal was rejected by the representatives of the right,
namely AP and the Catalan nationalists. The same groups again proposed
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an increase in exempted thresholds and the annual adjustment to inflation.
The left-wing parties, as would be expected, suggested higher or more pro-
gressive rate structures.38
e) The Value Added Tax
Several projects of this tax were presented to Parliament during the period.
The first one was from July 1978, whose discussion was reinitiated in April
1979 after the second elections. This project had not made it into law by
1981, when it was withdrawn by the government, putting forward a new
proposal more adjusted to European harmonization guidelines.
VAT has been considered a “revenue-raising machine”, and as such its ad-
vantages are many. It is an efficient tax, which may foster compliance in
businesses and favour savings with respect to consumption, and represented
a remarkable improvement in neutrality when compared to the existing
turnover tax. Ultimately, however, at least two aspects made it difficult to
introduce in Spain in the end of the seventies: the expected impact on price
levels (at a time of double-digit inflation) and the fact that it meant putting
an end to undercover export subsidies. In the end, the tax came into force
as part of the changes related to accession to the EEC.
The debates are a clear example of special interest politics, with MPs of
different parties aiming for more complexity in the tax, by granting exemp-
tions for more activities or including them in the reduced rates.39
Social Security Reform
The Social Security system had attained by 1977 a great importance in terms of
public revenue and expenditures. Social contributions represented 49% of the
revenues of public administrations, and 11% of GDP. These quantities, not inte-
grated in the general government budget, were administered by a whole set of
different institutions created over the 20th Century. Several problems called for
reform: complexity of the system, low resulting pensions, inequities between dif-
ferent groups of workers, high regressivity of the contributions, negative effects
on employment...
38Another point was the inclusion of illegitimate descendants in the first category of heirs, those
with lower rates applied.
39For example, health services, insurance, cars, fashion, wine, perfumes, or even shotguns.
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Proposals in this respect were, indeed, to be found in the programs of the main
political parties. The lines advocated by AP, UCD, PSOE and PCE in 1977 were
remarkably similar: they all called for universality, collective control, and gov-
ernment funding (at least, an increase in general taxes’ participation).40 The gov-
ernment had appointed a commission to design a new model, which appeared in
the "Libro Blanco de la Seguridad Social" in April 1977. However, during the fol-
lowing years, the programs kept mentioning the same issues, because they had
not been translated into practice.41
The reason is simple. Universalization and increased pensions, in a context of
growing unemployment, needed to be funded with reinforced transfers from the
government’s general budget. This, however, could barely be a reality before the
tax reform had paid off in terms of revenue and progressivity.42 Social Security
reform took off in 1978 with deep institutional changes, which brought about im-
provements in administration. But the main reform, with health expenditure and
non-contributory pensions assumed by the general budget, would not be a re-
ality until 1989-90. It had to wait for the introduction of the Value Added Tax,
which allowed a reduction in social contributions, and for an improvement of the
economic situation. In this sense, Guillén (2000) has emphasized continuity in the
Social Security system during the years of the transition. Government’s participa-
tion in the funding of the system increased (largely due to growing expenditures
in unemployment protection), and minimum pensions grew more than the upper
ones. But the basic nature of the regime, with differentiated categories of workers,
was maintained and even reinforced.
The contributory system was simplified in 1978, with the end of a long transitory
system established in 1972, which attempted to bring the tax bases for social con-
tributions progressively closer to the real wages paid, starting from a much lower
level in the sixties (see Monasterio, 1992). Since 1978, minimum and maximum
caps were dictated yearly by the government (by decree, and thus with no parlia-
mentary discussion). The maximum caps have the effect of exempting a fraction
40The parties of the left also insisted on increasing pensions to make them equivalent to the
minimum wage, annual adjustment to inflation, and improvement of the conditions of agricul-
tural workers.
41The main exception were the proposals of right-wing AP, which by 1982 had evolved towards
a two-pillar model, with basic-public and complementary-private levels (with private institutions
cooperating in the first one as well).
42In the words of the Libro Blanco, the objectives could only be attained “with more active govern-
ment involvement. But this leads to the need for a more sufficient and progressive tax system. It would be
vain to base redistributive action on regressive government contributions” (author’s translation).
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of the higher salaries, with regressive impact. The official version was that the
caps were being increased specially for the higher-paid categories of workers,
thus reducing regressivity. In hindsight, however, it does not seem to have been
like that. An analysis of the evolution of these caps shows that their increase was
effectively higher for the upper categories in absolute terms, but that during 1976-
88 all groups saw their bases increased yearly in very similar percentages (until
1989-93, when the number of different caps was reduced). Moreover, the caps
only increased in real terms in 1977-78 (and slightly in 1983), while for the rest of
the years that increase seems to have been impeded by the crisis and the conve-
nience of not pushing up labour costs. When compared to the average wage, the
tax caps were actually made lower (except slightly in 1983-84), which would point
to little or no eradication of the regressivity of these contributions. Of course,
to the extent that higher wages experienced above-average increases during the
decade, regressivity would be becoming higher.
Pressure groups
Actions to protect special interests outside the parliamentary course might also
be part of the story, although one harder to uncover. The leaders of the process
of tax reform cited the opposition of de facto powers as a powerful reason for the
partial derailment of the reform plan. For example, Fuentes Quintana asserted in
1996 that "The reform measures were effectively stopped. A big part of the tax changes
were paralysed by vested interests. [...] I am certain that there were [business] inter-
ferences to address what should be done."43 He resigned in October 1978, only one
year after the beginning of the tax reform, when the personal income tax had
just been approved and still not applied. His quick abandonment of politics was
caused by hard resistances to his economic reform plans, of which the tax mea-
sures of his collaborator Fernández Ordóñez were only one part. Fuentes was the
promoter of the Moncloa Pacts, which included a whole range of liberalization
measures together with the stabilization programme. Some of these measures
were opposed by the banking sector, the energy sector, and fellow members of
the government, which aimed for a more conservative policy – starting to reflect
the uneasy coexistence of very different tendencies inside UCD.44
43Excerpt of an interview by Andreu Missé, reproduced in Fuentes Quintana (2004).
44The interpretation of El País was quite clear in this respect: "The pressures of the financial sector
against the reform and the manifestations of the more conservative flank of business, along with the ma-
noeuvres to form a big right-wing party outside UCD, undoubtedly frightened the party’s political cadres
and Suárez himself", El País, Editorial of 25/10/1978.
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The Public Finance Minister Fernández Ordóñez stayed in government until April
1979, also before he could culminate his entire reform program (which included
the definitive wealth tax and the value added tax). He had a similar reading, and
denounced in a book one year later the reactionary character of resistances to the
reform.45 This protagonists’ version of the story has been backed by the histo-
rian Pan-Montojo (1996), putting forward evidence from complaints of left-wing
Members of Parliament about the influence of vested interests: for example, some
exemptions for capital incomes, which according to the socialist Lozano were
due to pressures by the regulatory body of the Spanish Stock Market (Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores).
Certainly, the behaviour of the banking sector was not of fully friendly cooper-
ation. In order to make taxation of capital incomes effective, withholding had
to be generalised, and information on bank accounts had to be accessible to the
tax administration. The lifting of the banking secrecy in the November 1977 act,
however, triggered a fierce campaign of opposition, which argued that the right
to personal intimacy was threatened, and that the measure could have negative
economic consequences, such as a reduction of operations and the growth of the
black markets. Cuadernos para el Diálogo denounced strong pressures on the Pub-
lic Finance reformers.46 ABC, on the other hand, voiced the concerns of Rafael
Termes, president of the bankers’ association, who showed willingness to coop-
erate, but complained about the burdensome task of sending information about
all their clients.47
According to the law, however, detailed data about quantities and operations was
only asked for in case of tax inspection. This was appealed in court by a taxpayer
in 1983, who finally lost his case in November 1984 at the supreme Constitutional
Court.48 In 1985, the government produced new legislation on the obligation
to inform the tax administration on each individual’s withholdings, which was
again appealed by 116 financial entities, that lost their case in 1986 (Castillo, 1994).
45"In Spain, where public spending has not yet reached the levels of industrial countries, and where the
tax system has very recently taken its first steps toward justice, a conservative phenomenon has been born,
fuelled not only by the international process, but by the nostalgia for the past. [...] This has strengthened the
pressure of conservative forces, from public manifestations against the tax reform and the Moncloa Pacts,
to a greater control of government policy". (Fernández Ordóñez, 1980), p. 137.
46"The men at the Public Finance Ministry [...] seem willing to address the problems and, further-
more, resist the pressures that such a powerful organization like the banking sector has already triggered.",
Cuadernos para el Diálogo, n. 221, 23rd to 29th July 1977.
47ABC, 29/12/1977, p. 51.
48Tribunal Constitutional, sentence 110/1984.
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Non-financial enterprises also showed deep concern about the reform, given the
economic context, and demanded lower fiscal burdens, particularly regarding
social contributions. These were paid nominally by employers in around 80% of
the total: although the statutory regulation did not reflect the economic incidence
of the tax, the relaxation of these contributions was a potentially high relief for
business at the time. These demands were included as proposals of the main
parties, but, as we have seen, not put into practice immediately. In any case, the
lack of thorough updating of the tax caps was consistent with business’ position,
since it could have potentially meant increases in revenue, were it not adequately
combined with reductions in tax rates.
Also as a result of the democratic transition, new business associations were
born, aimed at defending economic liberalization, and prominent members soon
came to see progressive reform as undesirable. As an example, Carlos Ferrer
Salat (president of CEOE, the main new employers’ association), said in 1977 that
"Because of its contents, this project [of general fiscal reform] is going to put an im-
portant brake on investment".49 Small firm-owners were more favourable to the
reform, since they suffered to some extent the regressivity of the previous sys-
tem, through presumptive assessments and the weight of social contributions for
labour-intensive enterprises. A small business owner from the metal sector said
to the press in June 1977: "I don’t mind the tax reform, what matters to me is that it
is done taking into account the economic capacity of each enterprise and that it prevents
that the most powerful ones get benefited. I hope that this democracy makes things go that
way".50
Both employers’ and workers’ associations were legalised in the spring of 1977,
and between 1980 and 1987 a series of social pacts were attained, with agree-
ments to tackle the economic crisis and focusing mainly on anti-inflationary mea-
sures, unemployment and labour market liberalization (Mella, 1992). As Comín
(2007) notes, these kind of agreements had not been possible in 1977, at the initial
months of democracy, Moncloa Pacts finally being reached between political par-
ties: “The negotiations between the Government and social organisations – employers’
associations and unions – had not made progress by August of 1977. So the Government
49Cuadernos para el Diálogo, number 233, 15 to 21st October 1977. These words correspond to a
conference about the current situation of enterprises organised by the Association for Progress of
Direction.
50Cuadernos para el Diálogo, number 216, 18 to 24th June 1977. Retailers from Madrid also
claimed against presumptive business taxation in 1976 (”Los comerciantes insisten en el cierre de
los sábados”, ABC, 10/11/1976, p. 44).
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decided to seek and try to reach an agreement among all the political parties represented
in Parliament” (page 21). During these years, trade unions were mainly worried
about the preservation of the purchasing power of wages and pensions, and tax
objectives ranked secondary in their agenda. Albeit illegal, they had existed un-
der the dictatorship, being an important part of the opposition to the regime dur-
ing its last decades. But their power was decreasing during the eighties, with
affiliation levels lower than those of EEC countries. Business associations, by
contrast, started to be organized in the first years of democracy and were quite
belligerent against the UCD and socialist governments. Is low – democratic –
corporatism related to the relatively low level of redistribution attained? This
is Jo Martin (2015)’s argument when she compares welfare state development
in the United States and Sweden, arguing that the second country’s lower bur-
dens on capital and high redistribution are both a consequence of the cooperative
decision-making process (in Sweden, in Eriksson, 2014’s words, big business was
“embedded”). Corporatism brought economic interests to sit together and feel
a responsible part of the setting of policy, ultimately making redistribution mea-
sures possible.
5.3.2 International integration
It could also be the case that Spanish domestic policies were democratic, but that
the external context made it increasingly difficult to support progressive taxa-
tion. International economic openness was increasing along political liberaliza-
tion, eventually culminating with the integration in the EEC/EU (1986) and the
subsequent commitments in trade and financial movements. The level of trade
openness can be seen in figure 5.8.
That economic openness is an obstacle to progressive taxation has been long es-
tablished in the literature. This arises from the “exit” option given in a common
market to the holders of mobile tax bases – namely capital, as opposed to labour.
Consequently, in an economic union where each state keeps raising its own taxes,
the models predict downward pressure on the mobile factors of production, to
avoid their relocation (see, e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1992 or Hettich and Winer,
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FIGURE 5.8: The increasing trend in trade openness
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Trade openness ((X+M)/GDP)
Source: Tena (2005), table 8.8 (pp. 630-31).
The index of trend openness corresponds to the sum of imports and exports
over GDP.
1999, pp. 102–106).51 Genschel (2002) contends that international tax competi-
tion has had harmful effects on countries’ policies, even though a general “race
to the bottom” has not been found in the tax to GDP ratios. He argues that, in the
absence of these constraints, taxes would likely be higher and more progressive,
with stronger burdens on capital and lower on labour and consumption.
So why did the European countries not reach an agreement on harmonization
to avoid these effects? This was indeed part of the talks in the European Com-
mission during the preparation of the common market. But the practical results
were highly uneven: while there was considerable unification in criteria around
indirect taxes (VAT and excises), the same was not reached when it comes to di-
rect taxation. Kopits (1992) provides an overview of the process. Corporation
tax rates harmonization was already put forward by the Commission in 1975, but
delayed by the need to define a common tax base – a complicated issue, the dis-
cussion of which is still under way. On the contrary, as soon as 1991 an agreement
was reached to avoid double taxation of dividends across frontiers.
Regarding more fundamental aspects of personal income taxation, a complete
unification of criteria was never fully on the table. But it was foreseen that, in
51Persson and Tabellini suggest that economic forces towards decreasing burden on capital
would be counteracted by a political reaction, so that the final situation could be the maintenance
of the statu quo. Interestingly, their model predicts convergence in capital income taxation across
countries, but divergence in labour income taxes, since the evolution of the latter would depend
on the effects of economic openness on inequality.
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the absence of automatic information sharing and/or homogeneous withhold-
ing, capital revenues could easily engage in fraud making use of the upcoming
liberalization. This, in turn, would provide the recipients of these incomes with
higher leverage to obtain tax privileges, in advance and after the lifting of controls
in July 1990.
Some initiatives therefore intended to limit these effects of downward pressure on
capital incomes. The initial proposal of the European Commission in 1989 was to
establish a uniform 15% minimum withholding tax on interest income of EC res-
idents. This option was abandoned, turning instead to an agreement on general
cooperation. These decisions required unanimity. Lasheras’ (1990) interpretation
is that interests in countries such as the United Kingdom and Luxembourg pre-
vented the adoption of general agreements on automatic information exchange
and uniform withholding at source, and that put a hard limit on the possibilities
for capital taxation in Spain: “this situation is forcing, in order to avoid massive out-
flows of domestic savings, to put taxation of capital incomes and capital gains in line with
that existing in the rest of countries of the Community” (Lasheras, 1990, p. 59).
Of course, these developments are only an epilogue in our story. They might,
however, be a very relevant one. Even if the country only entered the EEC in
1986, and free circulation of capitals was not a reality until 1993, the prospect of
these events was there long before. Accession to “Europe” was for a long time
an aspiration of the Spanish governments and also of the Spanish people, since
it was considered a sign of bringing the country towards the standards of living
and democratic politics of its neighbours. The relevant issue here is not so much
whether the effective capital outlets would have been so intense in the event of no
adaptation to low levels capital taxes, but the fact that they were seen as potentially
big threat in the economic literature, and present as an argument in the debate
about tax reforms since the last half of the eighties.
The failure of harmonization thus gave way to competition and national adjust-
ments in tax regulations. Ganghof (2001)’s interpretation suggests that govern-
ments operate in a “cuatrilemma” setting, where they have to give up on either
competitiveness (low taxation on capital), allocative efficiency (equal taxation on
incorporated and unincorporated capital), comprehensiveness (equal taxation on
capital and labour income of individuals) or progressivity (understood here as
increasing rates on labour income). All objectives could not be achieved jointly
in the international context of the late 20th Century. In Scandinavia, as is well
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known, these pressures brought about dual taxation of personal income. In Spain,
the path towards reinforcing capital taxation was somewhat “nipped in the bud”.
Subsequent reforms in the 1990s lowered top marginal tax rates and granted priv-
ileged treatment to capital gains. Finally, steps to dualization have been taken at
the beginning of the 21st Century, with the establishment of a separate schedule
for certain capital incomes.
Changes in economic theory have been taken place at a similar pace (Slemrod,
1995; Steinmo, 2003). The model introduced in Spain at the end of the 1970s
was a product of the postwar era and Keynesian supremacy. General, progres-
sive and redistributive taxation was at its peak in the sixties and seventies, with
the Carter Report of 1966 favouring a model of personal taxation as integrated
and comprehensive as possible. Proliferation of allowances and credits, however,
made the real systems differ from the model, and plagued them with horizontal
and vertical equity problems. The proposed solutions rested on new theoretical
approaches, related to the development of optimal tax theory during the 1970s,
which focused on the behavioural effects of taxation (i.e. the disincentive to work
or save, and thus the negative impact of tax rates on the tax base). Tax policy
proposals have thus tended to reduce progressivity, specially at the top, and pri-
oritize the objective of neutrality over equity considerations.
This evolution was taking place just as Spain was catching up with the devel-
opments of the previous decades. Whereas there was no strong alternative on
the table at the end of the seventies, soon these new ideas penetrated the public
debate in the country, and hindered the full development of the reform. Pan-
Montojo (1996) suggests the appearance of a program for “reform of the reform”
in the beginning of the 1980s, which called for protection of savings and invest-
ment. It was put forward by AP in the 1982 electoral programme, but its influence
reached also the centre and left of the political spectrum. The tide had changed.52
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the conditions under which tax reform took place in
Spain between 1970 and 1990. I have exposed the main aspects to be found in
52Fuentes Quintana (1987) is an outstanding symbol of the change in attitudes, becoming a
proponent of the linear tax. That the socialist party also evolved in a similar direction is clear
from the tax reforms undertaken under their rule in the 1990s and beyond.
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survey data regarding the public’s attitudes with respect to taxation, inequality
and redistribution. Albeit limited, the sources suggest the presence of a strong
demand for equalization, although slightly decreasing over time. The press gave
voice to some opinions very favourable to the progressive reform, which had
no clear alternative at the beginning. Apparently, this different option started to
emerge at the beginning of the 1980s, as part of a supply-side, business-friendly
economic program. The proposals of the main political parties showed a similar
evolution, with the initial emphasis on inequality reduction and tax progressivity
losing ground in their platforms during the successive elections.
Political institutions and the external context might have influenced to a great
extent how the citizens’ demands were translated into policies. In this regard, I
have identified several constraints which limited the effective culmination of the
reform. Malapportionment in Parliament is the first: the design of the electoral
law during the transitional period was made under significant conservative influ-
ence, giving birth to a system which benefited rural, conservative districts. The
importance of this element should not be underscored, since it largely shaped
the party system that emerged in the period following the first democratic elec-
tions of 1977. Successful parties got access to power in the constitutional talks,
attention in the media, and public funds for their activities.
Other political aspects that might have affected the process have only been hinted
to here, such as the relation of political participation with income levels and the
action of pressure groups, which is cited by different kinds of narrative evidence.
These issues deserve further attention in the future.
Economic distress and changes in public finance theory are very much related to
each other. Rising unemployment and sluggish growth certainly made it difficult
to strongly increase taxation. The reform of Social Security was delayed by the
resistance to increase labour costs, and the introduction of VAT was also deferred
by fears about its foreseeable inflationary effects. In 1977, the model aimed at
was the product of postwar Keynesian economics, developed under a period of
unprecedented growth and social peace in western democracies. The oil shocks
era brought about a different context, where emphasis was placed on the promo-
tion of private savings and investment. Finally, international openness came to
reinforce this process, by providing capital owners with a credible exit option.
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
This thesis has attempted to shed more light on a still under-researched topic in
economic history, namely the role of taxes in social systems and their interrelation
with political structures. I have analysed the case of Spain during its transition to
democracy, trying to find in the tax changes a reflection of political developments.
Democratization after a forty-year long dictatorship brought about a profound
tax reform, aiming to introduce in Spain the fiscal principles applied in other
countries during the 20th century. The main milestones were the introduction of
the personal income tax (1979) and the value added tax (1986), together with the
modernization of tax administration. These developments provided funding for
welfare state expansion and facilitated the country’s accession to the EEC. But
some of the practical effects of the reform were very soon criticised as limited,
and already in the 1990s, too early to allow a long-term evaluation, new public
finance ideas started to penetrate the system.
Most of the thesis has a quantitative character, using techniques from economics
and economic history. While based on widely used methods, I add some method-
ological proposals for correction of biases in survey data (chapter 2), a joint con-
sideration of total taxation and its impact on social groups (chapter 3), and an
addition to Feldman and Slemrod (2007)’s method for estimating fraud in differ-
ent income sources, by introducing a correction for sample selection (chapter 4).
Some of these ideas could be useful for other cases studies, specially were there
are significant data problems.
The main results can be summarised as follows:
1. Disposable income inequality did not substantially decrease after the transi-
tion to democracy – contrary to theoretical expectations and the conclusions
of previous literature.
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2. Taxation kept being regressive after the modernisation of the system, with
new progressive direct levies counteracted by consumption taxes and social
contributions.
3. Tax-and-transfer rates were jointly progressive, though very meagrely at
the top: the welfare state provided redistributive services, but it was not the
rich who paid for them.
4. One of the main cornerstones of the reform, personal income taxation, was
severely undermined during the first decades of its implementation by wide-
spread evasion and avoidance in non-wage incomes.
5. The demands for progressive taxation were constrained by both domes-
tic political institutions and the international context, which was no longer
favourable to these ideas.
How does our case study fit into the pattern identified by the literature, accord-
ing to which large, redistributive welfare states rest on regressive taxation, while
progressive tax systems give rise to limited redistributive government? Was the
Spanish case the result of a compromise of this type, where the expansion of so-
cial expenditures in the eighties and nineties could only be funded by the recently
introduced value added tax and persistently heavy social contributions?
Since Steinmo (1989, 1993) observed – contrary to his expectations – that the tax
system in the United States was more progressive in the 1970s and 1980s than the
Swedish one, several answers have been ventured. Steinmo’s own interpretation
was about the role of political institutions in shaping and translating social prefer-
ences. Other scholars have argued that strongly progressive taxes are ineffective
measures for redistribution, since they would trigger fierce political opposition
(Wilensky, 2002) or have adverse economic consequences (Lindert, 2004). Thus,
historically, these forces would have given rise to an apparent paradox, where
countries with highly redistributive tax-and-transfer systems based the funding
of these schemes on regressive taxes, such as consumption taxes or social contri-
butions.
Kato (2003) has formulated this relationship clearly, underlining the role played
by value added taxes in financing redistributive policies – with most success in
those countries that introduced them before the crisis of the 1970s. It has since
been accepted between tax scholars, and fits quite well with the public finance
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economists’ claim that it is optimal to redistribute through expenditure, and for-
get about progressive taxation.
Certainly, as much as it is true that expansion of public revenues in the end of the
seventies could only be achieved by increasing the burden at the top, a sustained,
further expansion under the economic crisis seems to have been politically fea-
sible only if it also limited the progressivity of taxes. But we should not forget
that total redistribution levels are the result of the combination of both sides of
the budget, so tax regressivity could severely limit contemporaneous redistribu-
tion – even if it might allow for future expansion. What does the comparison of
different countries say?
Prasad and Deng (2009) confirmed the Steinmo-Lindert idea showing that the tax
system in the US was more progressive than that of several European countries
in the period 1979-2000. The same conclusion can be reached by contrasting the
progressivity of the US taxes in Piketty and Saez (2007), though decreasing, with
that of the Swedish system as obtained by Bengtsson et al. (2015). However, when
comparing the operation of the joint tax-and-transfer scheme in Spain with those
of the United Kingdom and the United States, our Mediterranean country ap-
peared still beneath those in terms of inequality reduction throughout the period
1970-90 (remember figure 3.6). Thus, compared with the available international
data, the Spanish experience can be described as an incomplete convergence not
only to the European core but also to the most liberal polities. Welfare state de-
velopment, delayed by the dictatorship, was hindered by a new international po-
litical economy, where the combination of sluggish growth, economic openness
and neo-liberal theory made progressive taxes harder to defend and implement.
This, in turn, limited the state’s redistributive capacity.
To some extent, this story might also fit other countries in the European periph-
ery, adding a new category to the discussion. Welfare state laggards resorted to
regressive taxation to expand social spending, like the redistributive policy lead-
ers had done before. But lower revenue from personal taxes, higher levels of
inequality, and slow growth impeded the establishment of highly redistributive
tax-and-transfer systems. Were they too late?
Future avenues for research are diverse. From a national point of view, the story
told here can be further completed: either extended chronologically, in both di-
rections – although the older data would require slightly different methods –, or
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including a thorough treatment of transfers and the incidence of welfare state ser-
vices. The development of the public education and health systems pushed in the
direction of increased equality of opportunity, which would no doubt be a major
distributive result of democratization.
Comparative prospective studies include, for example, a broader consideration
of the distributive effects of late democratic transitions, where Milanovic (2013)’s
concept of the “Inequality Extraction Ratio” might be of interest (the idea was
first put forward by Milanovic et al., 2011). In the presence of economic growth,
constant or increasing inequality as measured by the Gini index can coexist with
reduced appropriation of the social surplus by the countries’ elites.
Another possible further development is an exploration of the conditions for the
successful introduction of tax innovations. Following the idea that more redis-
tributive states rest on regressive taxation, what made these developments po-
litically feasible in the first place? A similarly regressive tax de jure might have
different real effects and perceptions where the economic structure and levels of
inequality also differ. In this sense, an exploration of the dynamics of the intro-
duction of heavy consumption taxation in presently generous welfare states may
shed some new light.
A third topic related to the results of the dissertation is the impact of international
integration and tax competition on the autonomy of states to establish their de-
sired tax structures. The globalization hypothesis (Genschel, 2002; Steinmo, 1994)
has pointed to increasing economic openness as an obstacle to national redistribu-
tive schemes, especially with respect to progressive taxation. Surely the policy
coordination at the time of the abatement of frontiers has a lot to do with the
likelihood of this result. In this sense, we might benefit from a comparison of
the recent process of European integration with previous experiences, such as the
early process of economic integration across Scandinavian countries.
Finally, the history of tax evasion is a young research field. From a quantitative
point of view, few results are available still. Further studies could be undertaken
to complement what was started in chapter 4, analysing fraud in a longer time
period, in other taxes, or in other countries. In this sense, the conclusions that
have been recently drawn from the new top incomes series (Atkinson and Piketty,
2007) might be nuanced in some cases with estimations of hidden incomes, which
could potentially enrich our perceptions about long-term inequality and redistri-
bution.
Appendix A
Tax revenue series
Long term series of Spanish tax revenue were already provided by Comín and
Díaz (2005). For this study, nonetheless, I needed higher level of detail for the
imputation procedure, so I disaggregated the tax revenue on the basis of primary
sources. The data I use are on a accrual basis (i.e. not budgeted figures, nor cash
flows either). In some cases, they have been obtained from those other budgetary
phases which precede or follow, applying the corresponding adjusting factor.1
The existence of tax autonomy in some regions has made several adjustments
necessary. During the dictatorship, the provinces of Álava and Navarra had dis-
tinct taxing power on most items (generally, with high regulatory capacity in the
direct ones and only collection management in the indirect ones). Of these, they
kept a part for themselves and transferred an annual payment to the State (cupo)
as their share in the common budget.2 This means that the revenue of e.g. land
taxes in these provinces is not included in the general figure, so I had to dis-
aggregate them from the corresponding provincial administrations’ revenue to
integrate them in the study. This has been done resorting to budgeted data or
applying the general national structure: I am therefore not considering the dif-
ference that might exist in the tax burden distribution with respect to the rest of
the nation.3 For the post-transition period, a very similar regime persists in the
Autonomous Communities of Navarra and País Vasco (which includes not only
1It might be conceptually more solid to use cash-flow figures, but the accrual criterion has
been chosen because of various reasons; fundamentally the availability of consolidated data for
all Public Administrations and the fact that it is the most widely used in international statistics.
The difference between both quantities is insignificant in most cases.
2The cupo system was legislated upon for long periods of time, specially in the case of Navarra,
and fixed in nominal terms. This obviously entailed a progressive reduction in the value of real
central revenue coming from these territories, aggravated in times of high inflation (of which
there were several episodes during the dictatorship).
3And which most likely does exist to a certain extent. In recent times, it is known to mean a
lighter burden on corporations, for example.
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Álava but also its neighbouring provinces Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya). Information
on revenues is also not totally integrated, but improved enough for the purpose
of this analysis (the general statistics do show now how much, say, income tax
was raised in these areas).
On the contrary, the Canary Islands and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla have been
excluded from the computations because of their specific regime in indirect tax-
ation. It is considered that their presence would bias the results (since there is
lighter indirect burden, it would mean to underestimate the regressivity of the
general system – not too much, though, because of their small share in national
income and tax revenue). So, in the results, ‘Spain’ refers to the Península and the
Balearic Islands.
A.1 Total tax revenue: disaggregation of the series
The series have been obtained from official sources: totals are from Cuentas de las
Administraciones Públicas, which provide information for the whole of the Gen-
eral Government and its different components, while higher detail on the Central
State’s numbers comes from Cuenta General del Estado - Cuenta de la Administración
General del Estado. These have been consulted in the Archives of the Public Fi-
nance Ministry and the IGAE (Intervención General de la Administración del Estado).
Several publications of the Ministry of Public Finance have been used for other
purposes: information on the taxes of autonomous communities (“impuestos con-
certados”) has been obtained from Recaudación y estadísticas de la reforma tributaria,
while disaggregation of municipal taxes comes from Liquidación de presupuestos de
las Corporaciones Locales and the Memoria de la Administración Tributaria. See sec-
tion A.3 for the list of sources. Missing data have sometimes been estimated by
linear interpolation.
The social contributions totals are from Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas,
adding those from public employees (which appear as a direct tax in the Central
Government statistics) and disaggregating several components: the contributions
of the self-employed (1967-79, from National Accounts, Contabilidad Nacional de
España), of the unemployed (1967-79 from Memoria Estadística de las Contingencias
de la Seguridad Social Administradas por el INP, 1980-84 from Anuario de Estadísti-
cas Laborales of the Labour and Social Security Ministry), and the agrarian special
regime (1981-90, Anuario de Estadísticas Laborales, 1970 from Memoria Estadística
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de los Seguros Sociales administrados por el INP). There is a discontinuity in the so-
cial contributions series in 1967 (when the social security law came into force),
which I have not been able to eliminate. It is related to the introduction of family
protection in the aggregate accounting (the explanation can be found in Instituto
Nacional de Estadística, 1968).
Further disaggregation in several taxes (not shown in the following tables, but
used in the calculations) was obtained from primary sources in the Central Archive
of the Ministry of Public Finance (direct taxes) or other publications (indirect
taxes details by groups of goods): Información Estadística del Ministerio de Hacienda
(1960-72) and Estadísticas Presupuestarias y Fiscales (1973-89). It has been impos-
sible to find tariffs revenue by product types, even though I have come across
evidence that such statistics were calculated by the Ministry for several years
during the seventies.
The taxes from autonomous tax regions have been estimated from Información
Estadística del Ministerio de Hacienda and Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas
(which provides local budgets), applying when needed the composition at the
general level from Cuenta General del Estado.
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 show the tax revenue series in nominal pesetas, for the
period 1958-1990, and the whole of the country (i.e., before extracting the revenue
from the regions not considered in the study).
I next show the composition of tax revenue: the share of each item in the total
(tables A.4 and A.5), and also the importance of each one related to GDP (tables
A.6 and A.7).
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5,821
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
FiscalLicence
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Industry
&
Trade
Tax
24,157
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
orporation
Tax*
189,823
213,918
259,585
330,614
370,546
447,096
564,042
833,166
887,409
1,376,245
1,584,064
O
ld
Incom
e
Tax
6,399
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
LocalLand
PlotTax
21,977
25,309
34,034
41,175
48,315
57,467
68,506
73,707
84,869
107,291
86,333
W
ealth
Tax
17,887
14,448
19,792
19,441
18,631
26,901
33,088
44,515
57,176
35,742
96,910
PersonalIncom
e
Tax
659,751
815,322
985,377
1,214,906
1,506,506
1,629,282
1,747,729
2,533,903
2,887,023
3,591,344
3,840,625
LocalLand
Tax
54,385
54,563
59,832
64,809
76,549
79,464
123,429
103,955
209,999
232,442
289,383
LocalLicence
Tax
28,201
36,314
64,694
71,743
81,994
86,683
108,646
119,378
139,688
151,947
163,007
LocalVehicle
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
97,958
O
ther
22,122
56,974
32,866
58,542
54,524
87,086
55,172
87,962
23,400
14,108
20,481
TO
TA
L
1,065,330
1,242,160
1,484,141
1,832,796
2,191,805
2,451,460
2,742,947
3,851,464
4,365,751
5,586,315
6,261,170
IN
D
IR
EC
T
TA
X
ES
Transfer
Tax
and
Stam
p
D
uties
134,526
136,428
149,207
165,924
172,679
193,220
209,295
250,869
320,088
398,473
492,317
Equity
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
O
ilM
onopoly
9,120
0
0
75,600
37,000
108,169
333,725
111,647
158,137
99,194
90,887
Tobacco
M
onopoly
12,892
27,005
27,035
30,648
27,710
28,422
-
-
-
-
-
C
ustom
s
D
uties**
105,612
119,063
145,558
178,378
188,457
219,968
286,352
339,047
365,668
349,641
302,287
Im
portTaxes***
65,489
72,579
96,582
111,524
125,893
162,134
-44,559
-
-
-
-
Expenditure
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Luxury
Tax
161,135
160,697
195,479
241,072
269,728
297,498
51,278
-
-
-
-
Turnover
Tax
123,095
230,545
320,172
427,394
646,091
702,628
241,011
67,194
53,988
47,554
40,570
Excises
204,425
287,279
242,509
303,553
426,751
447,839
503,484
709,489
766,916
838,712
984,757
V
alue
A
dded
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,460,871
1,979,000
2,250,257
2,575,745
2,774,119
European
Tariff
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
40,115
50,388
59,803
61,720
LocalC
irculation
Tax
-
-
19,789
29,650
39,511
43,121
47,786
51,556
68,294
79,521
-
O
ther
132,176
130,215
154,062
199,127
229,846
275,023
99,605
131,308
108,429
107,441
85,886
TO
TA
L
948,470
1,163,809
1,350,393
1,762,870
2,163,666
2,478,021
3,188,846
3,680,225
4,142,163
4,556,084
4,832,542
SO
C
IA
L
C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
IO
N
S
Public
Em
ployees
13,062
14,873
16,634
19,420
23,013
30,505
39,044
48,789
47,379
58,430
61,591
Em
ployers
1,361,067
1,531,771
1,776,345
2,052,896
2,114,258
2,368,788
2,675,240
3,042,105
3,391,789
3,873,674
4,390,171
Em
ployees
262,624
288,986
345,303
422,158
509,177
535,508
635,185
662,706
704,300
818,806
932,663
Self-Em
ployed
99,440
112,233
135,502
165,960
215,582
238,213
282,673
311,924
338,330
375,117
414,697
U
nem
ployed
87,127
123,595
107,860
128,279
150,353
181,215
163,106
193,007
195,077
270,717
310,962
TO
TA
L
1,823,319
2,071,458
2,381,644
2,788,714
3,012,382
3,354,229
3,795,248
4,258,531
4,676,875
5,396,743
6,110,084
G
EN
ER
A
L
T
O
TA
L
3,837,119
4,477,427
5,216,178
6,384,379
7,367,852
8,283,709
9,727,041
11,790,219
13,184,789
15,539,142
17,203,796
%
IN
ST
U
D
Y
96.0%
95.8%
96.4%
96.0%
96.1%
95.6%
98.4%
98.1%
99.0%
99.2%
99.4%
Source:see
text.D
ata
is
in
m
illion
pesetas
*
Includes
a
“specialtax
of4%
”
on
capitalem
issions
1965-80.
**
Includes
custom
s
revenues
from
C
anarias
and
other
taxes
on
internationaltrade.
***
A
tax
thatw
as
supposed
to
m
irror
the
interior
tax
burden
ofim
ported
goods.
Appendix A. Tax revenue series 161
TA
B
L
E
A
.4
:C
om
po
si
ti
on
of
ta
x
re
ve
nu
e,
19
58
-1
97
4
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
D
IR
EC
T
TA
X
ES
In
he
ri
ta
nc
e
Ta
x
1.
6%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
3%
1.
3%
1.
1%
1.
1%
0.
9%
1.
0%
1.
0%
0.
9%
1.
0%
1.
0%
1.
0%
0.
9%
La
nd
Ta
x
(r
ur
al
)
1.
6%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
2%
1.
1%
0.
9%
0.
8%
0.
7%
0.
4%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
2%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
2%
0.
2%
La
nd
Ta
x
(u
rb
an
)
1.
9%
1.
8%
1.
8%
1.
7%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
4%
1.
3%
1.
3%
1.
1%
1.
0%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
2%
1.
2%
1.
2%
1.
4%
La
bo
ur
Ta
x
5.
4%
5.
3%
5.
5%
5.
4%
5.
2%
5.
2%
4.
9%
4.
4%
5.
5%
4.
5%
4.
2%
4.
4%
4.
8%
5.
3%
5.
5%
6.
3%
7.
3%
C
ap
it
al
Ta
x
3.
5%
2.
6%
2.
6%
2.
6%
2.
5%
2.
2%
2.
1%
2.
2%
2.
2%
1.
8%
1.
9%
1.
9%
2.
0%
2.
1%
1.
9%
1.
9%
1.
7%
Fi
sc
al
Li
ce
nc
e
1.
3%
1.
3%
1.
2%
1.
1%
1.
8%
1.
7%
1.
6%
1.
5%
1.
4%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
0%
1.
0%
0.
8%
0.
7%
0.
8%
In
du
st
ry
&
Tr
ad
e
Ta
x
1.
0%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
4%
1.
4%
1.
5%
1.
7%
1.
7%
1.
4%
1.
6%
1.
4%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
4%
1.
2%
1.
2%
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
Ta
x
8.
3%
8.
6%
7.
7%
7.
6%
7.
2%
6.
6%
5.
9%
7.
0%
7.
6%
6.
1%
6.
1%
6.
6%
6.
5%
6.
4%
6.
2%
6.
0%
6.
4%
O
ld
In
co
m
e
Ta
x
1.
0%
1.
2%
1.
2%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
1%
1.
0%
1.
0%
0.
8%
0.
9%
0.
8%
0.
8%
0.
9%
0.
8%
0.
8%
0.
7%
Lo
ca
lL
an
d
Pl
ot
Ta
x
0.
6%
0.
5%
0.
6%
0.
5%
0.
4%
0.
5%
0.
7%
0.
7%
0.
8%
0.
8%
1.
0%
0.
6%
0.
9%
0.
7%
0.
6%
0.
7%
0.
8%
W
ea
lt
h
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Pe
rs
on
al
In
co
m
e
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lo
ca
lL
an
d
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lo
ca
lL
ic
en
ce
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lo
ca
lV
eh
ic
le
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
O
th
er
7.
0%
6.
7%
6.
5%
5.
9%
5.
9%
6.
1%
5.
8%
4.
7%
3.
8%
2.
7%
2.
8%
2.
1%
2.
2%
2.
2%
1.
9%
1.
5%
1.
5%
TO
TA
L
33
.2
%
32
.4
%
31
.6
%
29
.9
%
29
.6
%
28
.6
%
27
.0
%
26
.3
%
26
.6
%
21
.5
%
21
.9
%
21
.1
%
22
.0
%
22
.5
%
21
.5
%
21
.6
%
22
.8
%
IN
D
IR
EC
T
TA
X
ES
Tr
an
sf
er
Ta
x
an
d
St
am
p
D
ut
ie
s
7.
8%
8.
1%
7.
5%
7.
5%
7.
2%
7.
9%
7.
4%
5.
1%
5.
1%
4.
3%
4.
6%
4.
9%
5.
2%
5.
1%
5.
1%
5.
4%
5.
8%
Eq
ui
ty
Ta
x
1.
6%
1.
7%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
4%
1.
5%
1.
3%
0.
1%
0.
1%
0.
0%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
O
il
M
on
op
ol
y
4.
4%
4.
0%
3.
0%
3.
7%
3.
7%
3.
6%
3.
5%
3.
3%
3.
9%
3.
7%
3.
5%
3.
8%
3.
1%
2.
2%
2.
2%
2.
6%
-0
.7
%
To
ba
cc
o
M
on
op
ol
y
2.
3%
2.
3%
2.
4%
2.
4%
2.
1%
1.
7%
2.
0%
1.
7%
1.
9%
1.
5%
1.
5%
1.
6%
1.
6%
1.
4%
1.
3%
1.
1%
0.
9%
C
us
to
m
s
Ta
x
3.
4%
3.
5%
7.
1%
9.
8%
11
.3
%
11
.5
%
11
.6
%
7.
5%
8.
8%
5.
9%
5.
3%
5.
4%
5.
1%
4.
7%
5.
0%
5.
2%
4.
8%
Im
po
rt
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6.
6%
6.
9%
4.
5%
4.
0%
4.
3%
4.
0%
3.
1%
3.
3%
3.
6%
3.
7%
Ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
Ta
x
13
.4
%
13
.2
%
13
.8
%
12
.4
%
13
.3
%
11
.0
%
9.
6%
0.
2%
0.
1%
0.
0%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lu
xu
ry
Ta
x
5.
3%
6.
4%
6.
7%
6.
7%
6.
7%
7.
0%
7.
9%
8.
6%
9.
2%
7.
9%
8.
1%
8.
5%
8.
6%
8.
6%
7.
8%
8.
1%
7.
5%
Tu
rn
ov
er
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.
4%
6.
5%
7.
0%
6.
2%
6.
4%
6.
4%
6.
9%
6.
3%
5.
8%
5.
7%
6.
1%
Ex
ci
se
s
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5.
9%
5.
3%
4.
5%
4.
8%
4.
7%
4.
8%
4.
8%
4.
2%
3.
6%
3.
2%
V
al
ue
A
dd
ed
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Eu
ro
pe
an
Ta
ri
ff
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Lo
ca
lC
ir
cu
la
ti
on
Ta
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
O
th
er
4.
0%
4.
6%
3.
8%
4.
9%
3.
1%
3.
4%
3.
0%
3.
3%
1.
8%
1.
4%
1.
5%
1.
6%
1.
8%
2.
2%
2.
2%
1.
7%
1.
9%
TO
TA
L
42
.3
%
43
.8
%
45
.8
%
49
.0
%
49
.0
%
47
.6
%
47
.7
%
48
.8
%
50
.0
%
39
.9
%
39
.7
%
41
.2
%
41
.1
%
38
.3
%
37
.0
%
37
.1
%
33
.3
%
SO
C
IA
L
C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
IO
N
S
Pu
bl
ic
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
0.
3%
0.
2%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
2%
0.
2%
0.
2%
0.
2%
0.
4%
0.
5%
0.
5%
0.
5%
0.
5%
0.
5%
0.
4%
0.
3%
0.
3%
Em
pl
oy
er
s
18
.7
%
18
.1
%
17
.0
%
15
.7
%
16
.0
%
17
.6
%
18
.7
%
18
.7
%
17
.0
%
31
.9
%
30
.6
%
30
.0
%
29
.4
%
30
.4
%
32
.5
%
32
.6
%
35
.0
%
Em
pl
oy
ee
s
5.
5%
5.
4%
5.
3%
5.
1%
5.
2%
6.
1%
6.
5%
5.
9%
5.
9%
5.
1%
6.
0%
5.
9%
5.
8%
6.
2%
6.
8%
6.
7%
6.
8%
Se
lf
-E
m
pl
oy
ed
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
9%
0.
9%
0.
9%
1.
0%
1.
7%
1.
4%
1.
4%
1.
4%
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
2%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
3%
0.
4%
0.
4%
0.
3%
0.
3%
TO
TA
L
24
.5
%
23
.7
%
22
.6
%
21
.1
%
21
.5
%
23
.8
%
25
.3
%
24
.9
%
23
.3
%
38
.6
%
38
.4
%
37
.7
%
37
.0
%
39
.2
%
41
.5
%
41
.3
%
43
.9
%
So
ur
ce
:s
ee
te
xt
.
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T
A
B
L
E
A
.5:C
om
position
oftax
revenue,1975-1990
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
D
IR
EC
T
TA
X
ES
Inheritance
Tax
0.9%
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.6%
0.5%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
Land
Tax
(rural)
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Land
Tax
(urban)
1.2%
1.1%
0.9%
0.9%
0.1%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Labour
Tax
7.8%
8.7%
9.3%
11.7%
4.7%
0.4%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
apitalTax
2.2%
3.3%
3.0%
3.2%
1.3%
0.2%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
FiscalLicence
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.0%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Industry
&
Trade
Tax
1.3%
1.2%
1.0%
0.9%
0.8%
0.6%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
C
orporation
Tax
6.2%
5.6%
4.7%
4.1%
4.9%
4.9%
4.8%
5.0%
5.2%
5.0%
5.4%
5.8%
7.1%
6.7%
8.9%
9.2%
O
ld
Incom
e
Tax
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.9%
0.9%
0.2%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
LocalLand
PlotTax
1.0%
0.7%
0.7%
0.8%
0.8%
0.6%
0.6%
0.7%
0.6%
0.7%
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.6%
0.7%
0.5%
W
ealth
Tax
-
-
-
0.3%
0.5%
0.5%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.4%
0.4%
0.2%
0.6%
PersonalIncom
e
Tax
-
-
-
-
9.4%
17.2%
18.2%
18.9%
19.0%
20.4%
19.7%
18.0%
21.5%
21.9%
23.1%
22.3%
LocalLand
Tax
-
-
-
-
0.6%
1.4%
1.2%
1.1%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.3%
0.9%
1.6%
1.5%
1.7%
LocalLicence
Tax
-
-
-
-
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
1.2%
1.1%
1.1%
1.0%
1.1%
1.0%
1.1%
1.0%
0.9%
LocalVehicle
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.6%
O
ther
1.6%
2.1%
1.9%
1.5%
0.5%
0.6%
1.3%
0.6%
0.9%
0.7%
1.1%
0.6%
0.7%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
TO
TA
L
23.7%
25.1%
23.6%
25.5%
25.8%
27.8%
27.7%
28.5%
28.7%
29.7%
29.6%
28.2%
32.7%
33.1%
35.9%
36.4%
IN
D
IR
EC
T
TA
X
ES
Transfer
Tax
and
Stam
p
D
uties
5.1%
5.0%
4.6%
4.3%
4.0%
3.5%
3.0%
2.9%
2.6%
2.3%
2.3%
2.2%
2.1%
2.4%
2.6%
2.9%
Equity
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
O
ilM
onopoly
0.3%
2.2%
1.8%
1.9%
2.1%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
1.2%
0.5%
1.3%
3.4%
0.9%
1.2%
0.6%
0.5%
Tobacco
M
onopoly
1.0%
0.8%
0.4%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
-
-
-
-
-
C
ustom
s
Tax
4.3%
4.3%
4.3%
3.0%
2.6%
2.8%
2.7%
2.8%
2.8%
2.6%
2.7%
2.9%
2.9%
2.8%
2.3%
1.8%
Im
portTax
3.6%
2.6%
2.2%
1.8%
1.4%
1.7%
1.6%
1.9%
1.7%
1.7%
2.0%
-0.5%
-
-
-
-
Expenditure
Tax
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Luxury
Tax
6.9%
7.1%
6.8%
6.7%
6.6%
4.2%
3.6%
3.7%
3.8%
3.7%
3.6%
0.5%
-
-
-
-
Turnover
Tax
4.6%
4.2%
3.4%
3.6%
3.4%
3.2%
5.1%
6.1%
6.7%
8.8%
8.5%
2.5%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
Excises
2.5%
2.1%
1.6%
1.3%
0.8%
5.3%
6.4%
4.6%
4.8%
5.8%
5.4%
5.2%
6.0%
5.8%
5.4%
5.7%
V
alue
A
dded
Tax
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A.2 Taxes in the Península and the Balearic Islands
In order to isolate the regions subject to study, tax revenue accruing to the Canary
Islands, Ceuta and Melilla have been extracted from the totals, only for specific
years. These data have been estimated with the criterion of the provincial admin-
istration where taxes were collected. For State taxes, this information is available
in Información Estadística del Ministerio de Hacienda / Estadísticas Presupuestarias
y Fiscales and Recaudación y Estadísticas de la Reforma Tributaria; for local taxes I
have also used Liquidación de los presupuestos de las Corporaciones Locales, the INE
Yearbook Anuario Estadístico, Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas, Estadística
presupuestaria de las entidades locales de 1982, Estadística de los presupuestos de las
corporaciones locales. Datos iniciales de los años 1984 y 1985, Memoria de la Adminis-
tración Tributaria and data on the Real Estate Local Tax for 1990 from the Dirección
General del Catastro (available online). Social Security Contributions were dis-
aggregated with Memoria Estadística de los seguros sociales administrados por el INP
and Memoria de la Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social.
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TABLE A.8: Tax Revenue in the Península and the Balearic Islands
1960 1964 1970 1976 1982 1985 1990
Land / Real Estate Tax 3,142 3,859 6,297 17,421 57,873 74,745 275,955
Labour Tax 5,273 8,287 21,393 124,174 - - -
Capital Tax 2,541 3,642 8,823 48,277 - - -
Industry and Trade Fiscal License 1,165 2,765 4,330 9,506 - - -
Industrial and Trade Tax 1,404 2,476 6,694 16,443 - - -
Inheritance Tax 1,438 2,199 4,163 10,911 27,077 37,372 81,005
Corporation Tax (1) 7,497 10,249 28,948 80,584 256,750 440,855 1,567,274
Personal Income Tax (2) 1,131 1,813 3,384 10,408 962,819 1,584,948 3,756,698
Local Land Taxes 574 1,174 3,794 10,463 33,398 56,394 84,721
Wealth Tax - - - - 19,166 25,939 94,291
Local Fiscal License - - - - 62,640 83,095 156,259
Local Vehicles Tax (3) - - - - - - 94,028
Other 6,010 9,464 8,946 27,223 32,134 86,523 15,974
DIRECT TAXES 30,175 45,929 96,773 355,409 1,451,858 2,389,871 6,126,204
Transfer and Stamp Duties 8,706 14,879 23,639 72,927 146,440 189,125 480,130
International Trade Taxes 6,855 20,003 40,939 92,640 228,303 360,576 336,111
Oil Monopoly 2,908 6,070 13,798 31,169 0 0 90,887
Tobacco Monopoly 2,320 3,441 7,063 11,435 26,221 27,305 -
Luxury Tax 6,425 13,439 37,996 103,356 195,477 297,472 -
Expenditure Tax / Excises 13,317 16,709 21,396 29,925 240,203 441,955 970,140
Turnover Tax - 2,496 31,732 62,377 317,427 694,346 19,914
Local Vehicles Tax (3) - - - - 18,995 41,391 -
Value Added Tax - - - - - - 2,774,119
Other 3,439 4,093 4,215 22,265 148,413 266,353 61,385
INDIRECT TAXES 43,971 81,130 180,779 426,093 1,321,479 2,318,523 4,731,538
Public Employees 241 269 2,155 4,375 15,836 29,220 59,343
Employers 16,093 31,356 128,362 504,113 1,728,908 2,299,311 4,264,645
Employees 5,035 10,907 25,410 85,941 336,082 519,801 905,996
Self-Employed - - 4,389 21,552 131,884 231,226 402,840
Unemployed - - 1,186 12,669 104,980 175,900 302,071
SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 21,369 42,532 161,502 628,649 2,317,690 3,255,458 5,934,895
TOTAL TAXES 95,515 169,591 439,053 1,410,152 5,091,027 7,963,852 16,792,636
All taxes in nominal million pesetas.
Source: see text.
(1) Corporate Income Tax includes a tax on equity issuance in 1970 and 1976.
(2) Personal Income Tax includes its precedents Contribución General sobre la Renta (1960 and 1964) and I. General sobre la Renta de
las Personas Físicas (1970 and 1976), although they were of a different nature, as is discussed in the text.
(3) The vehicles tax is classified in local budgets as indirect until 1989 and since then as direct.
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A.3 Data sources list
• Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales:
– Estadística presupuestaria de las entidades locales de 1982, Ministerio de
Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1986): Estadística de los presupuestos de las corporaciones locales. Datos
iniciales de los años 1984 y 1985, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda,
Madrid.
– (several years): Liquidación de presupuestos de las corporaciones locales.
Ejercicio..., 1984-1989, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1992): Liquidación de presupuestos de las entidades locales. Ejercicio 1990,
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
• Dirección General de Impuestos Directos (1964): Estadística de servicios de
la Contribución General sobre la Renta. Año 1960, Ministerio de Hacienda,
Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre, Madrid.
• Dirección General de Tributos:
– (several years): Boletín de información de la Dirección General de Tributos,
1979-1983, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1988): Recaudación y estadísticas de la reforma tributaria [1979-1986], Min-
isterio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1991): Recaudación y estadísticas de la reforma tributaria (1979-1990), Min-
isterio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1992): Recaudación y estadísticas de la reforma tributaria (1981-1991), Min-
isterio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1990, 1992, 1993): Comportamiento del Impuesto Extraordinario sobre el
Patrimonio de las Personas Físicas en... (1988, 1990, 1991), Ministerio de
Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (1996): El comportamiento del Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones (1988-
1995), Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
• Intervención General de la Administración del Estado:
– Cuenta General del Estado, 1976-1977.
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– Cuenta de la Administración General del Estado, 1978-1990.
– (several years): Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas, 1958-63 to 1990,
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (several years): Información estadística del Ministerio de Hacienda, años
1960-1972, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
– (several years): Estadísticas presupuestarias y fiscales, años 1973-89, Min-
isterio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid.
• Instituto Nacional de Estadística (several years): Anuario Estadístico de Es-
paña.
• Instituto Nacional de Previsión:
– Memoria Estadística de los seguros sociales administrados por el INP, Min-
isterio de Trabajo, Madrid.
– Memoria estadística de las contingencias de la Seguridad Social administradas
por el INP, Ministerio de Sanidad y Seguridad Social, Madrid.
• Ministerio de Hacienda (1981-1982): Memoria de la reforma tributaria. 1980
and 1981, Madrid.
• Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (several years): Memoria de la Adminis-
tración Tributaria. 1982/83, 1984-85, 1987-90.
• J. Santos Peñas (1975): Presión impositiva sobre las rentas de trabajo en España,
tesis doctoral, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
• Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social:
– (1987): Memoria 1985, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid.
– (1991): Memoria 1990, Ministerio de Sanidad y Seguridad Social, Madrid.
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B.1 Households and budget constraint by deciles
Table B.1 depicts the distribution of households according to the relation between
their incomes and expenditures, extending the data shown in the main text by
breaking down deciles of income. We already knew that the extent of households
spending more than they said to earn was decreasing as we moved to more recent
surveys. Here, we can also see significant differences across the (reported) income
distribution in each sample.
In all three surveys, the percentage of households spending less than or equal to
their yearly income is increasing with income. This, of course, is not surprising,
since part of the explanation lies in the real behaviour of households with differ-
ent economic means. In almost all deciles, however, the majority of households
lie within the 1-2 interval.
Casual observation of this table leads to conclude that adjusting incomes to ex-
penditures will bring up the revenues of the poor more than those of the rich (in
percentage terms), leading to lower levels of inequality. To the extent that some
households do spend more than their yearly income in a given year, and that
households with positive savings are also under-reporting their earnings, such
an adjustment can only be a small part of the solution and could even introduce
additional biases.
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TABLE B.1: Distribution according to the ratio
(Expenditure + Net Savings) / Income
0 - 1 1 - 2 2 - 4 >4 Total
1973 Decile 1 28% 52% 16% 5% 100%
Decile 2 28% 54% 16% 2% 100%
Decile 3 29% 56% 14% 1% 100%
Decile 4 26% 59% 14% 1% 100%
Decile 5 28% 60% 12% 1% 100%
Decile 6 28% 61% 10% 0% 100%
Decile 7 31% 60% 8% 0% 100%
Decile 8 34% 59% 7% 0% 100%
Decile 9 36% 57% 7% 0% 100%
Decile 10 41% 55% 4% 0% 100%
1980 Decile 1 36% 46% 15% 4% 100%
Decile 2 34% 52% 12% 1% 100%
Decile 3 35% 53% 11% 1% 100%
Decile 4 33% 57% 9% 1% 100%
Decile 5 34% 56% 9% 0% 100%
Decile 6 35% 57% 7% 0% 100%
Decile 7 35% 58% 7% 0% 100%
Decile 8 39% 55% 5% 0% 100%
Decile 9 43% 52% 5% 0% 100%
Decile 10 50% 47% 3% 0% 100%
1990 Decile 1 38% 41% 16% 5% 100%
Decile 2 33% 50% 15% 1% 100%
Decile 3 36% 51% 12% 0% 100%
Decile 4 34% 55% 11% 1% 100%
Decile 5 37% 55% 8% 0% 100%
Decile 6 38% 54% 7% 0% 100%
Decile 7 42% 52% 6% 0% 100%
Decile 8 49% 46% 4% 0% 100%
Decile 9 52% 45% 3% 0% 100%
Decile 10 64% 34% 2% 0% 100%
Source: author’s calculations based on Household Budget Surveys.
Note: households in the first column spend within their budget constraint. A ratio of
2, for example, means that the family reported to spend twice as much as her yearly
income.
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B.2 Effects of adjusting only self-employment earn-
ings
In this paper, the estimation of under-reporting of the self-employed à la Pissarides-
Weber is part of a wider strategy, to obtain adjustment of all incomes to National
Accounts. We can, however, ask ourselves what would be the result in terms of
inequality of up-scaling earnings after this first under-reporting inquiry. This is
shown in table B.2.
The exercise has only a limited effect on the Gini indices, which are slightly in-
creased (compare with the original data in the first columns of table 2.5). This is
because I apply here coefficients of 1.21, 1.26 and 1.17 (as resulting from table 2.6,
and significantly smaller than those applied in the adjustment to NA exercise,
table 2.8), and only to self-employment incomes, which are a limited part of the
total (always under 25%).
TABLE B.2: Effect of correcting only the under-reporting
of the Self-Employed
1973 1980 1990
Total (Hh) 36.78 34.43 33.25
OECD 33.13 32.03 30.11
OECD_mod 32.57 31.36 29.49
Source: author’s calculations.
B.3 Data aggregates comparison
The following tables show the data involved in each calculation of scaling-up
factors, following the scheme in table 7 of the text. Note that m corresponds to
the net definition (leaving imputations aside). The value for NOS is not applied
in the up-scaling procedure (the results from Pissarides-Weber equation are in-
stead), as is explained in the text, because adjustment to the National Accounting
framework in this flow should not be complete.
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B.4 Other equivalence scales and indices
Only the preferred estimates are shown in the text, which use the Gini index and
the OECD equivalence scale. Other indicators have been calculated, leading to
similar results: higher inequality in up-scaled data, slight and erratic decrease
over time. See table B.6.
B.5 Alternative adjustments of transfers
The up-scaling of transfers undertaken in the main estimation attempts to distin-
guish between the private ones and public benefits. Both have been found to have
significantly different reporting behaviour in the 1990 survey, which is the only of
the three where they are explicitly differentiated in the data. An approximation
has been made in the previous years to the distinct profiles of compliance, based
on those results. However, the procedure might introduce a significant level of
uncertainty.
In order to look more closely at the problem, I have performed two alternative
calculations (see table B.7). The first one does not correct transfer incomes at
all, and thus leaves the original data for this component untouched, combining
it with the other up-scaled incomes to obtain the total. The second procedure
applies a uniform correction to all transfer income in all deciles (even for 1990, in
order to establish the bias).
As can be seen, generally the preferred calculation (table 2.10) depicts intermedi-
ate levels of inequality with respect to the other alternatives presented here (no
up-scaling generating higher levels, and uniform up-scaling resulting in lower
levels). The exception are equivalent incomes in 1990, where our more precise
estimate yields higher inequality than these ones. This could suggest that our ap-
proximation under-estimates the effect of this distinct behaviour of private trans-
fers and public benefits, thus leading to inequality still being downward biased
in the results. The implication, however, is dependant on the distribution of both
components being homogeneous across the years, something unlikely given the
development of the Welfare State at the time.
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TABLE B.6: Income inequality according to other equivalence scales
and indices
1973 1980 1990
Original Corrected Original Corrected Original Corrected
Gini
Total (Hh) 36.19 36.83 34.26 33.51 33.02 34.84
OECD 32.56 34.59 31.99 32.60 29.99 32.95
OECD_mod 31.97 33.79 31.27 31.59 29.35 32.13
Sqroot 32.12 33.88 30.96 31.39 29.37 32.04
Top 10% share
Total (Hh) 26.74 28.23 25.35 25.80 24.70 27.13
OECD 25.72 27.69 25.09 25.80 23.97 26.87
OECD_mod 25.32 27.19 24.61 25.19 23.54 26.35
Sqroot 25.22 27.05 24.22 24.88 23.31 26.09
Top 1% share
Total (Hh) 5.58 6.47 5.20 6.03 4.85 7.15
OECD 5.44 6.65 5.20 6.14 4.80 7.30
OECD_mod 5.40 6.44 5.06 5.92 4.65 7.23
Sqroot 5.33 6.27 4.90 5.81 4.52 7.08
GE (2) index
Total (Hh) 32.90 40.59 31.67 55.31 27.80 69.63
OECD 28.49 40.32 31.85 57.93 26.48 71.91
p90/p10
Total (Hh) 5.72 5.25 5.27 4.43 4.95 4.73
OECD 4.19 4.38 4.17 4.13 3.77 3.93
p90/p50
Total (Hh) 2.15 2.24 2.08 2.06 2.07 2.10
OECD 2.04 2.13 2.03 2.02 1.96 2.02
Source: author’s calculations.
In all indices, the first row represents distribution between households, while the other depict distribution between
individuals according to different equivalence scales. The OECD original and modified scales apply weights 0.7-0.5
and 0.4-0.3 respectively to subsequent adults and minors in the household (under 14). The ‘Sqroot’ scale uses the
square root of the household size.
All calculations refer to disposable income. Gross incomes are expected to be more unequally distributed under a
progressive direct tax system (which applies specially to 1990).
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TABLE B.7: Gini indices under alternative adjustments
of transfer income
1973 1980 1990
No up-scaling of transfer income
Total (Hh) 38.80 36.43 35.65
OECD 35.05 33.77 32.61
OECD_mod 34.46 33.14 32.01
Uniform up-scaling of transfer income
Total (Hh) 36.21 32.72 32.14
OECD 34.16 32.13 31.64
OECD_mod 33.33 31.07 30.51
Source: author’s calculations.
B.6 Comparing with other approaches to Spanish in-
equality
The results in this paper differ from those previously obtained using the survey
data, because I estimate a higher level of inequality and a smaller decrease over
time. This includes the studies reviewed in section 2, based on the HBSs, and also
those which have used a different source, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Fa-
miliares. This is a rotating household panel also provided by INE, with quarterly
data and households staying in the sample for a maximum of 2 years.
The ECPF consistently displays lower levels of inequality than the HBSs (EPFs).
One reason for it might be that it suffers from a larger downward bias, because
of sample size and the definition of income employed (notably excluding certain
capital incomes). According to some reputable sources, this results in its low
reliability for the study of inequality (Eurostat, 1999; Goerlich and Mas, 2001).1
Its higher discrepancy with respect to National Accounts can be seen in Pou and
Alegre (2002).
For this reason, differences between my results and those of analyses based on the
ECPF are to some extent not surprising. Both Oliver et al. (2001) and Pijoan-Mas
1“The sample size is 3,200 households, a lot less than in the three EPFs, which does not allow regional
disaggregation. The objective of the ECPFs is measuring the growth in households’ consumption in the
short term, while the EPFs have a systemic purpose. This means that coverage, breadth of concepts and
treatment of the data are very uneven between both sources, so they cannot be considered of similar quality"
(Goerlich and Mas, 2001).
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and Sánchez-Marcos (2010), for example, provide an account of falling inequal-
ity between 1985 and 1996/2000, partially overlapping with the period analysed
here.2 The differing trends, however, are not completely irreconcilable: in fact, a
decrease in inequality in the second half of the eighties could be compatible with
general stability, when the whole decade is considered (specially knowing that a
whole cycle of recession and growth took place during the eighties, and rates of
unemployment were similar at the beginning and the end of the decade, around
15%). Falling inequality in labour market revenues of household heads is also
found for the entire decade in the HBSs by Abadie (1997) and in my scaled-up
data.3
My results can also be compared with studies on the evolution of inequality based
on other kinds of data. Prados de la Escosura (2008) provided a long-run esti-
mation based on a macroeconomic approach, calculating dispersion within and
between the incomes of “workers” and “capitalists”. His series show a rapid de-
crease in inequality in Spain between the mid 1950s and the mid 1960s, followed
by a much slower diminishing trend since then and until the second half of the
1990s, when inequality would have started to go upwards again. The persistence
I obtain is therefore quite consistent with Prados de la Escosura’s calculations.
For the post-transition period it is also possible to use income tax data and assess
the evolution of inequality in taxable income. By definition, however, the levels
and trend do not need to coincide with those of disposable income: between both
lie direct taxes, transfers and the impact of fraud. There are also other method-
ological differences, discussed in Ayala and Onrubia (2001): generally, tax-based
studies use the taxpayer as the unit of analysis (as opposed to the household, and
without applying equivalence scales) and have different universes (given by the
effective income threshold to personal direct taxation). This category of taxpay-
ers was also changing over the years: new taxpayers were coming in because the
tax was being introduced, and also as an effect of fiscal drag. All of this explains
why tax data generally show a higher level of inequality than survey data, and
2Oliver et al. (2001) do acknowledge the limitation of under-reporting in their source, around
30% of the National Accounts data for disposable income, although decreasing over time.
3I have calculated the indicator defined by Pijoan-Mas and Sánchez-Marcos (2010): head of
household earnings (considering labour income and 2/3 of self-employment income). The results
show decreasing Gini indices: from 34 to 32 in market earnings, and from 32 to 29 considering
also unemployment benefits. These numbers are quite compatible with those of the cited authors
in trends, but at a slightly higher level. Since these results do not contrast with Abadie (1997)’s
with the original data (which, on the other hand, focus on individuals not suffering from unem-
ployment), we can infer that differences in under-reporting do not affect the evolution of labour
earnings inequality as much as it does for other incomes.
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a worsening in (reported taxable) income distribution during the eighties (e.g.
Ayala and Onrubia, 2001; Lambert and Ramos, 1997). The study closest to our
discussion is that by Onrubia (2007), which includes calculations for the “fiscal
household” (thus homogenizing the periods before and after the introduction of
the separate filing option for married couples). The pre-tax income Gini index
(taxable base with some adjustments) was found to increase continuously from
1982 to 1991 (31.68 to 42.00).
Alvaredo and Saez (2009) studied top income shares, obtaining the revenues from
tax data and the population total (denominator) from National Accounts (there-
fore, their approach has the same comparability problems with my estimates,
namely different income concept and no equivalization). Their results show that
the top 0.1% share was fairly constant over the 1960s and 1970s (around 1.87%),
with concentration starting to increase in the second half of the eighties (2.14%
in 1990).4 The same trend is shown in the share of the top 1% (7.5% to 8.37% in
1981 and 1990) and the top 10% (32.61% to 35.35% in the same years). It should
come as no surprise that the figures are lower for disposable income: in my work,
I obtain for the top 1% of households 6.47% in 1973, 6.03% in 1980 and 7.15% in
1990. Nevertheless, the increasing concentration in the last years is seen in both
sources.
4Tables B2 and B3 in Alvaredo and Saez (2009). There are only three observations in the period
1961-1981, because of problems in the availability of the original data.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
C.1 Detailed imputation methodology
The estimation of tax payments consists in allocating the revenue of each tax us-
ing the distribution of the corresponding tax base across households:
Th,t =
Bh,t
N∑
h=1
Bh,tρh,t
N∑
h=1
Th,tρh,t, (C.1)
where Th,t is the estimated amount of tax t paid by household h, Bh,t the cor-
responding tax base, N the number of households and ρ each one’s sampling
weight. This formula has been applied generally, for taxes that are proportional
to the base, at the highest possible level of disaggregation (e.g., excises on spe-
cific goods or differential rates in VAT). Some items, however, required different
calculations, for example the inheritance tax and PIT (which are progressive and
for which we have better data).
C.1.1 Social contributions
The data permit distinguishing those paid by workers, employers, self-employed
workers, and the unemployed (on their behalf by the unemployment insurance).
For the first two groups, the General Regime and the Special Regime for Agrarian
Workers have been considered separately.
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Worker’s contributions
The tax base (Bases de Cotización) has been simulated with the information on
salaries and wages in the HBSs.
1. Correspondence between socio-professional category in the Social Security
regulations and socio-economic category and education level in HBSs. In
1970 and 1982, each household has been assigned the category of the house-
hold head; the 1990 data allow inferring the category of each working house-
hold member.
2. In 1970 there was one Base Tarifada for each category. For the following
years, the tax base is the salary up to the maximum threshold established
by the regulations. Household tax base is the sum of the individual tax
bases.
3. Further adjustments and approximations have been made when we lack
information on the salary, employment periods or working hours of each
member.
Employer’s contributions
The part falling on the employer is distributed according to entrepreneurial in-
come of “empresarios con asalariados” (entrepreneurs with salaried workers) and
capital incomes (to capture the impact of employees of corporations and inciden-
tal shifting).
Contributions of the self-employed
According to the distribution of entrepreneurial income of the corresponding
socio-economic categories in the HBSs.
Contributions of the unemployed
Distributed according to unemployment benefits in 1990. In previous years, using
the distribution of transfers (there is no disaggregation available) when there is
unemployment in the household having worked previously (in 1982 we have
information on each member, in 1970 only of the household head).
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C.1.2 Direct taxes
Almost every tax has a component paid directly by households and another that
falls first on enterprises and only gets to the final taxpayer through profits and
prices. This second component has always been distributed with the criterion
used for the Corporation tax.1
Urban Land Tax (Contribución Territorial Urbana - Impuesto de Bienes Inmue-
bles)
In proportion to housing expenditure (real or imputed rent). The HBSs of 1982
and 1990 have some data on the tax paid by owner-occupiers, which is assumed
to be 80% of the total revenue (given the distribution of housing regimes in 1990).
The remaining 20% has been distributed according to rents paid, also for the
owner-occupiers not reporting their tax.
Rural Land Tax (Contribución Territorial Rústica)
Distributed according to entrepreneurial incomes of agricultural land proprietors
(socio-economic categories in HBSs). I have distinguished between the fixed and
the variable part of the tax.
Industrial Tax (Impuesto Industrial)
Distributed according to entrepreneurial incomes of urban entrepreneurs (socio-
economic categories in HBSs). I have distinguished between the fixed and the
variable part of the tax.
Capital Income Tax (Impuesto sobre las rentas del capital)
Using the distribution of positive incomes from capital.
120% of land and housing taxes, and, 75% of the tax on income from capital, 60% of the fiscal
licence, 40% of municipal land taxes and 30% of the tax on vehicle circulation.
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Labour Income Tax (Impuesto sobre las rentas del trabajo personal)
The licence part has been distributed among the socio-economic category of pro-
fessionals, the variable one using the distribution of income from labour over the
threshold (60.000 ptas).
Municipal Land Tax (I. Terrenos y Solares)
In proportion to the sum of income from capital and imputed rents.
Corporation Tax (I. Sociedades and I. Especial del 4%)
According to the distribution of positive income from capital, total monetary ex-
penditure and income from labour. The central estimation weighs each of these
components by a third (alternatives in section C.3.3).
Old Income Super-tax (I. General Renta Personas Físicas)
Simulated according to the regulations (tax base, exemption threshold, family
and labour allowances, formula, tax credits for product taxes). The resulting
quantity is a lot higher the real tax paid, and so is also the number of taxpay-
ers. This is of course evidence of fraud, but out of lack of information to deal
with it correctly all the quotas were adjusted proportionally.
Property Tax (I. Patrimonio)
Property is approximated with a 3% capitalization of capital incomes, including
imputed rents and half the revenues from entrepreneurial labour. The households
with higher property have been selected up to the number of taxpayers from the
tax statistics (Memoria de la Administratión Tributaria), and the actual revenue has
been distributed among them using the tax shares paid by each tax base group.
Inheritance Tax (I. Sucesiones)
I follow here the Office for Tax Analysis of the U.S. Treasury (Cronin, 1999): each
potential taxpayer is assigned the product of...
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• The resulting quota in case of death (simulated property times the statutory
tax rate)2, under the assumption of there being two heirs (since it is to them
that the tax would correspond).
• The mortality rate in the 5-year age interval (obtained from INE; for 1970 I
have used the rate of the 45 year-olds in 1975, since there is no information
on age in the HBS).
The basic assumption of this procedure is that the heirs would be in a similar
income level than the decedent.
Personal Income Tax (IRPF)
The distribution of the tax paid (cuota líquida) is obtained, by permilles of tax-
payers ranked by their net incomes, from the micro-data provided by the IEF
(“PANEL PURO Y EXTENDIDO IRPF 1982/1998 IEF-AEAT (Declarantes)” ). It
is then imputed to the corresponding permilles in the HBSs (previously selected
from the households, using the information on age and income of each member).
The obtained distribution is applied to the actual tax paid in the year. Total tax
payment of the household is calculated as the sum of the quotas of all members.
Vehicles Tax (I. Circulación – I. sobre Vehículos de Tracción Mecánica)
There are reported payments in the 1990 HBSs, but these do not cover the total
quantity: the rest has been simulated using the information on expenditure in
gasoline, and the same procedure has been applied in 1982.
C.1.3 Indirect taxes
Taxes on specific consumption goods
Distributed according to the corresponding expenditure items, generally at the
3-digit level of disaggregation in the PROCOME classification (but 4-digit codes
were used in some cases).3 Thus I imputed taxes on the consumption of tobacco,
2The formula distinguishes by family closeness, but I have only used the formula for the closest
ones, to which the immense majority of inheritors belonged.
3PROCOME is a Eurostat system of classification of consumer goods that was used in HBSs
by all EU countries. Further information can be found at Instituto Nacional de Estadística (1992).
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alcohol, goods subjected to the luxury tax (cars, jewellery, electrical appliances...),
and so on.
A part of the revenue of the Oil monopoly and the Hydrocarbons excise is dis-
tributed according to total consumption, since it would impact on the production
process and final prices.
General consumption taxes
The General Sales Tax, Stamp duties and transaction tax, and Tariffs have been
distributed according to total monetary expenditure (alternatives are explored in
section C.3.1).
For VAT I have distinguished the groups of goods affected by each rate in 1990
(reduced, general and incremented). The distribution of the tax revenue among
these is given in the online database Badespe (Base de Datos Económicos del Sec-
tor Público Español, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales). The reduced rate is applied
to food, public transport, the editorial sector, medicines, school materials, the
hospitality sector, spectacles and housing investment. The incremented rate cor-
responds to the purchase of cars, jewellery, boats, and so on.
C.2 Average Effective Tax Rates by tax
Here I present AETRs for deciles of individuals (ranked by pre-tax equivalent
income), for the main taxes in each year. Generally, I have chosen the ones rep-
resenting at least 4% of total tax revenue. IGRPF in 1970 is an exception: it only
meant 0.8% of revenue, and is presented precisely to show its insignificance. In
1982, the Luxury tax represented 3.8% but I still include it for coherence between
the tables. The same reason is behind the inclusion of Tariffs in the last year.
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TABLE C.1: Average Effective Tax Rates by deciles, year 1970
IRTP IGRPF ISOC CSTFE1 IGTE LUJO IIEE CEXT
Decile 1 0.02 0.00 5.32 5.60 19.23 14.56 5.90 24.80
Decile 2 0.25 0.00 1.23 11.09 2.65 2.80 1.23 3.42
Decile 3 0.56 0.00 1.16 12.60 2.22 2.33 1.14 2.86
Decile 4 0.74 0.00 1.14 12.57 2.06 2.23 1.14 2.66
Decile 5 0.97 0.01 1.08 11.63 1.98 2.28 1.15 2.55
Decile 6 1.16 0.01 1.11 11.19 1.85 2.13 1.11 2.38
Decile 7 1.28 0.01 1.08 10.44 1.74 2.02 1.12 2.25
Decile 8 1.40 0.03 1.09 8.99 1.63 2.02 1.16 2.11
Decile 9 1.54 0.10 1.16 7.65 1.55 2.15 1.28 2.00
Decile 10 1.51 0.40 1.55 5.38 1.36 1.85 1.14 1.76
Top 5% 1.35 0.58 1.85 4.30 1.25 1.68 1.04 1.61
Top 1% 0.94 1.07 2.58 2.07 0.86 1.13 0.70 1.11
Source: Author’s calculations.
IRTP (Impuesto sobre los Rendimientos del Trabajo Personal): labour income tax. ISOC (Impuesto de Sociedades): Cor-
poration tax. IGRPF (Impuesto General sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas): personal income super-tax. CSTFE1:
Social Contributions under Hypothesis 1. IGTE (Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas): General Sales tax.
LUJO: Luxury tax. IIEE (Impuestos Especiales): excises on alcohol, petroleum products, and so on. CEXT: Tariffs
and other taxes on international trade.
TABLE C.2: Average Effective Tax Rates by deciles, year 1982
IRPF ISOC CSTFE1 IGTE LUJO IIEE CEXT
Decile 1 0.06 9.45 1.90 34.72 11.40 8.43 24.97
Decile 2 2.09 2.06 8.46 5.60 2.68 2.93 4.03
Decile 3 4.36 1.55 13.15 3.32 1.76 2.09 2.39
Decile 4 5.14 1.49 15.23 2.84 1.68 2.14 2.05
Decile 5 5.53 1.47 16.48 2.61 1.37 1.93 1.88
Decile 6 5.90 1.43 16.75 2.44 1.60 1.87 1.76
Decile 7 6.29 1.40 16.72 2.31 1.42 1.88 1.66
Decile 8 6.59 1.42 16.87 2.14 1.38 1.75 1.54
Decile 9 7.11 1.36 16.72 1.94 1.40 1.66 1.40
Decile 10 8.78 1.79 15.37 1.63 1.15 1.47 1.17
Top 5% 9.84 2.14 13.24 1.54 1.13 1.42 1.11
Top 1% 11.97 3.29 8.04 1.19 0.80 1.03 0.85
Source: Author’s calculations.
IRPF (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas): Personal Income Tax. ISOC (Impuesto de Sociedades): Corpo-
ration tax. CSTFE1: Social Contributions under Hypothesis 1. IGTE (Impuesto General sobre el Tráfico de Empresas):
General Sales tax. LUJO: Luxury tax. IIEE (Impuestos Especiales): excises on alcohol, petroleum products, and so
on. CEXT: Tariffs and other taxes on international trade.
188 Appendix C. Appendices to Chapter 3
TABLE C.3: Average Effective Tax Rates by deciles, year 1990
IRPF ISOC IEPPF CSTFE1 IVA IIEE CEXT
Decile 1 10.69 18.47 0.00 2.13 82.50 64.98 11.69
Decile 2 7.31 5.70 0.00 8.61 20.66 8.85 2.71
Decile 3 6.51 4.44 0.00 13.75 12.43 5.29 1.59
Decile 4 6.68 4.15 0.00 16.44 10.34 4.27 1.31
Decile 5 7.47 4.14 0.01 16.69 9.39 3.92 1.18
Decile 6 8.33 4.00 0.02 16.79 8.13 3.22 1.01
Decile 7 9.00 3.99 0.04 17.50 7.88 2.94 0.95
Decile 8 9.98 3.84 0.06 17.16 7.31 2.83 0.87
Decile 9 10.96 4.02 0.12 16.51 6.71 2.03 0.78
Decile 10 14.02 4.54 0.41 14.99 5.95 1.59 0.66
Top 5% 15.67 4.58 0.59 13.99 5.27 1.14 0.58
Top 1% 19.06 6.84 1.48 8.33 3.64 0.58 0.38
Source: Author’s calculations.
IRPF (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas): Personal Income Tax. ISOC (Impuesto de Sociedades): Corpo-
ration tax. IEPPF: Wealth Tax. CSTFE1: Social Contributions under Hypothesis 1. IVA (Impuesto sobre el Valor
Añadido): Value Added Tax. IIEE (Impuestos Especiales): excises on alcohol, petroleum products, and so on. CEXT:
Tariffs and other taxes on international trade.
C.3 Alternative (robustness) estimations
C.3.1 Consumption taxes
There is some better data for indirect taxation in the year 1980, disaggregated by
INE for a study undertaken in the IEF in the course of preparations for the in-
troduction of VAT. I have used these data to perform two alternative estimations
that show no significant deviation from the baseline ones, thus reinforcing the
general procedure.
• Domestic consumption taxation: Calatrava and Martínez-Aguado (1985) cal-
culated rates by sector using the input-output table (in this way estimat-
ing the cumulative effect of IGTE), and those were used by Argimón et al.
(1987) to obtain rates by consumption groups and calculate indirect tax in-
cidence on the Household Budget Survey. They cover IGTE, ICGI, Luxury
Tax, Excises, Fiscal Monopolies and Fiscal Licence. I have used their tax
rates and compared the resulting AETR over Disposable income by deciles
with those from my baseline estimation. The results show the same trend,
meaning that the impact of the different estimation procedure is not signifi-
cant. AETRs are not very distant from those given in Argimón et al. (1987),
but mine display higher regressivity in the lower deciles: this is attributable
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to different procedures of correction of the Disposable income given by the
HBSs (that study used provincial-level data).
• Tariffs: INE also provided disaggregated tariffs revenue by sectors in 1980
(the only year for which I have been able to find this information). This al-
lows to impute to the corresponding expenditures the taxes falling on final
consumption, while maintaining other revenues on total monetary outlays
(the disaggregated quantities are 47% of the total). The results are reassur-
ing: AETRs by deciles change for the most in 0.09 percentage points. It
can be concluded that using import taxes as a whole does not introduce a
serious problem.
C.3.2 Incidence of social contributions
As is discussed in the methodological section, I have estimated an alternative
scenario under different assumptions on the incidence of Social contributions,
because of the lack of consensus about their impact in the Spanish economy. Hy-
pothesis 2 imputes 50% of the contributions to labour, 25% to businesses (income
from individual ownership and capital) and 25% to consumption. This estima-
tion may reflect a situation where workers have gained enough bargaining power
to resist the full backwards shifting of this tax onto them, and could be more plau-
sible for the post-transition period (and consistent with a negative effect of social
contributions on the levels of employment).
The results are different from the baseline estimates shown in the text, because
these contributions made up a very significant part of total tax revenue. With a
portion of them falling on capital, they seem a lot less regressive, and this drives
the total to a considerable extent: the levels of progressivity and redistribution
obtained under hypothesis 2 are higher (less negative) than under the baseline
estimation.
In 1982, Social contributions were the most important tax in the system, represent-
ing 46% of that year’s revenue (and 12% of GDP); therefore, with this alternative
hypothesis the system appears a lot less regressive in the beginning of the eight-
ies than at the end, displaying a more intense cycle. However, the same general
conclusion about the negative impact of taxes on inequality is still valid.
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TABLE C.4: Progressivity and Redistribution
under Hypothesis 2
1970
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1161 -0.0320 -0.1368 -0.0456
AETR 4.78 8.84 9.74 23.36
RS 0.0057 -0.0042 -0.0173 -0.0203
1982
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1026 0.0009 -0.1796 -0.0131
AETR 10.26 16.76 8.54 35.56
RS 0.0115 -0.0028 -0.0182 -0.0157
1990
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.0805 -0.0207 -0.2327 -0.0433
AETR 17.60 17.21 13.55 48.36
RS 0.0155 -0.0062 -0.0411 -0.0626
Source: Author’s calculations.
C.3.3 Incidence of the corporation tax
Three alternative estimations have been calculated concerning this tax, due to the
uncertainty about its economic incidence:
• Alt. A: 100% on capital. This is an extreme possibility, done for comparabil-
ity with works that consider it (fundamentally earlier ones). Nunns (2012)
reports that the Tax Policy Center in USA recently changed from 100% to
80% on capital.
• Alt. 2: 70% on capital, 30% on consumption; following the approach taken
by Uriel (2003) for Spain.
• Alt. 3: 30% on capital, 70% on labour; according to several recent empirical
work with data from US and Europe (Arulampalam et al., 2012; Dwenger
et al., 2011; Fuest et al., 2013; Liu and Altshuler, 2013) and which fits the
developments in theory (e.g. Randolph, 2006).
In all cases, the incidence considered for the Corporation tax is also applied to the
part paid by corporations of other taxes (Fiscal Licence, Equity Issuance tax, Tax
on the Income from Capital, and so on). As can be seen in table C.5, all alternative
hypotheses are more progressive than the baseline, entailing a reduction in the
RS index of 1-2 Gini points for the most in absolute terms. Thus, the general
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conclusion of the analysis holds: the tax system got less regressive, and also more
negatively redistributive (in a non-monotonic way).
TABLE C.5: Alternative incidence of the Corporation tax
1970
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Baseline
K -0.0579 -0.0728 -0.0813 -0.0849
RS -0.0243 -0.0293 -0.0316 -0.0332
1982
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Baseline
K -0.0104 -0.0205 -0.0230 -0.0274
RS -0.0138 -0.0198 -0.0211 -0.0239
1990
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Baseline
K -0.0288 -0.0425 -0.0397 -0.0485
RS -0.0442 -0.0600 -0.0552 -0.0667
Source: Author’s calculations.
C.3.4 Other alternative estimations
Alternative calculations have been performed for the Real Estate tax (with the
hypothesis of 50% sharing of the burden between the owner and the occupier)
and considering different percentages of assumption by households of the local
taxes on land plots. The results are not shown here, since they change the indices
very marginally. This is not surprising, given the small share of these taxes in total
revenue (Real Estate Taxes: 1.1%, 1.1%, 1.7% in 1970, 1982 and 1990 respectively;
local land plot taxes: 0.9%, 0.7%, 0.5%).4
C.3.5 Public benefits as part of pre-tax income
Some studies make the methodological choice of using as income reference (de-
nominator in the calculations of AETR and ordering variable for Gini indices) a
“wide” gross income which includes public benefits. This is not done in other
works, such as Piketty and Saez (2007), while the criterion followed in Bengtsson
et al. (2015) is to add only those which are subject to direct taxation.5 I have also
4The prevalence of owner-occupied housing in Spain also contributes to the quantitative irrel-
evance of the alternative estimation in the case of the Real Estate Tax.
5In the case of Spain, and following the definition of the Personal Income Tax base, this would
mean including retirement and sickness pensions, but not unemployment or disability benefits.
However, unemployment benefits are liable to Social Security contributions.
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estimated all the indicators with this alternative framework, in order to compare
both.
There are conceptual differences between both calculations. Using Pre-tax income
as I have defined it in the main text has the drawback of picturing the lower end
of the distribution as extremely poor (with many households having very scarce
or no market income at all, and thus above 100% or even infinite tax rates). Many
of these families are led by old-age pensioners. Arguably, if the public benefit
system did not exist, their income would be higher than zero (they might have
saved for a private pension); and furthermore a part of what they receive as a
benefit is not a pure “transfer” but delayed salary income. In this sense, depicting
them as households with null income is an extreme of two options. But it is the
choice consistent with:
• Being able to abstract the incidence of taxation from that of public expendi-
ture.
• Considering Social contributions as a tax and introducing them in our anal-
ysis as such.
• Judging that public benefits are to a great extent a redistributive transfer;
i.e., that recipient households would have significantly lower income if not
benefiting from them (as found by Bandrés and Cuenca (1996) for pensions
in Spain).
On the contrary, including public benefits in pre-tax income entails not being
able to correctly separate the analysis of public expenditure, because it is already
included in our reference income. It also means depicting society as less unequal
than it is (public benefits being redistributive). The “true” pre-tax distribution
probably lies somewhere in the middle of both scenarios.
As was said in the text, HBSs data do not allow to separate public benefits from
private transfers for the first two years analysed.6 Even though for 1990 it would
be possible to do it, to keep consistency in table C.6 I have defined Pre-tax income
as Gross Factor Income + all Transfers. I call these results Scenario B, while the
baseline framework is Scenario A.
6As was said before, 89.5% of total transfers received by households in 1990 were public, a
percentage that might have been lower in preceding years.
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Resulting from this methodological change, inequality in pre-tax incomes is lower
(33.87 in 1970, 33.79 in 1982 and 35.01 in 1990)7. The tax system appears less re-
gressive, making the Gini index increase 2.3 points the first year, then only around
1, then again 2.3. The difference with the Scenario A specification grows over
time, as a logical consequence of public benefits developing during the period.
Hypothesis 2 regarding Social contributions makes a higher part of the burden
fall on top deciles (via partial incidence on capital and employers’ incomes; see
section C.3.2). Therefore, under the alternative estimation, the tax system looks
close to proportional, specially in 1982. However, the profile of effective tax rates
by percentiles under both hypotheses still shows significant downward-sloping
stretches in the lower classes (first 10-20% of households). The RS index fails to
indicate any significantly positive impact of taxes on the distribution of income.
TABLE C.6: Progressivity and redistribution under Scenario B
Social Contributions Hypothesis 1 Social Contributions Hypothesis 2
1970
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1364 -0.1397 -0.0873 -0.0618 0.1285 -0.0080 -0.0958 -0.0169
AETR 4.20 7.82 8.56 20.58 4.21 7.78 8.57 20.55
RS 0.0058 -0.0143 -0.0105 -0.0232 0.0055 -0.0017 -0.0113 -0.0106
1982
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1280 0.0022 -0.1046 0.0128 0.1185 0.0592 -0.1109 0.0355
AETR 8.37 13.76 6.96 29.09 8.38 13.68 6.97 29.03
RS 0.0110 -0.0045 -0.0091 -0.0070 0.0102 0.0067 -0.0095 0.0042
1990
Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total Direct Soc. Contr. Indirect Total
K 0.1485 -0.0161 -0.1604 0.0033 0.1394 0.0198 -0.1645 0.0117
AETR 14.32 14.16 11.03 39.50 14.34 14.03 11.04 39.41
RS 0.0234 -0.0074 -0.0240 -0.0226 0.0220 0.0011 -0.0245 -0.0141
Source: Author’s calculations.
Pre-tax incomes defined as gross market income + all transfers received.
7Equivalent Pre-tax incomes, weighting by household size.
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C.4 Data sources for the international comparison
C.4.1 Direct tax rates
• US, UK and France: Piketty and Saez (2007).
• Sweden: Bengtsson et al. (2015)
C.4.2 Direct taxes and transfers
• EU-15 countries: Immervoll et al. (2007).
• Other-OECD countries: Wang and Caminada (2011).
C.4.3 Tax-benefit systems
• Argentina (2006): Cornia et al. (2011).
• Brazil (2009): Lustig (2011).
• Chile (2003): Jorratt (2010).
• Colombia (2003): Barreix et al. (2006).
• Mexico (2000): Goñi et al. (2011).
• Uruguay (2005): Roca (2010).
• US (1982-2009): Congressional Budget Office (2012).
• UK (1977-2009): Barnard et al. (2011).
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D.1 Homogenization of databases for the discrepancy
analysis
In this methodological appendix I explain the adjustments undertaken to make
the survey and the tax data comparable.
1. The population in both databases is not completely coincident. My unit of
analysis is the taxpayer, obligated both to pay tax and to file a return. I have
thus modified in this sense the structure of the data in the HBSs, where the
focus is on the household, and excluded both individuals who filed only
to obtain refunds of excessive withholding (and paid no net tax) and those
with incomes under the threshold that legally required filing (who had very
small participation in total tax paid).1
2. Type of return: when the tax was created, the taxpayer unit was the family,
and thus all members receiving incomes should make a joint tax return.
This feature was modified after mobilization by high-income families with
two income-earners, who would pay significantly lower tax if allowed to
file separately. They won this case in 1988, and thus starting in that fiscal
year couples have the option to file independently or jointly. The first choice
is rational for those over a certain threshold of income, and where the share
of the second earner is significant. This has been simulated in the HBS for
1990, replicating the information in the tax data. However, to ensure an
1The limit of this obligation was 300,000 pesetas in 1982 and 900,000 pesetas in 1990. It is
noteworthy that these thresholds did not coincide with the non-taxable minimum, which did
not exist as such until 1988, and was 648,000 pesetas in 1990. An additional problem arises in
1990, when imputed incomes from the owner’s house were not to be considered for this limit, but
cannot be distinguished in the IEF data.
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homogeneous exercise over the years, married couples filing separately in
1990 have been merged into one observation.
3. Types of incomes: the fiscal database would allow us to further distinguish
among self-employment regarding the type of tax base estimation proce-
dure (namely accountancy-based or presumptive), but this is not possible in
the HBSs; as well as the separation of movable and fixed capital incomes.2
4. We do not have information on pensions received in 1982 in the survey data.
Therefore...
(a) For the aggregate discrepancy, I add pensions to the denominator, with
information from Ministerio de Trabajo (1991) (first, I have subtracted
22% as an approximation of the part corresponding to households un-
der the income threshold, from Bandrés, 1993). Without doing this,
the labour and total ratios would be over-estimated (at 86% and 63%
respectively).
(b) For the discrepancy by levels, pensioners have been dropped from
the tax data, so the comparison refers exclusively to active popula-
tion. In any case, during the first years after the introduction of the
tax there was certain discussion as to whether public benefits should
be included in the base, which was finally set at the supreme national
court: unemployment and disability pensions were excluded in 1983
and 1986 respectively, while regular old age pensions were subject to
tax. Recall, however, that these revenues were paid by the state and
withheld at source, so fraud in them is not expected.
5. Negative values in self-employment and capital incomes in the 1982 tax
data have been changed to 0 before the comparison, to avoid potential bias
given that there are no negative values in the HBS observations.
6. In order to obtain averages for the filing population, the HBS sample has
been re-weighted to match the characteristics of the tax data sample, with
respect to region, marital status and labour market status.
2In 1990 capital incomes have some disaggregation in the HBS. It is, however, not fully coin-
cident with the fiscal definition, because mortgages paid cannot be distinguished and deducted
from imputed rents from owner-occupied housing. Therefore, compliance in movable capital
would be over-estimated and the opposite effect would be true for fixed capital.
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7. The averages are then calculated over all observations in each income-region
category. This means that partial non-reporting of certain incomes is sub-
sumed with their under-reporting. The alternative procedure, using only
the observations with each kind of income, would entail assuming that par-
tial non-reporting is non-existent.
D.2 Alternative discrepancy: by income levels
In the text, discrepancy by income levels has been obtained as a result of a com-
position effect, after comparing the means for type-region combinations. Earlier
works on the sort, however, calculated the compliance ratios directly comparing
the means of type-level combinations, thus assuming that there is no re-ranking
as a result of income under-reporting. This is the case of Fiorio and D’Amuri
(2005), whose calculation corresponds to:
Csj =
YRsj
YSsj
(D.1)
where Csj stands for compliance ratio of income source s at income level j, YR
represents average income reported in the tax returns and YS average income re-
ported in the HBSs. Csj is expected to be lower than one, indicating the existence
of evasion.
The results of these calculations, by deciles, are shown in figure D.1. They display
something like a U shape for self-employment, and also for capital incomes in
1990. The total tax base is not shown to be significantly under-reported for any
income level in 1990 (presumably a result of the previously mentioned under-
adjustment in the HBS).
This procedure would be unreliable in the presence of significant re-ranking: if
taxpayers get ordered differently because of their reporting behaviour, to the ex-
tent that they changed their quantile, it is not consistent to compare the two dis-
tributions directly. Such was the motivation of the Matsaganis et al. (2010) ap-
proach. The extent of re-ranking and the validity of the assumptions underlying
both procedures rests, however, unknown. Reality probably lies somewhere in
between.
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FIGURE D.1: Estimated compliance ratios by income deciles à la Fio-
rio & d’Amuri
Source: author’s calculations with IEF panel data and HBSs (re-weighted). Fol-
lowing Fiorio & d’Amuri (2005).
Total compliance is not visible in the graph in 1990, since it is estimated at 100% for all levels (see text
about the under-estimation of incomes in the survey).
D.3 Variable definitions
Table D.1 shows the definition of the income variables from the IEF panel in terms
of the fields in the original database. The “narrow” definition is only possible in
2001, and is applied in an alternative calculation in order to estimate a wider
concept of evasion-and-base-voidening (see section D.5). In 1982 and 1990 there
are no reductions of incomes available in the original micro-data.3
D.4 Summary statistics of variables
Table D.2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions.
3In legal terms, the concept applied originally to calculate the tax base was the ‘Rendimiento
Neto’ (income net from obtainment expenses), and not, as later on would be the ‘Rendimiento Neto
Reducido’, where additional reductions had been granted. This does not mean that in the 1982 tax
there were no tax base reductions, but these were not specific to the income components before
the calculation of the tax base.
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TABLE D.2: Summary statistics of variables
1982
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tax credit 96 1,811 0 210,000
Donations 642 12,072 0 1,400,000
Labour income 889,072 689,260 0 3,08E+07
Movable capital income 60,768 372,551 0 5,33E+07
Fixed capital income 27,478 182,627 0 4,59E+07
Self-employment income 89,185 463,205 0 5,45E+07
Other incomes 7,915 206,139 0 3,93E+07
Negative incomes -14,189 96,495 -2,52E+07 0
Married 0.76 0.43 0 1
Pensioner 0.03 0.16 0 1
Dependants 1.25 1.35 0 10
Taxdiff* -298 126,467 -6,345,692 1,04E+07
Disability 0.03 0.17 0 1
Housing investment 52,022 186,870 0 7,750,000
Wealth 0.01 0.08 0 1
Citysize1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Citysize2 0.04 0.20 0 1
Citysize3 0.09 0.29 0 1
Citysize4 0.19 0.40 0 1
Effective taxpayer** 0.92 0.27 0 1
2001
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tax credit 5.65 95.28 0 1.22E+05
Donations 28.26 476.42 0 6.10E+05
Labour income 17,397.87 30,922.56 0 5.43E+07
Movable capital income 972.36 10,830.52 0 1.71E+07
Fixed capital income 653.51 3,446.79 0 6.74E+05
Self-employment income 2,446.83 12,356.13 0 2.82E+06
Other incomes 1,152.11 33,488.74 0 1.67E+07
Negative incomes -60.95 1,386.54 -1.41E+06 0
Married 0.69 0.46 0 1
Female 0.34 0.47 0 1
Age 45.15 14.82 16 100
Dependants (allowance) 1,875.42 2,305.81 0 38,014.00
Taxdiff* -203.41 7,048.98 -4.50E+05 6.47E+06
Housing investment 2,460.98 3,546.78 0 1.20E+05
Joint return 0.30 0.46 0 1
Wealth 0.16 0.37 0 1
Citysize1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Citysize2 0.04 0.19 0 1
Citysize3 0.08 0.27 0 1
Citysize4 0.16 0.36 0 1
Effective taxpayer** 0.90 0.30 0 1
Source: author’s calculations. All incomes are defined in positive terms,
with the negatives aggregated in a specific variable (see equations). Sev-
eral of these variables are used in their logged form in the estimations.
The unit is pesetas in 1982, and euros in 2001.
* Taxdiff is the tax differential (tax due - total withholdings) before the application of the tax
credit for donations (see text).
** Effective taxpayer signals returns with positive tax due (this is shown for informational
purposes, since it is not included in the estimations).
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D.5 Donation equation models
Table D.3 presents the donation equation models that have been run. The text
shows the results of my preferred estimation, together with those of the ‘Cen-
sored OLS’ approach (always using the preferred sample definition).
TABLE D.3: Models and samples used
SAMPLE ESTIMATION STRATEGY ROBUSTNESS
Original Censored OLS Pensions as only reliable category (2001)
Restricted Two-step: Probit + nl* Narrowly-defined incomes (2001)
Adjusted* Tobit Quadratic term in k (2001)
Heckman (direct) Separating deciles 1-5, 6-10
Notes: preferred results marked with *. All estimations strategies have been run for all sam-
ples, for each year.
Sample definitions: the restricted sample excludes observations with reported donations over the legal deduction limit
(which was established as a percentage of the tax base). The adjusted sample imputes these a donation equal to the
maximum allowed.
The robustness estimations generally serve to confirm our main conclusions. The
equation with only pensions as reference (only 2001) did not yield significant
non-compliance for wages, while the coefficients for other income sources did
not change with respect to the baseline.
The model with narrow definitions of income (only 2001) was meant to aim for
a wider concept of tax-evasion-and-base-voidening, which would include the ef-
fects of all reductions in the tax base. It did not, however, yield results signifi-
cantly different from the baseline estimation.
Looking for different compliance behaviours across the income scale in any given
income source, I have performed estimations with quadratic terms in k, as ex-
plored by Feldman and Slemrod (2007). These equations provide some evidence
of quadratic positive effects for fixed capital and self-employment incomes (but
the one-step regression failed to converge). The separation of the observations
into two groups according to income deciles entailed obtaining higher under-
reporting estimates for the top group (with the lower group only having percep-
tible fraud in movable capital, and self-employment just at the 10% level). This
would mean that our estimations of the regressive effect of tax evasion would be
a lower bound (because they are obtained imputing the same behaviour to tax-
payers in all income levels). Nevertheless, most of the taxpayers with donations
are found in deciles 6-10, so the reliability of the bottom group is rather low.
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Appendices to Chapter 5
E.1 Sources
1. Archival sources
• Archivo Central del Ministerio de Hacienda
• Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados
• Archivo del Partido Comunista de España
• Archivo de la Fundación Conferencia Anual Francisco Fernández Or-
dóñez
• Archivo General de la Administración
2. Press
• Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Nacional de España
• Hemerotecas online de El País y ABC
3. Electoral data: from the website of the Junta Electoral Central, in: http://
www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/elecciones/generales.
This has been complemented with population data from INE (Estimaciones
intercensales).
4. Surveys: see table E.1.
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